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Those with any imagination and 
understanding are filled with doubt 
and indecision.
–Bertrand Russell, New Hopes for a Changing World1
This is, in many respects, an anti-book. Books have a clear, unitary 
central message. The message is set out clearly in the opening chapter; 
seen growing up, fighting off rivals and doing all kinds of good deeds 
in a series of episodes in the middle; and then triumphantly restated at 
the end. Books come from certainty and self-confidence: the world is 
simpler than you thought! Anti-books, on the other hand, grow from 
critical self-reflection, compromise, and doubt. They cross and re-cross 
a complex landscape, trying to see its features from as many angles as 
possible, pointing out commonalities and false friends, abandoning one 
path and trying another. Their central message, if there is one at all, 
cannot be summarised in a sentence, but perhaps emerges, unsuspected, 
from an entanglement of detailed local engagements. It is a set of value 
commitments as much as a claim. 
In 2016 I realised, with some alarm, that I had been working for over 
twenty years (twenty years!) at the interface between the biological and 
the social sciences, trying to cross the gulf that still tends to separate 
those two great human endeavours. What conclusions did I have from 
all this effort? None clear enough, right now, for a book; but plenty for 
an anti-book. I had been downcast for years that where other people 
had grand, bold theories or sweeping claims to make their names 
1  Russell, B. (1951). New Hopes for a Changing World (London: Allen & Unwin, p. 5). 
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with, I did not. I had a lot of reading and thinking behind me; a lot 
of experimentation with different methods and ideas, without entirely 
nailing my colours to any of them; a lot of ‘both sides have useful 
things to contribute’ sentiments; a lot of reasonably good-humoured 
scepticism; and a great deal of respect for the craft. Running through all 
this was a diffuse sense of slight disappointment: in private moments, I 
could see that none of the theories espoused out there in the literature, 
especially those espoused by me, quite lived up to their promise. The 
big breakthrough had not quite come. When was I going to discover 
my gift?
It was only latterly that I realised: disappointment, good-humoured 
scepticism and the ability to see something valuable on both sides are 
gifts, of a sort. At any rate, if they’re what you’ve got, they’re what 
you’ve got. I resolved to reflect on human nature in a way that did 
not suggest closure, overstatement or facile answers, yet still offered 
something useful beyond the status quo. More than that, I wanted 
to find a way of writing more honestly about the academic life. The 
published record of books and papers airbrushes out a lot of the true 
nature of this life. Generally, the more influential and prestigious the 
publication, the more severe the airbrushing is. Readers can see only 
the tiny subset of thoughts and experiences that makes it through 
the filtering and signalling processes usually involved in publication. 
The quotidian mass of unpublished rumination is less cocksure, more 
imaginative, and in some important sense, truer. The excision of all the 
doubt and exploration from the final product both biases the scientific 
record, and gives novice scholars a completely unrealistic sense of what 
the academic life is really like. I have here tried to find a way of writing 
that is more open, more like an authentic conversation, than academic 
papers generally allow for. Over the course of the writing of this book, 
the search for the authentic voice became part of the substance as well 
as the style. As such, I hope the reader will forgive me an informality of 
tone, a periodic recourse to flippancy, and a certain self-involvement, in 
what follows. 
Hanging on to the Edges consists of fourteen essays, written in 2016, 
2017 and 2018, and originally published separately on my website.2 My 
2  www.danielnettle.org.uk
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intention was that each essay could be read in a single sitting (ignoring 
the footnotes unless you are keen to follow up sources), and each would 
stand alone. There are, however, plenty of connections between them if 
you want to make them. They are organized into three groups. Part I is a 
set of critical journeys through the current terrain of the human sciences. 
Respectively, these examine the recurrent tendency for researchers to 
over-claim for their theories (How my theory explains everything); the 
pernicious and persistent maintenance of a false distinction between 
the ‘social’ and the ‘biological’ (What we talk about when we talk about 
biology); the continuum from social theories that see humans as too self-
determining and independent-minded, to those that don’t see them as 
self-determining and independent-minded enough (The cultural and 
the agentic); the perils of conceiving of culture as something like DNA 
and its change as something like natural selection (What is cultural 
evolution like?); and finally, the whole question of what a theory is, and 
what a good one would look like in the case of human behaviour (Is it 
explanation yet?). 
Part II turns to the topic of poverty, particularly the consequences 
of poverty within affluent societies. This is one of my main specialist 
interests, and a topic to which the human sciences must turn with 
renewed vigour. Poor people know what it means to be hanging on to 
the edges, in many different ways. Just as the experience of poverty is 
insufficiently discussed, researchers struggle to conceptualise the causes 
and consequences of poverty in sensible ways. Thus, these essays deal 
as much with how to theorise about poverty as the empirical reality of 
what poverty is like. The mill that grinds young people old examines the 
link between poverty and ageing, and begins to raise my general claim 
that the behaviours of poor people typically make pretty good sense 
given the conditions under which they have to live. Why inequality is 
bad argues that economic inequality is bad for well-being, though not 
necessarily for the reason people usually say. Let them eat cake! considers 
the role of hunger in the consequences of poverty, arguing that before 
we turn to more abstruse and symbolic arguments, we consider the 
visceral: poor people in affluent societies simply can’t afford to eat well, 
and this could explain a lot. The worst thing about poverty is not having 
enough money argues, as its title suggests, that our explanations for the 
behaviour of poor people should start not with their intrinsic traits, 
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culture, or life skills, but with the elephant in the room: their scarcity 
of material resources. Evidential support for this argument comes from 
what happens when this material scarcity is lifted, even if that uplift 
is completely at random. Finally in part II, Getting your head around the 
Universal Basic Income examines the case for that particular form of social 
transfer, focussing both on its potential advantages and the intuitive 
reasons people find it problematic. 
In part III, I return to the academic life, its institutional organization, 
and how one might navigate its shoals. I have always been an advocate of 
inter-disciplinarity, and this is the subject matter of the first two essays. 
In The need for discipline, I try, with more success than I anticipated, to 
force myself into the view that specialist disciplines have value and 
transmit useful skills. In Waking up and going out to work in the uncanny 
valley, I reflect on the difficulties of doing inter-disciplinary work for a 
living, relating this to the categorical proclivities of the human mind. 
The penultimate essay, Staying in the game, is a slightly battle-scarred 
reflection on how to survive in academia. The final essay, Morale is 
high (since I gave up hope) links the personal search for the good life 
to the broader difficulties swirling around science, which concern 
reproducibility and incentives for discovering truth. 
For all I have said about this being an anti-book, there is a positive 
vision for the human sciences in there somewhere, albeit not spelled 
out in capital letters. I believe in the eventual unity of all knowledge. I 
believe in the capacity of science to discover the truth about the world, 
including about this extraordinary, self-conscious ape, and the various 
ways his social life on this planet might be organised. To realise its 
potential, science will need to be done rather better than it currently 
is. I look forward to a world where researchers entertain ideas without 
building fiefdoms; keep their ears and minds open; treat each other 
with courtesy and respect; seek out the places where their ideas and 
knowledge break down rather than comfortable confirmation of what 
they already believe; and admit when they don’t know, or are wrong. 
This is also a world where we academics studiously avoid the traps of 
ordinary-language dichotomies and institutionalised ways of thinking; 
apply ourselves willingly to problems that really affect human well-
being; are prepared to advocate certain social arrangements over others 
where we feel that our knowledge warrants doing so; and assume as 
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much humanity and nuance in the lives of people different from us 
(other classes, other cultures, other times) as we do in our own. That is 
a world worth working for. 
In closing, let me read to you from a letter written by the great Paul 
Feyerabend to the future readers of his final book.3 The letter was never 
used in that book, but was discovered on a floppy disk (remember 
those?) after Feyerabend’s death. He writes:
In a few pages, you will find a story written in a style you may be familiar 
with. There are facts and generalizations therefrom, there are arguments 
and there are lots of footnotes. In other words, you will find a (perhaps 
not very outstanding) example of a scholarly essay. Let me therefore 
warn you that it is not my intention to inform, or establish some truth. 
What I want to do is change your attitude. 
I can think of no better introduction to Hanging on to the Edges.
3  The letter is reproduced in Ian Hacking’s introduction to the fourth edition of 
Feyerabend’s Against Method: Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge (New York: 
Verso, 2010, p. xv). 

PART ONE
1. How my theory explains everything: 
and can make you happier, healthier, 
and wealthier
One has consistently to think against 
oneself — to make matters as difficult 
for oneself as one can.
–Jon Elster1
The quintessence of science is doubt. In other kinds of belief systems, 
the statements held to be true are hardened into dogma, declared as 
absolute and certain. In science, they are held provisionally, constantly 
questioned, continually refined and replaced. At any moment, new 
observations or reasoning will lead to them being qualified, revised or 
thrown out entirely. In dogmatic belief systems, all our epistemic effort 
is directed towards the confirmatory instances of what we believe; see, 
I went to sacred waterfall yesterday, and today my cold is better. In 
science, by contrast, all our epistemic effort is directed to the anomalies; 
the cases where the prediction is not met; where the theory breaks 
down; the puzzling inconsistencies that help reject incorrect claims or 
stimulate the development of a whole new paradigm.
This is fine, and so far, uncontroversial. But I spend a lot of my time 
reading what scientists write, and I have to ask myself: why, then, do 
they seem so damned sure of themselves? Where is all this doubt that 
is supposed to be so great? Did these people not get the memo about 
the Enlightenment? It seems like doubt hardly gets a look-in in your 
average scientific paper or book. If it appears at all, it is mainly levelled 
at other people’s claims. At best it plays cameo parts: for example in 
the opening section or two, clearing the stage of clutter for the author’s 
grand proposal to enter. And grand it is: here is my paradigm, here is 
what we have shown, here are all the things my theory can do. Come 
into my camp; what we have in here is good. In other words, individual 
1  Elster, J. (2007). Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social 
Sciences (New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 13), https://doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9781107763111
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bits of scientific rhetoric look uncomfortably unlike how science is 
supposed to work, and awfully like how persuasion is done in non-
scientific realms. 
§
The overplaying of one’s own correctness, and the underplaying of 
doubt, have a number of different flavours. In empirical papers published 
in the primary scientific literature, the principal flavour consists of 
finding a positive result, building the paper around it, and discussing it 
as if it definitely represented a real and important generalization about 
life. By ‘positive’ here, we usually mean some pattern that can have 
a statistician’s p-value attached to it, preferably a rather small one. A 
small p-value is taken to mean that the said difference or association 
is unlikely to be due to chance, and hence represents an important 
discovery about the world. The problems with this way of reasoning are 
well documented. For a start, there is a good argument that ‘significant’ 
p-values do represent chance in most instances. Hang on, you say, the 
p-value is defined as the probability that the result is due to chance; so 
if p is small, then chance is an unlikely explanation. But here it pays 
to distinguish between the probability of p being small given that the 
finding is false, and the probability that the finding is true given that p 
is small. They are not the same thing. 
To see why, let us say that the discovery of new and surprising things 
about the world is rare. By now that ought to be the case. Anyway, 
studies tend to be small-scale (to be low in what is known as statistical 
power), and so often fail to detect effects even when those effects are 
really there. So if you do experiment after experiment, maybe only one 
in a hundred correctly detects a genuine new and surprising result. 
Fine. But, by definition, one in twenty will produce a p-value less than 
0.05, the usual cut-off for declaring a result ‘significant’. So, for every 
hundred experiments you perform, you will get a ‘significant’ p-value 
about 5 times by chance, and about one time because you have made a 
genuine discovery. So, 5 out of every 6 ‘significant’ p-values are in fact 
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due to chance. As a very famous paper put it: most published research 
findings are false.2
I have some quibbles with the details of this argument. For a start, 
most published findings are not false. The data are not false. I think 
almost all scientists describe the data honestly. Rather, it is the inference 
that robust truths about the world have been discovered from these 
small p-values that is false in many cases. Also, people do not choose the 
experiments they perform at random, but go where pilot data and other 
information suggests there may be something going on. So the rate of 
true discovery may be higher than the argument implies. And then 
the argument neglects that many of the ‘significant’ p-values reported 
in the social and behavioural sciences are neither due to chance, nor 
discoveries about the world, but just reflect semantics.3 An example 
is the literature on the personality trait of neuroticism as a predictor 
of clinical depression. This is a perfectly serious topic of investigation. 
However, the predictor (personality trait neuroticism) is measured with 
a questionnaire containing questions like ‘Do you often feel blue? ’, and 
the outcome (depression) is measured with a questionnaire containing 
questions like ‘In the last two weeks, have you felt blue? ’. It would 
be an odd world indeed where you didn’t get an association with a 
‘significant’ p-value in a study like this, because the null hypothesis 
(people who say they often feel blue are no more likely than anyone else 
to say they have felt blue in the last two weeks) is somewhat nonsensical. 
Its failure doesn’t tell you much about humans beyond, perhaps, a basic 
capacity for self-consistency. It tells you more about the semantics of the 
questionnaires. But certainly this ‘finding’ is not a falsehood.
These quibbles aside, the general burden of the criticism holds. A 
small p-value does not mean that anything has been demonstrated that 
is repeatable. The picture is in fact rather worse than I have suggested 
so far. This is because of ‘researcher degrees of freedom’. Basically, for 
any reasonably complex dataset, there are several different statistical 
analyses that could be performed. For example, there may be several 
slightly different choices for the outcome measure; several nuisance 
2  Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2005). Why most published research findings are false. PLoS 
Medicine 2: 0696–0701, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.0040215
3  Arnulf, J. K. et al. (2014). Predicting survey responses: How and why semantics 
shape survey statistics on organizational behaviour. PLoS ONE 9: e106361, https://
doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0106361
 111. How my theory explains everything
variables that either could or could not be adjusted for; and several 
subsets of the data that could be discussed. As a result, the researcher 
has quite a few different goes at getting than all-important small p-value, 
meaning that the probability of finding one by chance is typically rather 
a lot higher than 0.05.4
An illustration of the power of research degrees of freedom comes 
from a recent study of large clinical trials of treatments and preventative 
interventions for cardiovascular disease.5 Starting in the year 2000, the 
researchers carrying out these trials had to ‘pre-register’ their planned 
analyses in a public database of trial protocols. This means that they 
had to say, in writing for anyone to see, in advance of having looked at 
any data, what the critical comparisons would be, and what they would 
consider to constitute evidence that the intervention had a positive 
effect. Prior to 2000, there had been no requirement to do this; the 
researchers collected their data, analysed their data, and then wrote up 
their papers. To put the following findings into perspective, these trials 
are not two-bit minor research projects. These are large-scale, publicly 
funded, medically important evaluations done by teams of eminent 
clinicians and biomedical scientists. 
Prior to the year 2000, 57% of the trials detected a ‘significant’ benefit 
of the intervention they were studying. After 2000, 8% did. The pre- and 
post-2000 trials did not obviously differ in any other respect than the 
requirement for pre-registration of planned analysis. It could of course 
be the case that human cardiovascular physiology changed in some 
fundamental way around the turn of the millennium, much as Virginia 
Woolf had claimed about human character on or around December 
1910.6 Somehow I doubt it though. 
§
All in all, then, it should be no surprise that when studies in the 
behavioural and life sciences are replicated, we don’t consistently see 
4  Simmons, J. P., L. D. Nelson and U. Simonsohn. (2011). False-positive 
psychology: undisclosed flexibility in data collection and analysis allows 
presenting anything as significant. Psychological Science 22: 1359–66, https://doi.
org/10.1177/0956797611417632
5  Kaplan, R. M., and V. L. Irvin. (2015). Likelihood of null effects of large NHLBI 
clinical trials has increased over time. PLoS ONE 10: 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pone.0132382 
6  Woolf, V. (1924). Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown (London: The Hogarth Press). 
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the patterns reported in the originals; the patterns argued so confidently 
to be real and to be a vindication of this or that theory.7 A great deal has 
been written about this recently. It makes uncomfortable reading. The 
scales are falling from our eyes. 
As consumers of science, we have to shift our focus from thinking 
about individual findings as instruments of truth, and instead thinking 
in terms of a slowly-evolving population of findings.8 If one study finds 
that eating broccoli is statistically associated with less depression, that’s 
not news. Once the population of scientific studies starts to contain 
finding after finding associating, in diverse ways, broccoli with reduced 
depression, that starts to be something interesting; maybe even heading 
for knowledge counter. Even once there it will continue to be dissected 
and its causal basis probed. It’s important for the media to understand 
that the development of knowledge is a gradual, population process, 
else it looks from the headlines like science is changing its mind all the 
time. This invites a kind of scepticism and hostility about the whole 
enterprise. Say I am trying to work out the proportion of cars on the 
roads that are red. Imagine if I issued a press release when I have 
observed a red car: ‘Study finds that all cars are red!’. Then researchers 
at a rival university could do a debunking study. They observe a car. 
It’s not red. ‘Study finds that no cars are red. Earlier study was flawed!’. 
Both parties increase their scientific visibility. But the truth is: neither 
study is decisive (that’s why science is hard); and yet every decent study 
very slightly increases the precision of our collective knowledge (that’s 
why science works). 
§
What interests me the most is not the near-universal over-selling that 
goes on in scientific papers describing the results of primary empirical 
studies. It is the programmatic over-selling you find when academics 
write their ‘big idea piece’, or BIP. The BIP is often a book, or more 
rarely, a long-form discursive article. If a book, it may be aimed at a 
7  Open Science Collaboration. (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological 
science. Science 349: aac4716, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aac4716 
8  McElreath, R., and P. E. Smaldino. (2015). Replication, communication, and the 
population dynamics of scientific discovery. PLoS ONE 10: e0136088, https://doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pone.0136088 
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more general audience than just the few research specialists in the field; 
the so-called ‘popular’ or ‘trade’ book. It’s the author’s chance to cement 
their position in the minds of the community; to recruit future devotees; 
to make their mark. (By the way, the pronouns in the preceding sentence 
are not grammatical errors, but none other than ‘singular they’, the 
American Dialect Society’s word of the year for 2015. ‘Singular they’ 
will henceforth be used throughout this book. And by the other way, let 
me pre-empt your inevitable thought: I am as guilty as anyone else of 
the sins to be described below.) 
The BIP has a recurrent four-act structure.
Act One: There are huge problems to be solved. The science is in 
disarray. Our existing theories are bad or incomplete.
Act Two: Heroically, through alarms and excursions, I’ve come up 
with this theory. It overturns the bad theories and completes the 
incomplete ones. It solves the problems. Here are some arguments 
in its favour.
Act Three: Here is another thing my theory is good at. And another. 
The good things about my theory go beyond the problem I set out to 
solve. Within a broad domain, it is quite possibly the long-awaited 
theory of everything. 
Act Four: You can apply my theory to life. Unification of the sciences? 
My theory. Economic uncertainty? My theory. Unlucky in love? 
You’ve guessed it. 
We can know these acts by nick-names, each of which tells you what the 
problem is. They sound like the syllabus for a class on bad reasoning: 
Act One: The straw man 
Act Two: The great man view of history 
Act Three: Confirmation bias
Act Four: If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail 
The BIP is, more or less, a systematic over-statement of the relative 
merits of the position the author is peddling. I say relative merits, 
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because not only is the author’s position inappropriately bigged up; the 
alternatives are inappropriately belittled too. It is not enough for my 
theory to succeed; others must fail. Usually, the existing theories are 
mis-represented to the point of denying their daily successes and the 
valid insights on which they were based. There is a tendency here to go 
for the tall poppies. Presumably you get more points for flaying a big 
theory than a little one. The favourite target of all seems to be the biggest: 
Darwin’s theory of evolution. As John Welch has recently pointed out, 
there is a quite a cottage industry of setting out to declare Darwin’s 
theory fundamentally inadequate/incomplete/incorrect, usually as Act 
One to the author’s own BIP.9 
You can see why. If you start out by saying: ‘evolutionary theory is 
basically fine as far as it goes, but I want to talk about phenomenon X 
somewhere in the world of living things’, then you are just a worker at 
the mill. You pay the rent but don’t get your picture on the cover of Nature 
magazine. If you start out by saying: Darwin’s theory fundamentally 
requires refinement/completion/replacement (by the thing I want 
to talk about), then you are an intellectual giant-killer, and people 
pay attention. But some of the claims that follow can be a little over-
cooked. Often they present a phenomenon that is, directly or indirectly, 
the outcome of genetic evolution as if it challenged our fundamental 
understanding of the process of genetic evolution. You may have seen 
examples: Richard Dawkins says evolution is all about selfish genes, 
but what about mutualism/mirror neurons/mariachi music? They’re 
really important! Evolutionary theory as we know it can’t be right! It’s 
not that mutualism/mirror neurons/mariachi music aren’t interesting or 
important, of course. Nonetheless, I can’t read this kind of BIP without 
the image coming to my mind of a philosopher of science, somewhere 
across the world, weeping quietly in order not to wake their spouse.
Whereas in Act One, all other theories are caricatured and over-
criticized, in Act Two, the author’s own big idea is suspiciously free of 
problems. It accumulates credit for things that are indeed consistent with 
it, but are probably consistent with many other theories too. And then 
we only get to visit the cases that show it to its best advantage. The odd 
thing here is that the author ought rationally to believe that their own 
9  Welch, J. J. (2016). What’s wrong with evolutionary biology?. Biology & Philosophy 
32: 263–79, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-016-9557-8
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theory, too, is likely to turn out false. Philosophers even have a name for 
this reasonable inference: the pessimistic meta-induction.10 The grounds 
for the pessimistic meta-induction go like this: the vast majority of 
explanatory beliefs about the world that humans, including scientists, 
have entertained through our history have turned out to be wrong. 
So faced with a new one, a reasonable being’s assumption should be 
that it too will turn out to be wrong. We should thus entertain a certain 
detachment and vigilance toward it. Yes, it could be interesting, worth 
thinking about, but at least in the current form, it’s probably wrong and 
it’s not going to be around for very long. The authors of BIPs are good 
at applying the pessimistic meta-induction to all the other theories; they 
just can’t take the extra step and apply it to their own. 
In some cases, Acts Three and Four become comical: the second 
half as farce. In Act Three, The Theory, extended further and further 
beyond any basis it had in the technical literature, becomes more and 
more under-specified, under-evidenced and under-grounded. It’s 
not even a promissory note. It’s a vague promise to meet you with an 
important package at some unspecified time in the future in a pub near 
Chingford. But by this point the author is three months late with their 
manuscript and subsisting on a diet of their own rhetoric. And then Act 
Four. You can almost hear the literary agent: ‘Well, they like it, but it’s a 
bit academic. It has a better chance of breaking through if readers could 
see how to apply it to their daily lives. Could you put in a chapter about 
how to make practical use of your big idea in internet dating/choosing a 
pension plan/promoting world peace? After all, we’ve got a big advance 
to pay off’.
This is not how science ought to work, is it? Surely the BIP should be 
a little bit about (a) the common features of different existing intellectual 
approaches to a problem, with a view to how they can be synthesised; 
and a lot about (b) the failures of our current understanding: the 
10  See Doppelt, G. (2007). Reconstructing scientific realism to rebut the pessimistic 
meta-induction. Philosophy of Science 74: 96–118, https://doi.org/10.1086/520685. 
Note that in the philosophy of science, the pessimistic meta-induction is discussed 
as an argument against the realist view of science (that is, the view that science can 
gradually come to approximate the objective truth about the world). I am using it 
in a more informal and uncontentious sense: that a lot of individual scientific ideas 
have turned out to be wrong. 
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anomalies, the failed predictions, the problems, the things that don’t yet 
fit. That’s where the scientific action is. 
§
The reasons why BIPs over-state their cases do not seem too difficult 
to understand. Do we need to point to anything more than ordinary 
human self-interest? People want to get their papers published. They 
want their grants funded. They want status. They want their book 
to make a stir. And a few of the best ‘popular’ or ‘trade’ books about 
science have made their authors surprisingly large amounts of money. 
So we have a perfect incentive set for ambitious writers and thinkers to 
over-sell their wares. What else would we expect them to do?
There’s been a lot written lately about changing the incentive structure 
of science, for example so that the acceptance of data for publication 
does not depend on the size of the p-value. This obviously makes sense. 
It will make it harder to ignore anomalies and negative replications, 
and that in turn will allow more airtime for appropriate doubt. But it 
will not eliminate the BIP-problem (if we decide that it is a problem, a 
question to which I will return). BIPs are typically statements of broad 
theories or paradigms. In the human sciences at least, broad theories or 
paradigms seldom make individual ‘line-in-the-sand’ predictions that 
can be decisively judged to have failed. They make meta-predictions: I 
predict that it will prove more useful in approaching a topic you wish 
to study if you use my framework to make your predictions, than if you 
don’t use my framework. And it’s obviously hard to defeat this meta-
prediction: maybe the meta-prediction is false, maybe you just didn’t 
use the framework correctly (yet). And who knows what it would have 
looked like if you had used a different framework anyway? So there’s 
plenty of wiggle-room for writers of BIPs to construct cases for their pet 
theories, and scope for ailing big ideas to persist. 
Anyway, there may be deep reasons BIPs so often over involve 
over-selling. This is suggested by a recent book, actually itself a BIP, 
Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber’s The Enigma of Reason.11 To explain 
their central thesis, first let us grant that there is a human capacity 
for reasoning, which is, roughly speaking, the capacity to produce 
11  Mercier, H. and D. Sperber. (2017). The Enigma of Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press). 
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and evaluate reasons for beliefs and actions. This capacity is central 
to the possibility of science. Mercier and Sperber review decades of 
psychological research showing, pretty unanimously, that human 
reasoning is systematically biased. Importantly, this is not just true in 
science, but across a broad range of contexts, everyday as well as arcane. 
Specifically, human reasoning often shows evidence of 
‘me-sidedness’. Individuals find it easy to accumulate reasons for, 
and hard to find reasons against, things they are anyway disposed to 
believe intuitively. When it comes to things they want to believe, they 
will accept relatively weak reasons for doing so; indeed, when asked 
to generate reasons for their actions and beliefs, their initial offerings 
are typically weak and superficial. Only when really pushed by other 
people will they come up with better ones. By contrast, when evaluating 
beliefs or actions that other people find intuitive, but they themselves 
have no strong intuitions about, they take a more balanced view of the 
pros and cons. They evaluate other people’s reasons in a much more 
demanding way than they generate their own. 
Common experience tells us that me-sidedness in reasoning is 
very widespread, but it has taken some experimental deviousness 
to demonstrate it directly. In one ingenious set of experiments, 
participants selected answers to some logic problems, and gave reasons 
for their answers.12 The problems were of a kind that has an undeniably 
correct answer, but not one so obvious that everyone sees it straight 
off. In a second phase, the participants were given the (different to 
their own) answers and reasons of another participant, to see if they 
accepted these and wished to change their own conclusion. Here’s the 
deviousness, though: in one condition, the answer and reason of the 
‘other participant’ was in fact their own answer and their own reason, 
whilst the one attributed to themselves was actually that of someone 
else. Many participants failed to detect this, because the critical switch 
was hidden in a number of non-switched problems. Anyway, these 
problems were unfamiliar, and participants were unlikely to have 
any settled views on them such that they immediately recognised the 
departure from their own position.
12  Trouche, E. et al. (2016). The selective laziness of reasoning. Cognitive Science 40: 
2122–36, https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12303
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What were the results? First, people got the problems wrong quite 
a lot of the time (the problems had of course been chosen to produce 
this outcome). Second, when invited to reason about their own initial 
answers, they easily generated weak and superficial reasons in favour 
of them. In fact, giving the participants more time to reason about their 
answers did not lead to them switching their initial answers very often at 
all, even when their initial answers were wrong. Reason, applied to the 
responses they knew to be their own, just tended to confirm whatever 
they had intuited anyway, even when it was bad. Third, and most 
importantly, when they re-evaluated their own answers and reasons 
believing them to be someone else’s, they thought quite critically about 
them. In fact, they rejected them as invalid slightly more often than not. 
Reassuringly, rejection was particularly likely if their answer had in 
fact been wrong. Nonetheless, the force of the result stands. These were 
answers and reasons that they themselves had in fact generated about five 
minutes earlier. When they thought they were justifications of their own 
intuitions, the participants thought the arguments were fine. When they 
thought they were justifications of someone else’s intuitions, they were 
appropriately and effectively sceptical. 
The experiments described above uncovered me-sidedness in 
reasoning by making the person’s own arguments appear as if they 
were someone else’s. The converse sleight of hand—making someone 
else’s arguments appear as if they were one’s own—has also been 
done.13 Me-sidedness suggests that people will like theories more just 
because they feel that their own intuitions have led to them, and this 
is exactly what the experiments showed. Participants were introduced 
to material about an alien planet, and to a theory about the behaviour 
of two species of fictional creature on this planet. They rated their 
degree of belief in the theory. The theory seemed initially plausible 
on the information given, but more and more facts were gradually 
uncovered until the theory started to seem unlikely. The experimental 
manipulation was chillingly simple: in one condition, the theory 
and discoveries were attributed to an ‘Alex’, who was presented as 
a researcher finding out about the planet. In the other condition, the 
13  Gregg, A. P., N. Mahadevan and C. Sedikides. (2017). The SPOT effect: People 
spontaneously prefer their own theories. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology 70: 996–1010, https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2015.1099162
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same theory and discoveries were attributed to ‘you’ (the participant). 
And guess what: the participants rated the theory as more likely to be 
true just because it was suggested that they themselves had come up 
with it. This remained the case once the contrary reasons started to pile 
in; though reassuringly, the participants in both conditions showed a 
decline in belief as more counter-evidence accumulated. Between them, 
these results seem clear, and are corroborated by many other findings. 
We like our own intuitions and positions, and will accept pretty weak 
reasons for them; whereas we are sceptical and demanding about other 
people’s intuitions and positions. 
These facts about reasoning constitute something of a puzzle. The 
classical view of reasoning is that its function is to help the thinker 
find true beliefs and adopt right actions. It’s a distinctively human 
adaptation for making each individual better at discovering the truth 
about their world. On this view, the ubiquity of ‘me-sidedness’ looks 
like a daft flaw. Here we are with this great telescope, but we usually use 
it with a rose-tinted lens on it. Mercier and Sperber argue, though, that 
the original and typical function of reasoning is not for the purpose of 
solitary, internal truth-finding. The function of reasoning is to persuade 
others, in order to facilitate social interaction. 
We humans coordinate our actions with other individuals to 
a remarkable extent, often for mutual benefit. It’s hard to do that 
effectively given that individuals typically have different preferences, 
needs, expectations and experiences. These preferences, needs, and 
expectations are, within each individual, largely generated intuitively. 
We give reasons to each other as a way of bringing about smooth 
coordination and effective collective action. But of course, the interests 
of different individuals in a social group are typically only partially 
aligned. We want the group to coordinate effectively, but we would 
prefer it to coordinate effectively in doing what we want, not what the 
others want. And so reasoning is an adaptive capacity to move the 
intentions and plans of others towards where we already want them to 
be. 
Viewed in this light, me-sidedness is not a design flaw of reasoning, 
but a design feature. Of course reasoning should be good at finding 
arguments in favour of our own positions—that’s what it is for! Of 
course it should be satisfied with the minimal acceptable argument 
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in favour of our own position—we are already persuaded of it! Our 
reasons only need to be good enough to get traction with others, so only 
if other people dispute or reject them do we need to generate better ones. 
But on the other side of the coin, the evaluation of others’ arguments, 
Mercier and Sperber’s position rightly suggests we ought to be quite 
sceptical and demanding. After all, it’s really not in our vital interests 
to go along with other people’s agendas in life docilely. Our interests 
are typically different to theirs, even if both parties are going to gain 
from coordination. We don’t want to be dupes. When other people have 
intentions and courses of action, then, we should evaluate them quite 
carefully, and we should demand decent reasons why that course of 
action rather than another is in fact an appropriate one. 
§
Applying all this to science, of course BIP-authors are going to over-state 
their cases. They are not being cynical, knowingly doing so for financial 
or status reasons. They are giving us the honest output of their—
often impressive—reasoning processes. It’s just that their reasoning 
processes, if Mercier and Sperber are right, are intrinsically prone to 
being me-sided. Thus, as a matter of course, you can expect to find all 
the reasons for the position the author lives with and few of the reasons 
against, alternative positions down-played or used as foils, and a failure 
to tackle difficult counter-examples. At first blush, this all seems rather 
depressing for science. We look to science as the paragon of objectivity, 
but now we end up concluding that scientists are no better, no less 
partisan, than politicians or quacks, and moreover that this is because of 
fundamental design features of human reasoning. But actually, Mercier 
and Sperber’s thesis is not bad news for science. 
For a start, what makes science revolutionary is not that the 
individual scientists are necessarily any better at reasoning than 
politicians or quacks. Why should they be; they are no more and no less 
human. What makes science revolutionary is the way that knowledge-
evaluating processes are socialized. Individuals may often over-claim for 
their positions, but the scientific community has particular norms and 
institutions for counter-acting this: peer review of papers, critical review 
articles, replications, meta-analyses. In other words, the objectivity of 
science is not contained within the heads of the individual scientists who 
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come up with the ideas, but rather is distributed across the community 
of people who review, argue, replicate, test, critique, and teach. In 
evolutionary biology, we are taught that genetic mutation proposes, 
but natural selection decides. In science, intuition plus me-sidedness 
proposes, but the community (eventually) decides, and it decides at 
least to some extent on the basis of evidence and arguments. This is 
why it is so disappointing when the media present ‘the scientists don’t 
agree’ as a reason for dubiousness about some area of science. Of course 
the scientists don’t agree—if they did, they wouldn’t be scientists! But 
here’s the paradox of science: by never agreeing, by always doubting, 
we gradually and collectively come up with beliefs we can all agree on 
and which we do not need to doubt. 
Actually, the reasoning experiments show that people are generally 
quite good at evaluating arguments as long as those arguments are not 
their own. This means that processes like peer review and replication, 
when implemented and executed wisely, will tend to do some good. 
These processes can be frustrating and arbitrary at times. There’s nothing 
worse, when you are just getting going with your own me-sidedness, 
than having to deal with someone else’s me-sidedness! Nonetheless, 
these painful exchanges constitute a critical selective pressure that on 
average improves the level of correctness in the population of beliefs 
that the community currently holds. They drag us very slowly up a 
selection gradient towards knowledge—with all the usual caveats that 
selection is probabilistic, that selection gradients are not uniform, and 
that you can get stuck at local maxima in the landscape. 
Even more than this, the research Mercier and Sperber review shows 
that people will eventually abandon and revise their own positions if 
their reasons for holding them are challenged in a compelling enough 
way. Me-sidedness means people have strong priors in favour of their 
own intuitions, but they are not completely immune to updating their 
intuitions given enough evidence and argumentation. This, Mercier and 
Sperber suggest, leads to a more positive view of the scientific process 
than that contained in Max Planck’s famous claim that: ‘A new scientific 
truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them 
see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die’.14 It 
14  Planck, M. (1950). Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers (New York: Philosophical 
library, pp. 33–4).
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suggests that as long as scientists don’t live in silos, as long as they talk, 
argue, justify their claims to each other, then individuals with a stake 
in the research will at least sometimes change their minds in a way that 
goes from worse beliefs to better ones. 
§
All this casts the BIP in a slightly different light. If the community is 
going to decide, it needs to know what the strongest case is for each 
of the options it is deciding amongst. Thus, BIP authors, ridiculous 
though they can be, are playing a useful role in a wider drama. There 
is a parallel here with the adversarial legal system in countries like 
England. In an English court, an impartial authority, perhaps a jury, will 
ultimately decide one way or another. One advocate for the prosecution 
and one for the defence will each present the strongest possible case 
for their side. The advocates are expected—indeed required—to show 
me-sidedness for their position, to accumulate arguments for it, and 
to minimise the arguments against. In the proper exercise of their 
functions, at least one advocate will be wrong, must be wrong, and both 
must be partial. So too, perhaps, in science: by writing a BIP, an author 
makes the best possible case for the prosecution or for the defence, not 
because reality probably is that way, but because the best way for the 
impartial community to adjudicate will be to have laid out before it the 
strongest possible version of the case. 
I can see that it is useful for the scientific community to review 
bold exemplars of positions that it is trying to assess. Imagine if every 
statement of a theoretical position were hedged around with caveats; 
complete in its weighing of pros and cons; exhaustive in its treatment 
of possible alternatives and other factors. It would be very hard to get 
your teeth into exactly what was at stake. As a young man ostensibly 
studying psychology and philosophy, I actually spent most of my time 
reading popular books on evolution. Why? At least partly because the 
evolutionists had a big idea whose universal scope and power they 
presented without qualification. These were ideas singing at the tops 
of their voices, not mumbles and apologies. Social science writing, with 
its frequent insistence on variegation and specificity, on multiplicities of 
factors, can really lose out here in the airtime of public discussion. 
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We seem to be in danger of completely exonerating the authors of 
BIPs from their absurdities. We have seemed to have freed them from 
even a minimal obligation of balance and good scholarship. Rather 
than striving to overcome their proneness to me-sidedness, BIP-authors 
can claim it serves the greater good of science (‘just doing my job, 
guv’nor’). This seems to be going too far. And there is an alternative to 
adversarial legal systems: inquisitorial (or non-adversarial) systems. A 
substantial fraction of the world’s population lives successfully under 
such arrangements. Here, the court itself is involved in the gathering 
of evidence, both for and against, and must come to a balanced 
determination. The generation of arguments and the evaluation of their 
merits are unified in a single office, rather than being divided across the 
advocates and court respectively. Should science operate more like this?
It’s said that inquisitorial systems may be better at discovering the 
truth, whilst adversarial systems may be better at giving all individuals 
a hearing and hence protecting them from the inappropriate exercise 
of power. I don’t know. I suspect science needs both modes. Really 
new ideas, paradigm-shifters like continental drift, are not going to get 
any traction without me-sided advocates. So you need the adversarial 
model at an early stage in the development of a paradigm. But cocky 
advocates strutting against one another does get a bit wearing—tribal, 
sterile, prone to self-congratulation and self-perpetuation. It is incapable 
of sorting out the details and typically does not produce synthesis. You 
then need wise magistrates, a lot of them. 
The population needs both behaviours, and it will always get them, 
because some scientists take readily to the adversarial mode, while 
others gravitate more to the inquisitorial. It depends to some extent on 
one’s personal balance of approach and avoidance motivations. What 
gets you out of bed in the morning, the possibility of glory and renown, 
or the terror of turning out to be wrong? For some BIP-writers, it seems 
to be the former; for natural magistrates, the latter (or at least, strong 
scruple about balance and correctness) seems to loom larger. The same 
personality diversity when it comes to reasoning is observable outside 
science too: some people want to persuade and charm their social circle, 
while others place a big emphasis on listening to all sides and forming 
a reasonable consensus. 
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We need to value our bold advocates, our BIP-writers. Most of 
them, like Icarus, will fail, but in so doing they might just open up 
new terrains, inject creativity, and inspire others. They need to have 
a decent modicum of balance and openness, though, and we need to 
soften their more blatant partisanship. Mercier and Sperber’s thesis 
suggests that we can do this in science the way we do it in the rest of 
life—through conversation. It is through conversation that people’s 
reasons are challenged, questioned, refined, balanced. But it has to be 
conversation undertaken in good faith with others whose perspectives 
are different from one’s own, otherwise all that results is entrenchment 
and polarization. BIP-authors should not be rewarded for, or by, living 
in disciplinary or paradigmatic silos. Rather they must be engaged in 
friendly and quizzical conversation. We also need to make sure our 
institutions value and reward the quieter and wiser magistrates too. We 
don’t currently do this enough. In promotion, funding, publication, and 
visibility, more thoughtful, perhaps more honest, souls often lose out. 
It is easy to see how this ends up happening. Indeed it is related to 
the broader societal pattern of more extroverted people being rewarded 
more in the world of work, without obviously adding more value.15 
Anyway, I have to stop this now and work on the draft of my next 
book. It’s called: As far as it Goes: A Decent Theory that Isn’t Revolutionizing 
all of Biology, and Probably Won’t Change your Life. Do you think it is going 
to sell?
15  Pehkonen, J. et al. (2010). Personality and labour market income: Evidence from 
longitudinal data. Labour 24: 201–20, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9914.2010.00477.x
2. What we talk about when we 
talk about biology
Among all these pieces of information that 
together produce human behaviors,  
which are nature and which are culture?  
No one knows, and it does not matter in 
the least—in fact no one could find out, 
because the separation is nowhere.
–Pascal Boyer1
The radio network NPR titled a 2013 written piece about an interview 
with scientist and author Adrian Raine as follows: ‘Criminologist 
believes violent behavior is biological’.2 Sentences like this pose a 
problem. The problem is that they ought to be clearly nonsense; but 
somehow they are not. Somehow they seem, despite all reason to the 
contrary, to mean something. They manage to mean something to most 
of the people most of the time, and perhaps even to all of the people 
some of the time. The same is not true in equivalent cases not involving 
humans. Imagine the headlines: ‘Ornithologist believes bird song is 
biological!’; ‘Microbiologist believes bacterial infection is biological!’. 
You take my point. 
What is violent behaviour? The unwelcome violation of the body 
of one or more victims by one or more aggressors. The aggressors do 
this with their feet, or their hands—hands in fists, on weapons, or even 
on joysticks in remote bunkers. Sometimes hands are not needed; but 
here, larynxes are required, larynxes wired up to brains in a particular 
way. And what aggressors do changes the victim’s body: her knees, her 
1  Boyer, P. (2018). Minds Make Societies: How Cognition Explains the World Humans 
Create (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, e-book location 4819). 
2  NPR Books, April 30th 2013, http://www.npr.org/2013/05/01/180096559/
criminologist-believes-violent-behavior-is-biological
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kidneys, her face, or just the state of her nervous system. I am pretty sure 
feet, hands, larynxes, brains, knees, kidneys and faces are biological. 
Surely, if the Almighty did not want violent behaviour to be biological, 
He wouldn’t have made us out of meat. 
Enough, I hear you say. Of course the implementation of violent human 
acts is done using biological stuff. But what we are interested in is the 
reasons violent acts occur. And to give a useful account of the reasons 
we need to appeal to processes of quite a different kind to ‘biology’. 
Compare an example: US presidential elections are implemented in 
some districts using paper ballots, in some using voting machines. These 
ballots and machines are physical objects. They, or similar devices, were 
necessary for the implementation of the 2016 presidential election, but 
they aren’t an interesting part of the story of the outcome of that election 
(unless you think there were some pretty strange election irregularities). 
Explaining why the outcome was one way rather than the other requires 
discussion of: US demography; contemporary US social, economic 
and political institutions; ideologies; narratives; decisions made by 
individual campaigns; and so forth. Election results are delivered using 
physics, but there is a coherent sense in which it would be controversial 
and rather strange to claim their outcomes are physics. 
In the social sciences, we find ourselves in an odd quandary 
regarding the explanation of human outcomes. A standard position 
might go something like this. Humans are biologically implemented 
creatures, but they have special properties. In virtue of these properties, 
the outcomes of their lives have reasons and meanings rather than physical 
causes; are influenced by culture or society, not nature or genes. The special 
properties (we can argue about what they are) have a natural, biological 
origin. But once the special properties are in place, they permit an infinite 
range of possible social histories, whose explanations are to be couched 
in constructs that are not, in any interesting sense, biology. They float 
free of their substrate. These constructs are themselves quite varied, but 
they include talking about (choose your favourites and pay for them at 
the checkout): social structures, culture, norms, institutions, discourse, 
individual meanings, response to incentives, agency, values, and so on. 
You could defend the standard position’s division of labour on the 
basis that social structures, meanings and agency were ontologically 
different from biology; that is, different things of a fundamentally 
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different kind. Surely these days that would be a bit hard to justify. 
More plausibly, you could defend it pragmatically. Sure, in principle if 
we had complete, accurate models of how biological systems worked, 
then maybe social processes would start to be expressible ‘biologically’. 
But the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans has only got 959 cells (302 of 
which are neurons), and despite decades of research we are currently 
unable to predict exactly what an individual C. elegans will do next when 
put on a dish. What hope, therefore, the Dutch tulip mania of 1637, or 
any other of the complex, historically-situated human interactions that 
form the subject matter of social science? In practice, we may as well 
stick with our familiar analyses in terms of social norms, values, supply 
and demand, or the madness of crowds. Either way, we end up with a 
division of labour in the academy where biologists and social scientists 
don’t usually get to share the same coffee room.
§
As things stand, human biologists mostly talk about things like genes 
and brains and hormones, while social scientists mostly talk about a 
separate set of processes like preferences, culture, social capital and 
institutions. As a division of labour goes, it works up to a point. Both 
parties have come up with a lot that will stand the test of time. In the 
long run, though, if you have badly conceived boundaries, you are 
going to keep having boundary problems. Individually, any one of 
these boundary problems might be soluble ad hoc, but collectively, 
they accumulate and unsettle. In the end, the only way to solve them is 
going to be by abolishing the boundary—on the ground, and in people’s 
minds. That is where we are with the boundary between ‘biology’ and 
‘non-biology’ in the human sciences. 
It’s not that the standard position puts humans on one side (‘non-
biology’) and all other kinds of creatures on the other (‘biology’). 
That would be more straightforward in some ways, though prone to 
immediate and easy falsification. The problem is that the standard view 
puts humans partly in ‘biology’ and partly in ‘non-biology’. For example, 
Tourette syndrome feels like a biological kind of thing, and I don’t think 
‘Researcher believes Tourette syndrome is biological’ would garner any 
headlines. In fact we don’t know of any single genetic cause of Tourette 
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syndrome, the environment appears to be very important, and the 
manifestations are largely behavioural. Indeed, people can suppress the 
symptoms of this ‘biological’ phenomenon through voluntary effort, 
to some extent (in describing Tourette syndrome, the intriguing term 
‘semi-voluntary actions’ is used). 
But violence, call violence biological, and that’s worthy of a headline, 
though in fact the kind of individual violent acts of which Raine writes 
are often committed impulsively without intention. It’s controversial 
to call violence part of biology, because you have moved the ill-
defined boundary. Somewhere between semi-voluntary swearing, 
and impulsively getting into fights, approved ‘biology’ has stopped 
happening, and approved ‘non-biology’ has begun. Then you get to the 
1637 tulip mania and the outcome of the 2016 US presidential election, 
and that’s definitely not ‘biology’.
The dual view of humans with a ‘biological’ part and a ‘non-
biological’ part is not new, of course.3 It is found in Descartes’ view of 
humans as ordinary biological animals in their bodies, with an extra-
biological soul, not shared with other animals, bolted on. It is also found 
in the ‘restricted naturalism’ of the great evolutionist A. R. Wallace. 
Wallace saw humans as the joint product of natural forces (evolution) 
and some higher power. Other animals were produced by the natural 
forces alone. Thus, within human experience, there were both animal 
bits (pain, hunger, thirst, presumably sexual attraction) and non-animal 
bits (spiritual, moral and aesthetic values, for example). We are hybrid 
beings. We lie in the gutter, but we are looking towards the stars. I 
contemplate the eternal, fastened to a dying animal.4 
The hybrid view causes absolute chaos once you take it at all 
seriously. Which aspects of human life go into ‘biology’ and which into 
‘non-biology’? For those that end up partly in each, how do the ‘non-
biological’ bits of the story interact causally with the ‘biological’ bits? 
The ‘biology’/’non-biology’ division runs down the middle of all the 
most important questions. Health: indubitably biological but profoundly 
affected by social-structural factors and policy decisions. Agriculture: a 
3  See Benton, T. (1991). Biology and social science: Why the return of the 
repressed should be given a (cautious) welcome. Sociology 25: 1–29, https://doi.
org/10.1177/0038038591025001002
4  It feels increasingly like that. 
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set of socially-organized processes and practices that centrally involves 
an ecosystem of other species. And so on.
We end up with really strange claims, like ‘depression can have 
both social and biological causes’. (The division between ‘social factors’ 
and ‘biological factors’ is commonly made in medical teaching.) 
Surely it’s a bit cumbersome to hold that the very same configuration 
of the brain can be arrived at for two categorically distinct, unrelated 
kinds of reasons. More to the point, the unity of the phenomenon, 
its integrated nature as the end-state of individuals with particular 
genetic and somatic endowments developing through particular kinds 
of experience in particular societal contexts, is necessarily closed to 
us whilst the boundary remains in place. The boundary also leads us 
to overlook obvious but important explanatory resources. Edmund 
Russell’s account of why the industrial revolution happened when and 
where it did accords a central place to Darwinian evolutionary change; 
not in Homo sapiens, but in the cotton plant.5 This kind of explanatory 
move is so heterodox from a humanities perspective that Russell has to 
justify it as part of a broader new ‘evolutionary history’ paradigm. He 
would not need to do this if no boundary had been in place. 
When Berlin was divided in 1961, families and businesses found 
themselves with one part on one side, one part on the other. The 
boundary ran down the middle of some streets. In Berlin’s railways, 
several ghost stations were created, where trains could pass by but 
not stop because the above-ground exits were in the wrong sector. At 
Bornholmer Strasse station, trains from both East and West Germany 
passed through, but no-one from either sector could get out. How 
many places are we collectively failing to explore because the standard 
positions of social science, and of biology, fail to provide the skills, 
incentives, and encouragement we need in order to do so? 
§
I am as interested in the reasons the boundary continues to exist as I 
am in campaigning to abolish it. Many intelligent interlocutors will 
concede that the division into ‘biological’ and ‘non-biological’ makes 
no real sense when you talk to them about it in detail. But then, when 
5  Russell, E. (2011). Evolutionary History: Uniting History and Biology to Understand Life 
on Earth (New York: Cambridge University Press). 
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they are tired, when they are talking to a lay audience, when they 
need a convenient shorthand, suddenly there it is again. There on their 
presentation slide, or in their written summary, or in something they 
say: ‘Here we outline a biological explanation’, they say; or ‘as well as 
individual biological factors, social context may be important’. Put a 
penny in the swearing jar! All that is human is biological, and social 
context is a biological factor. What you have just said makes about as 
much sense as: ‘As well as numbers, addition can involve 1, 3, 7 and 9’. 
Even Adrian Raine, in the interview cited at the head of this essay, says 
of his research: ‘I’ve got to be careful here [….] Biology is not destiny, 
and it’s more than biology, and there’s lots of factors that we’re talking 
about there’. So in fact, Raine reproduces the ‘biology’/’non-biology’ 
boundary; all he has done is partially moved one phenomenon—violent 
behaviour—a little further into biological territory, whilst endorsing 
the view that it is a hybrid phenomenon, subject to two categorically 
distinct kinds of causes. 
Historians of science tend to situate the origins of the persistent 
‘biology’/’non-biology’ dichotomy in particular influential academic 
ideas and positions, themselves the products of the concerns of their 
times. Thus, on the one hand we have nineteenth-century biologists’ hard 
division between the immortal germ-line, to which slow, evolutionary, 
genetic processes happen, and the transient soma, which comes into 
the world from the germ line, but once there is off the leash in a short-
timescale world of contingent environmental processes. It only has 
to report back at the end in the form of lifetime reproductive success. 
This hard disjunction within biological thought made our processual 
understanding of genetic evolution tractable under the modern synthesis 
of the early twentieth century, but if we don’t deploy it with care, it 
opens up an apparent space between nature/biology (supplied by the 
germ line as factory standard) and nurture/non-biology (happening 
to the soma). In this space, dualism can fester.6 On the social science 
side, we have figures like Weber and Durkheim, wanting to carve out 
6  Fox Keller, E. (2010). The Mirage of a Space between Nature and Nurture (Durham, 
SC: Duke University Press). The dualism of germline/genes vs. soma/environment 
is not quite the same as that of ‘biology’ vs. ‘non-biology’. Most obviously, for 
all other species, we think of both the ‘genetic’ and ‘environmental’ bits as being 
‘biological’, whereas for our own species, exceptionally, we tend to call the somatic/
environmental bit ‘non-biology’.
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a terrain on which legitimate and distinctive social enquiry could be 
conducted, as well as those in the tradition of Wallace wishing to salvage 
deeply-held spiritual or moral beliefs despite a growing understanding 
of our kinship to other species. It was in the interests of all these people 
to reproduce and reinforce some version of the ‘biology’/’non-biology’ 
boundary.7 
These intellectual-history accounts are all well and good, but given 
the extraordinary and widespread persistence of the ‘biology’/‘non-
biology’ dichotomy (including amongst people never exposed to 
Weisman or Weber), I am tempted to give it an explanation that’s a bit 
more, well, biological. Maybe the distinction between ‘biology’ and ‘non-
biology’ maps onto some deep-seated way of thinking that humans are 
predisposed to develop and find intuitive to deploy. This would make 
some kind of ‘biology’/’non-biology’ distinction a ‘cultural attractor’—
that is, a cultural convention prone to emerge recurrently and persist in 
diverse human communities, because of regularities in the way people 
think, remember and communicate.8 An appealing feature of this idea is 
that it would explain why: (a) at the individual level, people who have 
been thoroughly disabused of the ‘biology’/’non-biology’ distinction 
often reproduce it nonetheless, especially in moments of distraction or 
fatigue; and (b) at the cultural level, discursive traditions that initially 
contain no ‘biology’/’non-biology’ distinction often acquire one over 
time. I think for example of Marxism here: Marx was an enthusiastic 
endorser of Darwinian naturalism, and his theorising founded social 
relations on humans as ‘active natural beings’ engaging in productive 
interactions with the rest of the natural world. Very soon, the biological 
naturalism was washed out, and biological and Marxist theory seem to 
have rather little to do with each other, either in rhetoric or in practice, 
thereafter.9 
7  See Benton, T. (1991). Biology and social science: Why the return of the repressed 
should be given a (cautious) welcome. Sociology, 25: 1–29, https://doi.org/10.1177
/0038038591025001002; and Meloni, M. (2016). The transcendence of the social: 
Durkheim, Weismann, and the purification of sociology. Frontiers in Sociology 1: 
1–13, https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2016.00011 
8  See the concluding chapter of Boyer, P. (2018). Minds Make Societies: How Cognition 
Explains the World Humans Create (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press) for an 
argument along these lines. 
9  Marx in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844: ‘Man is directly a natural 
being. As a natural being and as a living natural being he is on the one hand 
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§
So perhaps the ‘biology’/’non-biology’ distinction has been built by our 
culture along a natural fault line in the psychological landscape. Does 
that help us understand people’s intuitions about where the boundary 
of ‘biology’ lies in human affairs? Does it, in short, help us understand 
what people are talking about when they don’t want to talk about 
biology?
In life, people are understandably concerned to distinguish 
processes that could not, through any sequence of our actions, come out 
any differently, from those processes where it matters what we decide 
to do. For example, it doesn’t matter whether or not I try to persuade 
people that human hearts should be on the left side of the body. I don’t 
need to bother. Nearly all human hearts are going to be there, for a long 
time into the future, regardless of what I do. On the other hand, the 
level of social inequality in Britain is related to specific actions people 
decided to perform at particular times. It is related to these actions in 
a complex way; the actions are many, the consequences are subtle and 
at times unforeseen; the people performed them under exposure to 
particular discourses encouraging them to think in particular ways. But 
nonetheless, I could take actions that might have some effect, somewhere 
down the line, on the level of social inequality in Britain. 
Thus, it feels like there is useful intuitive distinction between the stuff 
that you just have to accept, and the stuff that could come out differently 
(it was different at other times, it is different in other places, or it could 
be different if we organized things differently). You can see how this 
fixed/non-fixed divide could be useful to think with, in all kinds of 
human contexts. Which aspects of my potential spouse do I need to just 
put up with (her height, for example), and which ones might I manage 
to negotiate or shape so they are different in the future (her behaviour, 
endowed with natural powers, vital powers — he is an active natural being’ (p. 
69). Download at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/
Economic-Philosophic-Manuscripts-1844.pdf. Gramsci in the Prison Notebooks 
(written between 1929 and 1935): ‘Philosophy cannot be reduced to a naturalistic 
“anthropology”: the nature of the human species is not given by the “biological” 
nature of man’ (Hoare, Q. and G. M. Smith eds., 1971, Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks, London: Lawrence and Wishart, p. 335). Of course there is a great deal 
more to be said about the difference between Marx and Gramsci, or indeed early 
and late Marx, than this glib observation. 
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maybe)? Reasons play a different role in the fixed and non-fixed cases. 
It’s not important for human societies to reason well about why hearts 
are on the left. They might figure out a reason why they are on the left, 
and that would be interesting. But it’s not important to the outcome how 
people reason about it. Not so social institutions, laws, taxation and so 
forth: here, the quality of the reasons we come up with affects the social 
outcomes we get. There is also a connection (though not a completely 
simple one) between non-fixity and voluntariness or intention: that 
which is not fixed can perhaps be voluntarily or intentionally addressed. 
Voluntariness and intention have special roles in human justifications 
for action, and hence moral culpability (you usually don’t blame me for 
that which I did not voluntarily choose to do).10 
The spatial metaphor of inside and outside, or body core versus 
body surface, often gets fused to the concern with fixity and non-fixity. 
So we say things like ‘Deep down, he’s always going to be selfish’; ‘is 
this really in her nature, or is it just something on the surface?’. This 
spatial translation of the fixed to the middle and the malleable to the 
edges recalls some diagram of essence and accidents from Medieval 
philosophy. It is very intuitive, even if it makes no literal scientific sense. 
§
It seems, then, that we have plenty of intuitive raw material for the 
cultural emergence of a ‘biology’/’non-biology’ distinction. We take 
what seems to us fixed and stick that in a category. We call this bit 
‘biology’ to the exclusion of the rest. This is supported and made more 
compelling by the intuitive relation of the fixed/non-fixed distinction 
with the inside/surface metaphor: the fixed/’biological’ is the stuff on 
the inside. Inside a body you find muscle and blood and viscera (and 
if you look closely enough, genes), stuff that you don’t know how to 
change, that looks just like the insides of other animals. On the surface 
of bodies you find all kinds of things you can take on and off like clothes 
and ear-rings and smartphones, and these don’t look ‘biological’ at all. 
10  The connection between intention and moral culpability is apparently universal, 
though its strength may vary somewhat across societies: Barrett, H. C. et al. (2016). 
Small-scale societies exhibit fundamental variation in the role of intentions in moral 
judgment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113: 4688–93, https://doi.
org/10.1073/pnas.1522070113
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The voluntary/involuntary distinction often gets mixed in here, too. I 
didn’t do it because of my genes, I did it because I wanted to! Or: he 
didn’t do it intentionally, he was compelled by an inner urge.
With this rather muddled set of distinctions culturally available, 
‘biology’ becomes the category for everything we don’t want our 
destinies and our social arrangements to be. ‘Biology’ becomes the 
place where all the fixed stuff lives, so if you are interested in change or 
contingency, you define what you do in opposition to the ‘biological’. 
This is why, in social science, the bad word that follows the bad word 
‘biological’ is usually ‘determinism’. ‘Biology’ is the bit of you that is 
a mere zombie, compelled to follow preordained urgings. You would 
naturally want that bit to be as small as possible if you valued your 
autonomy. Finally, ‘biology’ is somehow inside you, with all the 
disgusting smelly stuff you only look at in medical contexts, whilst 
most of things you enjoy in life involve your outer surfaces exchanging 
energy with the world around you. This may explain the tremendous 
media air-time you can get with neuro-imaging studies showing with 
pretty maps how activity in the brain differs between people who are 
and are not X, where X is suffering from schizophrenia, falling in love, 
growing up in poverty, or listening to Mendelssohn. ‘Gosh!’ we say, 
‘I didn’t realise that was actually happening on the inside’. Of course 
those activities involve being different on the inside. How could they 
possibly not? But showing that something is going on inside in no way 
constrains the importance of stuff going on outside in influencing why 
those experiences happen as they do.
§
Once the two receptacles of ‘biology’ and ‘non-biology’ have been 
made, incoming traffic gets diverted into either one or the other. 
Genes — ‘biology’; environment — ‘non-biology’; innate — ‘biology’; 
learned — ‘non-biology’; evolved — ‘biology’; acquired — ‘non-
biology’; nature — ‘biology’; culture — ‘non-biology’. Maybe that’s not 
such a bad thing, you say, at least as a first approximation. I’ve argued 
that fixed/non-fixed and voluntary/involuntary are actually useful 
distinctions to make in everyday life—that’s why they exist. So maybe 
the conventional ‘biology’/’non-biology’ description is heuristically 
useful in scientific discourse too, at least as a rough framework for 
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starting out? If it didn’t exist under the labels ‘biology’ and ‘non-
biology’, we would have to invent it anyway using different terms. 
This is a reasonable view, but, I think, wrong. The ‘biology’/’non-
biology’ distinction of the standard position has only bad features that I 
can see. It cuts natural continua, such as fixity, into artificial dichotomies, 
leading to pointless and unproductive contestation about boundary 
cases. Everything could be different; the question is more ‘what would 
it take to make X different? ’. It puts into the same category concepts 
that are in fact quite distinct. ‘Genetic’ is not the same as ‘evolved’. And 
finally it puts into different categories things that are not exclusive. 
Learning, for example, is something done by genes. Yes, genes, the 
product of a history of natural selection, do not merely enable learning by 
their presence. They are intimately involved, through their expression, 
in how learning actually works. So when you appeal to learning, you 
are appealing to a genetic process (and, indirectly, to evolution). More 
generally, any attempt to mark the ‘inside stuff’ off from the ‘outside 
stuff’ is a dual disservice. It ignores how profoundly environmental 
processes become embedded in the body, and how things like genes 
can exert effects outside the body envelope.11 
§
My thesis, then, holds out both good and bad news for the standard 
position demarcating social science. The bad news is: it’s all biology. 
Everything social scientists do is biology. It’s not that it will be replaced 
by biology in the future, in some Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? nightmare 
scenario. Everything social scientists do already is, and always has been, 
biology. Why? Because biology is the study of living things. Humans 
are living things, and so whatever they do, however they organize 
themselves, whatever extraordinary technologies they create, whatever 
meanings they entertain, reasons they give or tastes they develop, these 
are all biological processes. 
All you have done here, you might respond, is to define biology so 
as to include all of the things the social sciences are interested in. We 
do not immediately understand social phenomena any better by doing 
this. Has anything actually been gained by this move? I might retort: 
11  Dawkins, R. (1982). The Extended Phenotype (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
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well, it was the standard position that started this, by defining biology 
in a restricted and artificial way so that the things social scientists are 
interested in would not be in it. All I am doing is restoring a more 
sensible baseline. The redefinition doesn’t change anything overnight, 
but in the long run it might help us do better research. As scientists, we 
are bricoleurs (tinkerers), using whatever materials and ideas we have 
lying around to try to solve new problems, or better solve existing ones. 
If, by erasing boundaries within the academy, we expand the repertoire 
of techniques and ideas that individuals know and encounter, then we 
might all be able to progress a bit more quickly. 
So the bad news is: it’s all biology. But here’s the good news: biology 
is not what you think it is. The resistance to ‘biology’ in the social 
sciences is founded on the fear that certain things we really value would 
be foreclosed by joining up to the biological sciences. I believe this fear 
is largely groundless. 
The fear arises from an opposition between law-like determinism 
(assumed to characterise biology as a natural science) and the world of 
partial influences and historical contingencies (assumed to characterise 
the social sciences). In natural science, the argument goes, there 
are absolute laws. If you drop a cannon-ball from a tower on earth, 
there is no doubt about the outcome. In the social sciences, we have 
general tendencies and patterns, but these always have exceptions and 
specificities in their realization; we have historical processes that are 
explicable in retrospect but could not have been predicted prospectively. 
We social scientists just can’t fit what we do into a world of simple 
natural laws. 
This fear is easily dismissed, since its view of how natural science 
works is misleading. That science consists in uncovering a few simple 
and absolute laws holds, if it holds at all, only as a description of physics. 
Philosophers of biology are pretty clear that biological science is not like 
this. The history of life is a contingent and path-dependent historical 
process. There are certainly regularities in the way it has evolved, but its 
course is a complex resultant of selection gradients, available variation, 
the kinds of raw material that was already there, chance, and time. What 
evolution produces is an astonishing diversity of inter-linked systems: 
cellular systems, organ systems, organisms, social groups, ecosystems. 
These are all dynamic; their dynamics depend on where they start from, 
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and feed back into the selection pressures of the future. Although sense 
can be made of how these different kinds of systems work, no-one 
believes you can simply read off all their specific properties from a few 
very simple laws, either of an evolutionary or biophysical kind. 
A second fear is that biological science involves a kind of explanatory 
monoculture, whereas explanation in the social sciences needs to be 
more heterogeneous. The social sciences involve identification of many 
different mechanisms of rather different types, at different levels: 
individual-level mechanisms like response to incentives or psychological 
biases; social-level mechanisms like stratification or spatial assortment; 
cultural-level mechanisms like diffusion of innovations; or even 
symbolic and discursive-level mechanisms. Critics of social science 
see the diversity of this explanatory menagerie as a weakness. A field 
with such an undigested diversity of explanatory strategies must just 
be a conceptual mess. But a lot of social scientists would respond that 
they value this very diversity. In complex human social phenomena, 
you can’t just deduce the historical outcome from properties of the 
individual psychologies, or the social organization, or cultural diffusion, 
alone. You need all of these things, and whilst you need to understand 
how they inter-relate, you can’t eliminate any of them from the stock of 
things we need to appeal to, and should not try. 
The fear of ‘biology’ that comes from this somehow assumes that 
biological science, in contrast, only admits of one type of explanatory 
construct. That explanatory construct, in this straw biological 
science, is usually molecular (for example, a gene, a hormone, or a 
neurotransmitter). This is why another bad word that often follows the 
bad word ‘biological’ in social-science-speak is ‘reductionism’. Once 
again this is a gross mischaracterization. Biological science is a diverse 
enterprise involving people who work at many levels. Almost all of the 
levels involve systems thinking: from cellular systems, physiological 
systems, whole organisms, swarms, hives, communities, populations 
to ecosystems. Though researchers are centrally concerned with how 
the functioning of the systems at one level relate to the dynamics 
at another level (e.g. molecules to cells, cells to whole organisms, 
individual organisms to populations), the traffic goes both ways, and 
there is certainly no simple theoretical monoculture. The stuff that goes 
on inside the individual is not, in principle, theoretically privileged 
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over population processes. There is no sane proposal to eliminate the 
organism, the population, or the ecosystem as levels of analysis, or to 
deny that there are complex dynamics at these levels we cannot simply 
deduce from the dynamics at more molecular levels. In fact, explanation 
in biological science looks somewhat like explanation in social science: 
it is not a matter of reducing everything to the molecular level, so much 
as the identification of various kinds of mechanisms, operating at 
different scales, in slightly different ways in different contexts, to shape 
the outcome of complex and variable systems through time. 
The cause has not been helped here by the writings of certain zealous 
‘biologisers’ from the humanities and social sciences. Look at the social 
sciences, they say, a complete hodge-podge of unintegrated, theoretically 
incoherent sub-disciplines, not really getting anywhere. Now look 
at biological science. It’s the most successful branch of knowledge 
of the past hundred years. It is conceptually unified by the theory of 
evolution. If the theory of evolution did that for biological science, then 
given that we too are evolved beings, it can now do the same for the 
social sciences and humanities. I have sympathy with many aspects of 
this view, but it is important not to over-simplify for rhetorical effect. 
Inspired by popular accounts of evolutionary biology, the ‘biologisers’ 
ascribe biological thought all manner of positive properties they feel 
the social sciences don’t currently have, like simplicity, unity, and 
theoretical elegance. A lot of these properties turn out to be somewhat 
over-stated once you start actually swimming in biological waters. There 
is widespread human tendency to under-estimate the complexity and 
internal heterogeneity of categories of which we don’t have much direct 
personal experience. I suspect there is an inverse correlation between 
how unified and elegant you think biological science is compared to 
social science, and how many hours you have ever spent in a biology 
lab or field site. 
The truth is that biological science, viewed from closer up, is also 
something of a hodge-podge; less so than social science, but a little bit 
hodgy and in some respects podgy nonetheless. It is unified by the 
theory of evolution only to a point. Most working biological research 
is cellular and molecular, and here the theory of evolution usually 
plays rather little role either in techniques, explanations, or the kinds 
of questions people ask (it probably should do more, but it doesn’t 
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at present). And then even in the parts of biological science that are 
more explicitly evolutionary, such as whole-organism biology and 
ecology, there’s a great deal we don’t know about how it all works 
out in detail. The ‘biologisers’ sometimes imply that it suffices to read 
Fisher’s The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, maybe coupled with 
William Hamilton’s seminal 1964 papers on kin selection, and then you 
can simply deduce kidneys, or star-nosed moles, or what happens in 
Yellowstone National Park. You can’t. That’s what biologists do all day. 
They don’t agree about it all. It is going to end up involving a great 
diversity of processes, and a lot of detailed understanding of specific 
mechanisms. 
A final fear that social scientists might have about changing the sign 
over the office door to ‘biologist’ is that they would lose the opportunity 
to speak about agency, and related notions of responsibility and the 
moral life.12 The non-human living world may exhibit complexity, but 
it is not a world whose inhabitants have agency. This is why human 
affairs are different, and we need to hold on to this fact in the ways 
we talk about it. I agree that agency, and the things that go with it, are 
distinctive features of human life that need to be accounted for, not 
down-played or ignored. But ‘distinctive’ need not mean ‘not biological’. 
In fact, some of our existing social science theoretical frameworks do 
a bad job with agency. Social constructionism would be one example. 
If our very personhood is a cultural construct, originating in social 
discourses we were exposed to but did not choose, then what sense can 
we make of responsibility, moral justification or voluntary action? Are 
they not just shams? The more I think about agency, the more I feel 
that it is not so much that agency can be reconciled with seeing us as 
biological beings. It is that only by seeing us as biological beings can 
we rescue any coherent notion of what human agency is or the uses to 
which it is generally put.13 Joining up with biological science certainly 
does not make the problem of agency any more difficult than it already 
is. If anything, it’s the key to progress. 
§
12  For some discussion, see Scruton, R. (2017). On Human Nature (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press). 
13  See The cultural and the agentic, this volume.
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Re-designating social science as one of the biological sciences should not 
be a case of restricting the types of data or explanatory entities to which 
social science is entitled. And it is certainly not a case of seeing humans 
as just the same as monkeys or mongooses. After all, monkeys are not just 
the same as mole rats or slime moulds, yet they are all totally biological. 
It’s more a case of feeling free to pursue the theoretical and empirical 
connections between different types of data, types of description, types 
of process, without getting held up at the border post. It gives us a 
greater library of options to improvise with, connections to make. 
The goal of abolishing the ‘biology’/’non-biology’ distinction is 
worthy. Can we succeed? I don’t know. There are institutional and 
organisational issues here that are going to be slow to unpick, if they can 
be unpicked at all. And if the ‘biology’/’non-biology’ distinction really 
is a cultural attractor, we are running into quite a strong psychological 
headwind. But folk psychology is what science is here to rise above, 
not something to which it is condemned. Admittedly, though, people 
have been trying quite seriously to dismantle the boundary between the 
‘biological’ and the ‘social’ for at least fifty years, and yet there is still 
plenty of evidence of it on the ground. 
Taken together, the folk psychology of the audience, and the ways 
institutions are divided up, can provide incentives for perpetuating 
the boundaries even amongst those who know much better. In my 
experience, when a scholar defines their position as not-just-X, where 
X is, for example, ‘biology’, they are not usually interested in the actual 
contents of category X. In fact, they usually present a deliberately 
impoverished view of what those contents are. They almost require such 
a limited view. If they admitted too much of the truth about X, such as 
its internal heterogeneity and potential for future change, their appeal 
to not-being-just-X would probably fail in its functions. The appeal is 
a territorial claim; a rallying point; a stoking of prejudice; a parochial 
code for fellow-feelers to identify one another; it is a kind of aesthetic, 
moral and financial self-justification; it is a signal of social distinction. 
The unfortunate thing is that scholars, like politicians, can get rewarded 
for these kinds of moves, and misunderstood or ignored if they fail to 
make them. 
We can try to do something about this, even if it is an uphill battle. 
As authors, we can catch ourselves every time we lazily or parochially 
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use a phrase like ‘Whereas biologists believe…’, or ‘Whilst economists 
see….’. Which biologists? Which economists? And why label them by 
their kind? Why not just use their names? As readers, we should be 
as critical and sceptical of parochial claims from our scholars as from 
our politicians. We should see ourselves as citizens of the whole wide 
intellectual world, and demand reasons, expressed in clear language, 
that make sense universally, without appeal to the tribal affiliations of 
their originators.

3.The cultural and the agentic
Culture is thus an effect as much as a cause…
–Herb Gintis1
The late Pat Bateson used to tell a joke about two philosophers. ‘Thinkers 
can be divided into two kinds’, says the first philosopher, ‘those who 
propose dichotomies, and those who reject them’. ‘Nonsense!’, replies 
the second. 
At risk of similar tendentiousness, I contend that there are two major 
styles of social explanation. They have their origins in lay talk about 
reasons for actions, and they run through the professional discourses 
of social researchers. Extremes of both styles fail, and they fail in 
complementary ways. Our job is to make synthetic theories that capture 
the valid insights of both styles of thinking whilst also transcending 
them. I will call the two styles cultural and agentic respectively. I am not 
sure these are perfect names. There are various synonyms and near-
synonyms for each one knocking about. Nonetheless, my chosen names 
are reasonably memorable and I will stick with them here.
First, let’s point out that human societies have an order, an order 
that transcends the minute-to-minute decisions, or even the lifetime 
decisions, of any one individual or interacting dyad. When I wander 
down the lane to the bakery, I don’t have to devise a strategy for making 
it clear to the baker that the object of my desire is the leavened wheat 
product on the shelf. There’s a convention that both of us unthinkingly 
subscribe to but neither of us invented, of denoting this with the sounds 
‘loaf of bread’. I don’t have to offer to write the baker a scientific paper, 
teach her programming, or tend her garden (about all I could offer 
in improvised barter) in exchange for her comestibles. We have an 
institution called money by which exchange of anything for anything is 
1  Gintis, H. (2017). Individuality and Entanglement: The Moral and Material Bases of Social 
Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 153).
© 2018 Daniel Nettle, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0155.03
44 Hanging on to the Edges
possible and requires no further contestation other than specification of 
the price. I also understand that I am not to haggle over the price; that 
she will sell me her bread at the same price regardless of how many 
loaves she has left; and that it would be completely unacceptable for 
her to ask different prices of different customers, for example on the 
basis of the colour of their skins. These last two rules (price unrelated 
to scarcity, price unrelated to identity of buyer) are particularly 
interesting. Strategic agents making improvised decisions might well, 
you’d think, charge more when supply seems short relative to demand, 
or when selling to people they don’t like, but in the shops on my street, 
there are social rules that you don’t do that. And these rules have moral 
force; people treat them as if they were binding and are outraged when 
they are violated. So there is a lot of social order going on, even in the 
simple act of procuring my lunch. This order—its structure, diversity, 
and evolution—is to social theory what fritillaries and swallowtails are 
to lepidoptery. 
You are informally offering what I call a cultural explanation every 
time someone asks you why we don’t haggle over price in Newcastle, 
or voluntarily eat horses, or allow polygamy, and you answer: that’s 
just our culture. That’s what is normative here. For this to constitute 
anything like an explanation rather than just a restatement of the 
phenomenon, you must be claiming something along the following 
lines. The social order itself, or something that encodes it, has a real 
concrete existence external to individual actions, is causally primal in 
respect of those actions, and hence explains those actions in a non-trivial 
sense. Individual actors inherit and reproduce this order, with not much 
more deliberation and choice than when we inherit and reproduce our 
DNA. Whereas the inheritance and reproduction of DNA happen by 
meiosis and mitosis, the inheritance and reproduction of the social 
order happen by socialization. To the extent to which people seem to 
be exerting free choice, they are only doing so within the constraints 
and set of acceptable roles that the social order makes available to them, 
like alternative expression levels of the same DNA sequence. If we want 
an explanation for the existence of the social order, we need to move 
to a different level of analysis, in which the explanatory forces will be 
something other than individual choices, since individual choices are 
the consequence, not the cause, of the social order under which they 
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occur. Thus, in cultural thinking as I define it here, the social order, or 
the cultural rules that encode it, is the upstream source of individual 
actions. 
Different flavours of cultural theory abound in social science. 
According to certain versions of the ‘cultural evolution’ paradigm, 
humans have a very general propensity to acquire and internalize 
whatever is normative in their culture. They automatically adopt the 
norms of the majority of people they encounter, or of the most locally-
prestigious people they encounter. They do so, according to the theory, 
largely credulously; that is, without regard to how those norms suit their 
interests. So much so that, according to one hypothesis, whole societies 
can and do fail through slavish adherence by their members to self-
injurious norms, in what has been termed cultural group selection.2 The 
reason that the societies we observe have fairly sensible norms is not 
that the people in them exerted good sense, but that all the ones that 
happened to have bad norms have gone extinct. That’s a pretty strong 
claim.
To take another example, in cultural theory in the tradition of Michel 
Foucault, the very ideas that people can conceive of as true, reason 
about, or discuss, are the products of a symbolic order that pre-exists 
them, known as an episteme.3 The hegemonic episteme of the age controls 
what seems right and natural, and limits people’s understanding of 
the current world or possible alternatives to it. You might think you 
hold beliefs because they are true, or do things because you want 
to, but really the episteme has constructed you to think that way. It is 
2  See for example Henrich, J. (2004). Cultural group selection, coevolutionary 
processes and large-scale cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 
53: 3–35, https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00103-3; Richerson, P. et al. (2016). 
Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation: A 
sketch of the evidence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39: e30, https://doi.org/10.1017/
s0140525x1400106x. In fairness to these authors, their cultural evolution framework 
is not incompatible with individuals being somewhat discriminating about the 
norms they adopt, or having individual agentic preferences in addition to a general 
tendency to conform to norms. The models and interpretations they present do 
however strongly stress docile conformity, hence culturality in my sense, at the 
expense of purposive agency. I should also point out that what I describe here as 
cultural group selection is only the first of three distinct processes described under 
that name by Richerson and colleagues. 
3  Foucault, M. (1970). The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New 
York: Pantheon). 
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insidiously guiding and constraining you at every turn. It is a causal 
force. And where does the episteme come from? Again, its origins lie at 
some different level of analysis, upstream from everyday behaviour and 
apparently voluntary individual choice. 
So these are examples of how the cultural corner looks. What 
about the agentic? Here the leading professional representative is the 
easiest to characterise: the ‘rational actor’ model of microeconomics 
and political theory. In agentic theories such as this, the individual is 
a sovereign decision-maker. She has a set of preferences over different 
bundles of outcomes. These preferences are causal and primary, though 
of course they can vary according to the context—effectively, the set of 
options available—and the state of the chooser. The social order, rather 
than being causal, is the downstream consequence of the preferences 
of many agents interacting over time. If I prefer Strauss to Stravinsky, 
it’s not that the sinister episteme has socialized me with normative 
conceptions of what music can be. I just like it. If Strauss is popular, 
it’s because many other agents share my preference. If the divorce rate 
goes down, it’s not that the social system ‘needs’ more stable families, 
or subtly coerces people into particular matrimonial roles, or even that 
a particularly virulent cultural meme has taken hold. It’s simply that 
under the current set of economic and demographic circumstances, 
more people are finding that staying married is an attractive strategic 
option relative to the option of leaving their marriage. 
How could an agentic theory deal with the existence of the social 
order? Social interactions occur, according to agentic thinking, when both 
parties prefer having them over not having them, and both parties seek 
the form of interaction that comes highest in their register of preferences. 
The type specimen is the mutually-beneficial exchange between the 
buyer and seller of a material good. You do it when it suits you; if it 
didn’t suit you, it wouldn’t happen. But the rational actor analysis does 
not need to stop at monetized exchanges between strangers: a scientific 
collaboration, a romantic relationship, or a commitment to a voluntary 
organization can all be captured by the same logic. The interactions go 
on as long as they provide something for which both parties have a 
preference relative to the available options for the other possible uses of 
their time and energy. 
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Taken too literally, rational actor thinking might seem to imply that 
there are no norms at all, just atomic strategic agents. That is, every time 
I go into the bakery, the whole business of fixed and universal prices is 
up for potential renegotiation; or every year in a marriage, each partner 
has to check their current preference function and negotiate the terms of 
sexual exclusivity for the next accounting period. But this claim would be 
unfair on the rational actor model, and since being unfair to the rational 
actor model is something of a convention in much of social science, it 
is important to get this right. The rational actor model need have no 
problem with the idea that there are norms, or even that the norms are 
in some sense binding. The point is that the norms themselves should 
be analysed, at a deeper level, as the outcomes of the preferences of 
interacting individual strategic agents through time. So the social order 
is the dependent variable, with human preferences as the independent 
variable, whereas in cultural explanation it was the other way around. 
We can analyse the norm of fixed and universal prices in the bakery as 
if it were the product of a voluntary agreement between customers like 
myself and the baker. In a society where good bread is abundant and 
affordable, I would prefer not to have to enter a great long discussion 
about how much money I should hand over every time I want a loaf. 
The baker for her part values my repeated custom more highly than 
the opportunity to make an extra pound or two on a one-off occasion 
when I am desperate, and knows she will gain this by offering me the 
convenience of fixed prices. So in equilibrium, it’s always £3, and both 
parties accept the norm. 
There’s always a danger that agentic thinking will become Panglossian: 
whatever social order exists is necessarily for the best, since free agents 
have brought it about by acting in accordance with their preferences. 
This is an interesting contrast to cultural thinking, which is very often 
dystopian and critical of the current order. The impetus behind much 
cultural theory, for example, is the drive to expose the subtle roots of 
domination and oppression inherent in the episteme. But we can remain 
agentic without being Panglossian. The social orders that come down 
to us, even though they are expressions of past agents’ choices, may not 
be optimal for the way we live now. People have differed historically in 
their power and control of resources, and hence social orders have been 
produced that favour some people at the expense of others. It is then 
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rational to try to change them to make them fairer. Plus, importantly, 
there are many scenarios where benign equilibria cannot spontaneously 
be reached without bringing other kinds of institutions into being. 
For example, in ‘tragedy of the commons’ type situations, individuals 
acting in an uncoordinated way will end up at an equilibrium that none 
of them prefers. The solution is to advocate a higher-level mechanism 
of enforcement, such as a system of fines, laws or customary rules. 
This higher-level binding social mechanism requires active, deliberate 
work to bring it about; but it is still in some sense the outcome of the 
preferences of rational sovereign agents. 
§
What are the strengths and weakness of cultural and agentic thinking, 
respectively? They are the mirror images of one another. The cultural 
view correctly captures the insight that the social order is cumulative, 
historical, and has emergent properties; and it does so more naturally 
than agentic thinking does. The English political system, for example, 
is of such a Byzantine complexity that no two freely-interacting 
representative agents could possibly come up with it in a reasonable 
time. Its peculiar design features—a second legislative chamber that 
consists partly but not mostly of hereditary aristocrats, the fact that the 
monarch is the head of state and yet wields no power, and so forth—
probably don’t instantiate the preference functions of any of British 
citizen, living or dead. They represent the current snapshot in a kind of 
descent with modification process. This process has a historical quasi-
life of its own, so much so that the cultural perspective is in some ways 
right to see the institutional system as the unit of analysis, and individual 
politicians as partly its current vehicles, rather than the other way 
around. Many of the properties of the system, although they may have 
arisen from the voluntary decisions of certain individual actors, were 
not predictable from those voluntary decisions, and certainly do not 
represent the outcome of the actors’ intentions. When non-independent, 
non-omniscient, socialized agents interact through time, this generates 
emergent properties and historical continuities. And if this applies to 
the English political system, it applies too to any system of meaning, 
knowledge, social organization or technology in any human society. 
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The other great strength of the cultural perspective is that it captures 
the fact that the social order is, for each of us and to at least some extent, 
unchosen and empirically real.4 People do often adhere to social norms, 
even when there is no prospect that a violation will be detected or 
punished, just because they are the norms. Behaving normatively thus 
cannot be completely reduced to some immediate strategic or prudential 
calculation, such as the desire to avoid getting a bad reputation, 
although such concerns do of course exist. And the available ways of 
talking about a topic do undoubtedly influence the possible actions we 
entertain: this is true in science as much as in political life. These ways 
of talking are, in a broad sense, inherited from our culture, and often go 
unquestioned much of the time. 
But the weakness of the cultural way of thinking is in its inability 
satisfactorily to account for social change; and hence, in the end, to 
explain which properties of the social order endure. People follow the 
norms they are socialized into, except when they don’t. Sometimes 
they say: I don’t want to do that any more! It’s lame! It’s not right! I 
protest! It may be what my parents did, what most people do, what 
the prestigious people do, but I don’t feel it suits my interests and I 
will abandon it/modify it/flout it. So in an important sense, people are 
faithful replicators of norms only when those norms suit their current 
perceived interests and opportunities to a reasonable extent; otherwise, 
they try to change them in decidedly non-random ways. If you don’t 
allow for this in your social theory, allow for the order-transforming, 
purposive exercise of human agency, you really have no useful account 
of how societies develop, or how we end up with the historical conflicts 
and compromises that we do. 
Another interesting difference between cultural and agentic 
thinking concerns the extent to which social groups are conceived of 
as heterogeneous. Cultural thinking leads us to think of each society 
4  Or at least, the social order feels like an empirically real object that can be appealed 
to. As Pascal Boyer has recently argued, our widespread propensity to refer to and 
reify things like ‘English culture’ or ‘the Dinka social system’ is really just a folk-
sociological shortcut, something humans impose on the ceaseless and variegated 
flow of social interactions as a mental simplification—a simplification that can 
become badly misleading if we take it too literally in scientific theorising (see Boyer, 
P. (2018). Minds Make Societies: How Cognition Explains the World Humans Create 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).
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as having a perfectly shared norm structure, ethos, or episteme.5 This 
might well be different from that of a different society or historical 
period, but, within the society or historical period, everyone subscribes 
to it; within-group homogeneity and between-group variation. Hence 
the anthropologist’s fantasy that you can talk about ‘the culture’ or 
‘the norms’ of the Fuegians or the Russians as more than a statistical 
summary of a distribution. But this really is a myth: careful study 
actually reveals that there is, in many domains, much more variation 
in values and behaviour within cultural groups than there is between 
them.6 
For agentic thinkers, by contrast, the central and most important 
truth about human societies is that they are made up of diverse 
individuals with different ideas, preferences and interests. The social 
order is partial and contested; to the extent that it exists, it is the uneasy 
truce in innumerable arguments and compromises between people 
with different wants and values. It is always, therefore, unstable and 
provisional, imperfectly agreed, and will be obeyed unevenly. At every 
moment it will be challenged, disputed, violated, transformed and 
renegotiated, usually in small ways and occasionally in larger ones. It is 
this ceaseless seething of variation and challenge that gives the system 
its dynamism, but also which makes it alight over historical time on 
consensual, or at least hard-to-overturn, solutions to the problems of 
communal living. 
Culturally-oriented writers do sometimes talk about within-group 
heterogeneity in values, and of individuals challenging the social order. 
For example, people may contest or resist the dominant episteme rather 
than just accepting it, according to their own context and perspective. 
5  For example, Foucault: ‘In any given culture and at any given moment, there is 
always only one ‘episteme’ that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, 
whether expressed in theory or silently invested in a practice.’ Foucault, M. (1970). 
The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Pantheon, p. 
168). 
6  Bell, A.V, P. J. Richerson and R. McElreath. (2009). Culture rather than genes provides 
greater scope for the evolution of large-scale human prosociality. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 106: 17671–74, https://doi.
org/10.1073/pnas.0903232106. The emphasis of these authors is rather different: they 
show that there is more within-group homogeneity and between-group variation in 
cultural values than in genes. True, but let’s put it into context: the rather little of the 
variation in cultural values that is explained by cultural group membership is a bit 
more than the virtually none of the variation in genes that is so explained. 
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This immediately raises the question: what are these people standing on 
whilst they try to rip up the floor? Where is the vantage point outside of 
an episteme from which you can critique it and formulate a different one 
more suited to your interests? What resistance to dominant ideologies 
tells us is that it can’t be socialization all the way down; the cultural 
explanation, to be complete, requires that there is an agentic bedrock 
people can stand on to sometimes contest the episteme. Malleable as 
people may be to the norms and discourses of their time, there are 
some properties of natural agency—some no-doubt fuzzy set of recurring 
intuitions, motivations, judgements, and interests—that stand beyond 
the local social order, and which people can use to resist, criticise or 
reinforce that order. Maybe these properties of natural agency are 
only intermittently visible, as it were distant mountains often lost in 
the epistemic fog, but they must be there somewhere. Their roots, it 
is reasonable to suggest, lie in the legacy of the deep natural history 
shared by all living humans.7 
§
As things stand, the social sciences are balkanized between agentic parts 
and cultural parts. Economics is largely agentic in its style of reasoning, 
and much of political science follows suit. My own disciplinary watering 
hole, behavioural ecology, also favours the agentic.8 By contrast, parts 
7  Shared by all humans except, it seems, for Michel Foucault. After Noam Chomsky, a 
great believer in humanity’s shared properties of natural agency, debated Foucault 
on television in 1971, he commented: ‘I liked him personally, it’s just that I couldn’t 
make sense of him. It’s as if he was from a different species, or something’ (Miller, 
J. (1993). The Passion of Michel Foucault (New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 201–3).
8  See Smith, E. A. (2013). Agency and adaptation: New directions in evolutionary 
anthropology. Annual Review of Anthropology 42: 103–20, https://doi.org/10.1146/
annurev-anthro-092412-155447. Things get rather confusing here. Behavioural 
ecology is an evolutionary approach. As Smith notes, evolutionary approaches have 
often been criticized by social scientists as allegedly not allowing for human agency, 
whereas ‘sociocultural’ approaches apparently do. I still maintain that behavioural 
ecology is agentic in the sense I am using it here, since it assumes individuals 
actively and plastically make efforts to pursue their survival and reproduction 
given the circumstances in which they find themselves. The individuals considered 
by behavioural ecology are thus not just agentic, but have something specific to be 
agentic about. In my view, whether a position does well or badly at allowing for 
human agency is orthogonal to whether it self-identifies as ‘evolutionary’. Strongly 
culture-first positions struggle to recover an interesting or rich notion of agency, 
since they view individuals as basically dupes, uncritically susceptible to their 
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of Sociology and Anthropology are more cultural. Clearly this split is 
a problem. Some kind of agreed division of labour persisted for a few 
decades. For example, for large-scale societies, the discipline of Economics 
dealt with monetised, rational, instrumentally-motivated exchanges of 
goods and services between strangers, using agentic thinking, whilst 
Sociology dealt with non-monetised, normatively-governed features of 
life such as family formation, households, and voluntary associations, 
using, with exceptions, mainly cultural thinking. But this division of 
labour does not really work. For one thing, the rational-actor reasoning 
of Economics can be readily applied within households and to non-
monetised interactions; for another thing, it is clear that morality and 
normative concerns play a big part even in monetised transactions 
amongst strangers.9 When you are in a restaurant in a foreign city, do 
you pay a tip? If you are anything like me, your first question will be: 
what do people round here generally do? I want to do that. 
Cultural and agentic thinking both capture something real, and 
satisfactory social theories need to encompass both. It’s hard to find 
clear roadmaps for how to do this: usually authors start off in the 
camp belonging to one perspective, and at most hint at the other. The 
most useful source I have encountered is Herb Gintis’ Individuality 
and Entanglement.10 Gintis’ book is a serious call to arms to reintegrate 
Economics with Sociology and Anthropology, and hence bridge the 
agentic and the cultural. Central to Gintis’ analysis is the rational actor 
model. At the primary level, humans are agentic decision makers. 
Typical economist, you say, this is just the same old individualistic, 
agentic stuff. How do you explain morality? How do you explain why 
people follow norms when no-one is watching? Hang on—you are in 
danger of making a common conflation of rational actor with self-regarding 
actor. The micro-economists’ rational actor model only says that people 
can be modelled as having preferences, and that when they do things, 
they follow these preferences in a consistent way. For example, if they 
prefer A over B and B over C, then they will choose A over C. The model 
social and historical context. This is true whether such positions adopt evolutionary 
paraphernalia or not.
9  See Bowles, S. (2016). The Moral Economy: Why Good Incentives Are No Substitute for 
Good Citizens (Yale: Yale University Press). 
10  Gintis, H. (2017). Individuality and Entanglement: The Moral and Material Bases of Social 
Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
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nowhere says that the preferences people hold have to be selfish ones. 
The preferences could be aesthetically, morally or socially motivated. 
They could be altruistic or self-harming. The rational actor model only 
makes a claim about how preferences will be translated into decisions. 
Thus, it’s a fallacy whenever you read (and you often do read): ‘The 
facts that many people give blood, or donate money to strangers, violate 
the predictions of the rational actor model’. Not necessarily. The donors 
could be acting perfectly rationally, just as the rational actor model 
requires, if their preferences include improving the welfare of others. 
What generosity violates is the hypothesis that people’s preferences are 
exclusively self-regarding. But you should have noticed that anyway. 
Gintis suggests that we have three broad kinds of preferences, self-
regarding (when we are hungry, we want food); other-regarding (when 
we see someone in distress, we want to help); and normative (we want 
to follow the rules, because they are the rules). But how do we integrate 
these very different preferences, when so often it seems that they might 
point us in different directions? There is no fundamental problem here. 
After all, we have no difficulty with the idea that we might integrate 
conflicting self-regarding preferences: we simply weigh them against 
one another, trading off if need be. I have to decide how much of my 
money to save, and how much to spend on running shoes. I might 
well be influenced in my trade-off by the prevailing rate of interest on 
savings, or the prospect of a looming expense next year, or a sale at the 
running shop. The same logic of weighing up and trading off applies 
when integrating self-regarding and non-self-regarding preferences. I 
want to help others, but the amount I invest in doing so will reasonably 
depend on the effectiveness of help I can deliver to them, the other calls 
on my time, and any rules I would have to break to do so. On my bicycle 
I like to stop at red lights, even when no-one is around—I think it’s 
a good norm—but I might sacrifice obeying it if I was in a hurry, or 
in order to come to someone’s rescue. And if I thought it was a bad 
norm, I would have a lower threshold for breaking it. So, in short, all of 
our varied motivations, self-regarding, other-regarding and normative, 
can simply be thought of as producing preferences of a unitary kind, 
preferences that get weighed against one another and traded off in 
moment-to-moment decision making, according to the context. 
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Because we have normative preferences—desires to do the 
appropriate thing, not for instrumental reasons, but for its own sake—a 
social and moral order can emerge, be largely obeyed and be somewhat 
stable, even when there are moment-to-moment self-regarding 
incentives for violating it at every turn. The order becomes internal and 
psychologically real. This sounds like a good thing, but is not always 
so. If the local norm seems to be that other people behave selfishly, then 
selfishness can spread rapidly and become a locally stable anti-social 
order.11 
The existence of normative preferences allows Gintis to capture what 
is good about cultural thinking. However, our normative adherence is 
not slavish; because we also have self-regarding and other-regarding 
motivations, if the norms get too costly to our self-interest or the welfare 
of others, we may prefer to violate or abandon them. This captures 
what is good about agentic thinking. Thus, norms both structure our 
behaviour in the short term, and yet are structured by our behaviour in 
the long term, in the sense that bad norms can be changed.12 Norms 
are empirically fixed, but transcendentally negotiable. And there is an 
emphasis I would like to add: when people find norms too costly, often 
they do not just individually abandon them. Instead or in addition, they 
talk to others about changing them. They produce, in the public sphere, 
reasons and arguments for why the social order should be different: 
political actions. Sometimes they even manage to persuade one another, 
and social change ensues. This aspect of social life, the use of reasoning 
and conversation as a means to change the rules of the games we live 
by, all the while accepting that there must be rules, is neglected in many 
contemporary treatments of culture, which focus instead on automatic, 
unreasoned socialization. But it is the possibility of reasoning and 
11  Keizer, K., S. Lindenberg and L. Steg. (2008). The spreading of disorder. Science 
322: 1681–85, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1161405; Schroeder, K. B., G. V. Pepper 
and D. Nettle. (2014). Local norms of cheating and the cultural evolution of crime 
and punishment: A study of two urban neighborhoods. PeerJ 2: e450, https://doi.
org/10.7717/peerj.450
12  For example: ‘it would be wrong to think of [the social order] as a dictator who 
rules by force […]. Social norms will not be followed when they are not considered 
legitimate […]. Moreover, social norms generally are instantiated and changed 
through collective action, so that [the social order] itself is the product of a social 
will’ (Gintis, H. (2017). Individuality and Entanglement: The Moral and Material Bases 
of Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 113).
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conversation that gives me, as a scholar and a member of civil society, 
most hope for our common future.13 
Gintis’ analysis has the capacity to generate everything from 
extreme cultural thinking—if you assume that people’s intrinsic 
preference for upholding norms is very strong relative to their other 
preferences—through to business-as-usual agentic analysis, if you 
assume that normative concerns have a trivially low weight compared 
to other concerns. The strength of normative motivation is thus like a 
slider with which you can fade from the very agentic to the very cultural 
and back again. Gintis does not solve where the slider is actually set for 
the typical human. Indeed, different passages of his book have quite 
different emphases in this regard. But surely, if we can take this as a 
framework, we can go beyond simply calling one or the other style of 
explanation wrong, and instead design a unified empirical programme 
that tries to find out where the slider is set, and what affects this setting. 
§
I worry that we are too cultural when reasoning about people who are 
very different from us, and too agentic when reasoning about ourselves 
and our friends. Let’s say anthropologist A claims, in her academic work, 
that the behaviour of the tribal people she studies is well explained by 
their propensity to internalize norms through socialization, leading to 
slavish within-group homogeneity in values and beliefs. Presumably, 
she doesn’t believe these same principles account for her own behaviour 
in adopting this view. When asked, she doesn’t answer that the reason 
she holds this view is because she was socialized to do so, and she 
slavishly accepts whatever she is taught. She says she adopted her view 
because she thought about it deeply and thinks it is a good theory, 
possibly in spite of the view being non-normative in the field. Her daily 
professional life shows theorist A that her fellow anthropologists don’t 
easily accept the norms of the disciplinary community either: they take 
great pleasure in ceaselessly and idiosyncratically quibbling with her, 
13  An approach very congenial to the perspective outlined in this paragraph has been 
developed by Simon Powers. He seeks to explain the form of social institutions by 
modelling strategic agents who interact economically in transactions following the 
current social rules, but also interact politically to change those rules for the future. 
See Powers, S. T. (2018). The institutional approach for modeling the evolution of 
human societies. Artificial Life 24: 10–28, https://doi.org/10.1162/artl_a_00251 
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for substantive as well as strategic reasons. As a consequence, far from 
there being cultural homogeneity in her discipline, there are as many 
shades of opinion as there are scholars, if not more. So the cultural 
group that theorist A actually has most experience of—her academic 
community—doesn’t seem to fit the very theory she espouses. She and 
her fellow academics live in an agentic world, where different individuals 
have different values; beliefs require substantive justification; everyone 
is intensely sceptical about the claims of others; and the result is a 
myriad of clashing and shifting opinions within the same cultural group. 
Her study subjects, by contrast, seem to live in a cultural world where 
everyone credulously and automatically accepts what they are taught, 
and there is stable within-group consensus. So either: academics in 
Western societies are profoundly different from other humans; theorist 
A is right about her study subjects, but deluded about herself and her 
fellow academics; or theorist A is right about herself, but deluded about 
her study subjects. 
It’s easy to see where this double-think comes from. When we 
don’t know much about a category of people, that category looks 
homogenous, and we represent it cognitively with a few sweeping and 
static generalizations. That’s all our direct experience allows us to do. So 
that’s how, if we are not very careful, we end up thinking about people 
in faraway places or distant times: more culturally. But where we have 
more direct personal experience, we build a richer representation, with 
more room for individual heterogeneity, the diversity of motivations, 
the within-group conflicts, and the ever-shifting dynamics. So that’s 
how we think about ourselves and the other academics within our 
own discipline: more agentically. Thus, a bullshit test for social-theory 
frameworks that I rather like is to ask: do I find that framework rich 
enough to account for the social lives of the people I actually know? 
If the answer is no, then I see no reason it should be rich enough for 
anyone else either. 
A version of double-think that I encounter in my own work concerns 
the behaviour of poor people, and why it differs from the behaviour 
of rich people. Poor people within developed countries are relatively 
likely to do various things that harm their health, such as smoking and 
overeating. A frequent mode of explanation for this in the literature is 
to say that, because their adverse lives grind them down, poor people 
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are in less of a position to exert agency or free choice than rich people 
are, so they end up manipulated by the tobacco or sugar industries.14 I 
find this argument uncomfortable. I accept of course that poor people 
have fewer options than the rich (there are fewer ways to furnish 3000 
calories per day on a small budget than on a large one), and may 
also experience different benefits from health behaviour (no point in 
avoiding smoking if you are likely to be killed in an industrial accident 
by age 50 anyway). I also accept that people can be manipulated by 
commercial interests. But the argument that rich people are somehow 
more agentic than poor people, rather than equally agentic but with a 
different set of constraints and incentives, disturbs me. In effect, it seems 
to be saying, the rich may be fully human rational actors responsible 
for their decisions, but the poor are just credulous patients doing what 
they are told; a lower stage on some kind of scala rationis humanae. They 
need to be helped, as children must be, up to the point where they will 
be capable of choosing for themselves, but they are not yet there. The 
fact that these ideas come from scholars who are sympathetic to poor 
people, critical of capitalism, and progressive in intent, does not for me 
completely mitigate the discomfort of the double standard. I could live 
with the idea that we are all the passive victims of commercial interests; 
or the idea that we all choose our health behaviours, according to the 
constraints and incentives of our circumstances. But I can’t get entirely 
comfortable with the idea that there are different modes of explanation 
for rich and poor.15 
14  For example: ‘poor and food-insecure groups have the least agency to resist 
commercial interests […] this lack of agency is itself promoted by corporate 
manipulation of dietary quality and food availability’: Wells, J. C. K. (2017). Obesity 
is not just elevated adiposity, it is also a state of metabolic perturbation. Behavioural 
and Brain Sciences 40: e105, p. 35–6, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x16001552. See 
also Marmot, M. (2015). The Health Gap: The Challenge of an Unequal World (London: 
Bloomsbury) for similar views.
15  In a recent discussion, Gillian Pepper and I were accused of subscribing to the ‘poor 
but neo-classical’ style of analysis. This style of analysis basically says that poor 
people follow the same neo-classical micro-economic principles as anyone else. 
On balance we take it as a compliment: we’re not sure we are really neo-classical, 
but if we were to be, we would want to be neo-classical about rich and poor alike. 
See Carmel and Leiser’s commentary (p. 22), and Pepper and Nettle’s response 
(p. 45–54), in Pepper, G. V. and D. Nettle. (2017). The behavioural constellation 
of deprivation: Causes and consequences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40: e314, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x1600234x  
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What I take away from this is the following principle: we should 
have a strong prior that all humans are just as cultural and just as agentic as 
each other. I don’t mind where you place your thinking on the cultural-
to-agentic continuum—though I am more disposed to the agentic than 
the cultural, I can see the merits of several different positions. Wherever 
you place it, though, I think it should start at the same point for everyone, 
regardless of: the colour of their skin; their level of education; whether 
they are a hunter-gatherer, a subsistence farmer, an unemployed welder 
from Glasgow, a university professor, an antique Roman, or a Dane. 
Either we are all agents, it seems to me, or none of us is.
4. What is cultural evolution like?
Different problems require different tools
–Tim Lewens1
For over twenty years, I have been having an on again/off again affair. 
The other party in the affair is appealing and effortlessly elegant. She 
promises to wash away the mundane, equivocal, hesitant, mutually 
contradictory strata of my work as a behavioural scientist and replace 
them with something simpler, crystalline and more powerful. I 
encounter her from time to time in the course of my professional duties. 
We write a paper or two together. I expect summits at Camp David. But 
within a year or two I start to pull away. She is brittle behind the mask. I 
start to worry about how the bills will really get paid. When the mirrors 
have stopped dazzling and the smoke has cleared, I realise I still have all 
the problems I had before.
The other party in the relationship is an idea. Actually, two linked 
ideas: (i) that cultural change is a Darwinian process; and (ii) that 
because (i) is true, social science can be substantially simplified under 
the rubric of a single body of theory that does the same job, in the same 
way, as evolutionary theory does for genetic evolution. These ideas have 
been knocking around for about forty years. They have their passionate 
adherents.2 But they continue to attract scepticism, and despite all the 
conceptual discussion, I don’t notice journals of sociology, politics, social 
anthropology, history, cultural studies and so on being full of empirical 
calculations of cultural fitness, cultural relatedness, cultural heritability 
1  Lewens, T. (2017). Cultural Evolution: Conceptual Challenges (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 146).
2  Notable adherents are: Dawkins, R. (1976). The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press); Mesoudi, A., A. Whiten and K. N. Laland. (2006). Toward a 
unified science of cultural evolution. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29: 329–83, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x06009083; Mesoudi, A. (2015). Cultural evolution: 
A review of theory, findings and controversies. Evolutionary Biology 43: 481–97, 
© 2018 Daniel Nettle, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0155.04
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and so forth, in the way that journals of evolutionary biology are full of 
the genetic versions of these notions. So what is going on?
There are a number of possibilities. One is that ideas (i) and (ii) are 
fundamentally correct, and Rome wasn’t built in a day. The history of 
science shows us that the right idea takes a long time to rise up through 
layers of inertia, tradition and disciplinary resistance. Plate tectonics, 
for example, took about 60 years from first, derided claims to universal 
acceptance. The acceptance took the form of a characteristic S-curve: 
very slowly rising for a long time, then a phase of rapid spread, then 
the slow mopping up of the few remaining non-believers. So as a 
cultural Darwinian, you must tell yourself that you are just entering the 
accelerating phase on the S-curve; this year. My problem is: I thought that 
twenty years ago, when I wrote my first cultural Darwinian papers.3 I 
am still waiting.
Another possibility is that idea (i) is wrong, and hence idea (ii) 
also fails, but there are other reasons people cling to them. Research 
in the humanities and social sciences is in slow decline (not without 
a fight). Eighty years ago, to a fairly reasonable approximation, the 
humanities and social sciences were what universities did. Today, also 
to an approximation, universities have a dual role: they teach students 
in humanities and social sciences, and they do research in biology. A 
glance at the difference in teaching load, and research and infrastructure 
funding, between my faculty in my university (Biomedicine), and 
the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, is instructive. We are 
researchers with expensive labs and technical support teams who give 
the odd lecture; they are teachers who occasionally manage to scrape 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11692-015-9320-0. Before I annoy anyone any more than I 
need to, I should distinguish between cultural evolutionary thinking, and cultural 
Darwinism. The former is simply the attempt to understand the population-level 
consequences over time, for human societies and their cultural attributes, of 
individual patterns of learning and cognition. It is broader than cultural Darwinism, 
a subset of cultural evolutionary thinking which sees cultural change as a process 
of Darwinian selection and hopes through that insight to radically transform the 
social sciences. Cultural evolutionists are not necessarily committed to cultural 
Darwinism: see Lewens, T. (2017). Cultural Evolution: Conceptual Challenges (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) for discussion.
3  For example Nettle, D. (1999). Functionalism and its difficulties in linguistics 
and biology. In Functionalism and Formalism in Linguistics (M. Darnell et al. eds, 
Amsterdam: Benjamins, p. 445–62), https://doi.org/10.1075/slcs.41.21net
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the time to write articles and books. Anything that seems to offer the 
humanities and social sciences the possibility of getting what biology 
has had seems worth grasping at. So idea (i) does not quite die. Sadly, 
those who want to save the humanities and social sciences through a 
Darwinian theory of culture are probably looking in the wrong place. 
The recent growth of biology is almost entirely in cellular and molecular 
work, a part of biology largely free from the guiding light of Darwin’s 
dangerous idea. The driving forces have been rapid technical progress 
in what researchers can measure, and the computational firepower to 
mine the resulting big data. So that’s where a lot of the smart money in 
social science is going to go too.
As so often in life, I find myself somewhere in the middle ground. 
The analogy between genetic and cultural evolution is strong enough 
that it continues to capture my theoretical attention.4 On the other hand, 
it’s not straightforward enough for ideas (i) and (ii) to get off the ground 
in a major way. I don’t expect the revolution imminently. Hence my on/
off affair. Hanging on to both edges, as usual.
§
Genetic and cultural evolution are not exactly isomorphic. Everyone 
admits that. On the other hand, there are some general similarities: 
something gets transmitted from individual to individual; some 
things spread and others become extinct; there is a kind of descent 
with modification, and so on. So the issue is: what do we do with this 
partial similarity? We could either: define Darwinian processes rather 
narrowly, and thereby include genes but exclude culture; or find broader 
ways of defining Darwinian processes, so as to include the cultural case 
as well as the genetic.5 Clearly the answer we get to the question of 
whether cultural change is Darwinian will depend on the definition of 
‘Darwinian’ we adopt. A more fruitful avenue, to my mind, is to ask: 
what special job does evolutionary theory do for organismal biology, 
4  Most recently in El Mouden, C. et al. (2014). Cultural transmission and the evolution 
of human behaviour: A general approach based on the Price equation. Journal of 
Evolutionary Biology 27: 231–41, https://doi.org/10.1111/jeb.12296
5  As in Claidière, N., T. C. Scott-Phillips and D. Sperber. (2014). How Darwinian is 
cultural evolution?. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences 369: 20130368, https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2013.0368
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and what are the properties of genetic evolution in virtue of which it can 
do that job? Then we can assess the extent to which cultural evolution has 
those properties, and hence whether a Darwinian ‘cultural evolutionary 
theory’ could do that job. I’m in an off-again phase, and so I am going 
to conclude that cultural evolution generally lacks the properties and 
hence ‘cultural evolutionary theory’ (thought of in this particular 
way) can’t really do the job. This much has often been said before, by 
better people than me. Perhaps I have a slightly more unusual insight, 
though, which is that the real problem for the hope of a unified cultural 
Darwinian theory is that different cultural cases are very different from 
one another, and hence approximate the genetic situation to different 
degrees. This is a serious blow to hope (ii), the hope of simplification of 
the social sciences under a cultural Darwinian banner.
It’s a commonplace that you have Darwinian evolution whenever 
you have variation (different individuals in a population have different 
traits); heredity (offspring resemble their parents); and differential 
reproductive success (the descendant generation differentially samples 
from the ancestral one, or equivalently, different individuals have 
different chances of becoming ancestors). This much is true, but I think 
we need to build the requirements up more slowly. First, there must 
be a clearly defined population of individuals through time; you need 
to know what your individuals are. Second, within that population, 
you must be able to identify which individuals are descendants of which 
others, and which are not. Without being able to do this, there is no 
hope of measuring reproductive success, since the very notion depends 
on descendant-counting. Third, these individuals need to have traits: 
characters, discrete or continuous, that you can measure, and hence 
characterize straightforwardly the extent to which descendant is like 
ancestor.
With these requirements in place, we can characterize the way 
any particular trait changes from one generation to the next. This was 
famously done by George Price, in the Price equation.6 So general and 
important is this equation that it has a movie based on it, wΔz (directed 
by Tom Shankland, 2007; apparently it’s a horror story). The Price 
equation says, in words, that in each generation:
6  Price, G. R. (1970). Selection and covariance. Nature 227: 520–21, https://doi.
org/10.1038/227520a0
 634. What is cultural evolution like?
Total evolutionary change in the trait =
 A bit due to selection +
 A bit due to average transformation
The Price equation also tells us how to compute the value of each bit. 
The bit due to selection is exactly the covariance between the value 
of the trait, and fitness, where fitness is the individual’s number of 
descendants in the next generation, divided by the population average 
number of descendants. A covariance is like a correlation: it can be 
positive, negative or zero. So let’s say that the trait is nose length. If 
it is the case that the longer your nose, the higher your reproductive 
success on average, then the covariance between nose length and fitness 
is positive, and the value of the bit due to selection is positive. This 
means selection is making noses longer from generation to generation. 
If longer noses tend to be associated with reduced reproductive success, 
then the covariance of nose length with fitness is negative, and hence 
selection is making noses shorter. And of course, the length of your 
nose may have no systematic relationship with reproductive success, in 
which case, the bit due to selection has a value of zero, and there is no 
directional selection on the trait.
Then there is the bit due to average transformation. Imagine a case 
where, because of some strange quirk of genetics or development, 
offspring always had noses that were a bit longer than the average 
of the lengths of their two parents’ noses. It’s easy to see that noses 
would get longer over evolutionary time, even in the absence of any 
natural selection. In fact, they could get longer over evolutionary time 
even with some natural selection acting in the opposite direction. The 
Price equation tells us exactly when this will happen: when the average 
amount by which an offspring’s nose length exceeds those of its parents 
(the bit due to average transformation) exceeds the negative covariance 
between nose length and fitness (the bit due to selection). This is because, 
to get the total evolutionary change from the Price equation, you simply 
add the two bits on the right-hand side together.
It’s important not to confuse random mutation or imperfect heredity 
with average transformation. Let’s say there is quite a lot of genetic 
mutation, so that offspring nose length is not perfectly predicted by parent 
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nose length. If an offspring’s nose is just as likely to be a bit shorter than 
their parents’ as a bit longer than their parents’, then on average, their nose 
is neither longer nor shorter, and so the bit due to average transformation 
is still zero. The genetic mutation averages itself out as it were, and the 
total evolutionary change comes from the bit due to selection alone, even 
though individuals do not perfectly resemble their parents.
§
With this exposition in the bank, we can begin to ask what properties 
genetic evolution has that allow it to do a special job for organismal 
biology. And it does do a rather special job. A relatively straightforward 
mode of theorising, in which trait evolution is explained on the basis of 
higher or lower fitness, can be brought to bear in much the same way on 
any organismal trait, be it the dimensions of the hummingbird, the shape 
of fish eyes, the propensity to help others reproduce, or the way animals 
forage. The mode of theorising can be used regardless of what the trait 
in question actually is, and in particular, without knowing anything 
about the details of the molecular genetic mechanisms involved. Why 
can we do this?
The first reason we are able to do this in the genetic case is that 
the relations of ancestry and descent are straightforward. I have just 
two genetic parents. No one else has influenced the length of my nose 
(heritably, that is). Those same two individuals are my parents in respect 
of all of my other traits, not just nose length. The ancestor-descendant 
link points in one direction only: I can’t back-influence the heritable 
traits of my genetic parents. And how many parents I have does not 
depend on the lengths of their noses. That sounds bizarre, but is not 
guaranteed in the cultural case. For example, I might sample the way 
of life of the first few people I encounter. If it seems to suit me, fine, I 
follow it, but if it seems dreary, I might go looking for other people to 
emulate. This is me shopping for cultural ancestors on the basis of the 
traits they offer, something we don’t get to do with our genes. Because 
of the straightforwardness of the ancestor-descendant mapping in the 
genetic case, you can readily count offspring and measure reproductive 
success. And then it’s easy to compute the value of the bit of evolutionary 
change due to selection: measure the trait you are interested in, count 
descendants, apply the formula for a covariance.
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The second reason fitness is central to organismal evolution is 
that for most traits considered by biologists, the bit due to average 
transformation is zero or negligible. The conclusive evidence for this is 
that when, in wΔz, the evil serial killer carves the Price equation onto the 
flesh of her victims, mindful of parsimony and apparently having the 
biological case in mind, she only includes the term for the bit due to selection 
on the right-hand side. She can simply leave out the term for the bit due to 
average transformation because, usually, genetic reproduction systems 
have no particular transformational drive one way or the other. Thus 
the Price equation, for genetic cases, usually reduces to evolutionary 
change being equal to the covariation between the trait value and fitness.
Why is average transformation negligible as a source of change in 
genetic systems? It is because, in some profound sense, the function of 
DNA replication mechanisms is to indifferently reproduce whatever is 
thrown at them. That’s their job. DNA replicase is indifferent whether 
it replicates a cytosine or replicates a guanine, indifferent indeed to 
what if anything the particular stretch of DNA it is currently copying 
actually does. It simply has no interests other than to fulfil its evolved 
role of making DNA into more DNA. To the extent that mutation 
happens (and it does, though overall fidelity is high), this mutation can 
be fairly analogised, as it often is, to ‘mistakes’ or ‘imperfections’ in the 
replicative process. And at reproduction, fair meiosis generally ensures 
that no variant gets a leg up, on average, over any other.
The profound content-indifference and impartiality of DNA 
replication provides us, as scientists, with the option of abstracting 
away from a lot of the details of how replication and reproduction 
actually work in each particular case. You can usefully treat genes in 
populations as if they were simply beans being drawn from a bag.7 
To think about the evolution of nose length, you don’t really need to 
know about the molecular details of which stretches of DNA influence 
nose length and how, at least in the first instance. This is because you 
can take it for granted that those molecular details, however they work 
out, come down to offspring of long-nosed parents having long noses, 
plus some effectively random noise. So we can make a great deal of 
progress just by knowing that nose length is heritable, and measuring 
7  Haldane, J. B. S. (1964). A defense of beanbag genetics. Perspectives in Biology and 
Medicine 7: 343–59, https://doi.org/10.1353/pbm.1964.0042
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how it correlates with fitness, without getting bogged down in the 
messy biology of the specific case. Indeed, the messy biology of the 
mechanisms in each particular case is still largely unknown to us: a 
black box that we have scarcely as yet peered inside. And because in 
each biological case, we have been able to abstract from the details of 
the molecular and developmental processes involved, then all normal 
biological cases are effectively like one another from an evolutionary 
theoretical point of view. Transmission is by fair replication from one or 
two parents, and selection (plus drift) are, to a first approximation, the 
drivers; the rest is about the impact of the trait on fitness in populations. 
The general formulae apply. This is the sense in which we can sensibly 
talk of an evolutionary theory, rather than one theory for the evolution 
of eye shape, based on the developmental biology of eyes, one theory 
for the evolution of blood proteins, based on the physiology of blood 
proteins, and so forth.
§
Now let’s start to think about cultural cases. We start where I started 
my career, with the evolution of words.8 Consider Zipf’s law, which 
states that words that are used more frequently in a language tend to 
be shorter, whilst rare words are longer.9 This looks pretty much like 
an adaptation: it benefits speakers in terms of overall articulatory effort 
if the shortest available word forms are used up on the meanings we 
need most often, and longer words forms saved for meanings we don’t 
need to utter very often. And it’s tempting to characterise the process 
producing the pattern in terms of selection. Doing so, in fact, goes right 
back to Darwin, who noted in The Descent of Man:
As Max Muller […] has well remarked:—”A struggle for life is constantly 
going on amongst the words and grammatical forms in each language. 
The better, the shorter, the easier forms are constantly gaining the upper 
hand, and they owe their success to their own inherent virtue.”10
8  Nettle, D. (1995). Segmental inventory size, word length, and communicative 
efficiency. Linguistics 33: 359–67, https://doi.org/10.1515/ling.1995.33.2.359
9  Zipf, G. K. (1949). Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort (Cambridge, MA: 
Addison-Wesley).
10  Darwin, C. (1871). The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (London: John 
Murray, p. 465–66).
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Let’s unpack how this might work. People have a set of cultural parents 
from whom they learn their word forms. We can assume that they learn 
their word forms early in life, and the forms are fixed thereafter. So that 
means word-form learning really is a bit like genetic inheritance, with 
ancestor-descendant arrows pointing in one direction only, from older 
people to younger. The set of cultural parents is broader than just their 
genetic parents of course, but the Price equation can be generalised to 
an arbitrary number of parents, and indeed can be generalised to a case 
where parenthood is a matter of degree: you have many cultural parents, 
and some are more influential than others.11 Fitness then becomes not 
the number of descendants you have, but the average strength of your 
influence on all the individuals in the next generation. No intrinsic 
problem there; though, given that the set of people you learn from can 
be different for different traits (I learn playground games from my 
peers, science from my teachers), it does follow that every individual 
has not just one cultural fitness, but indefinitely many cultural fitnesses, 
one for each cultural trait.
The main quibble with analogising the emergence of Zipf’s law to 
adaptation through natural selection is that it is not clear the adaptation 
arises from the selection bit of the Price equation, rather than the 
average transformation bit. It could be that as you grow up, you hear 
various idiosyncratic variant word forms spoken around you, and you 
have a bias towards adopting in your own speech those variants that 
give you short word forms for frequent meanings. That would be a kind 
of selection. But an alternative (not mutually exclusive) mechanism is 
that as you use language, you tend to spontaneously shorten words 
or phrases you utter frequently. You might do this even if you have 
not heard the people you learn from do so. Geddit? This could be the 
source of Zipf’s law. Word forms tend to start life long, and if they are 
used often, speakers spontaneously contract them through economy of 
effort. If that’s right, then the adaptive change is not actually due to 
selection, but rather a particular bias in average transformation (a person’s 
habitual word form for a common meaning will be a bit shorter than 
11  See El Mouden, C. et al. (2014). Cultural transmission and the evolution of human 
behaviour: A general approach based on the Price equation. Journal of Evolutionary 
Biology 27: 231–41, https://doi.org/10.1111/jeb.12296
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the average length of that word form in the models from whom that 
speaker learned).
Whether word evolution is due to transformation or selection 
is, you might say, a rather unimportant technicality. Perhaps. But 
there have been very fine experiments in recent years using so-called 
transmission chain or iterated learning paradigms. Here, one participant 
learns something (a starting stimulus furnished by the experimenters); 
a second participant learns from the first; a third participant learns from 
the second; and so forth. These experiments have been applied to cultural 
content as varied as stories, communication conventions, rhythmic 
patterns, statistical relationships, and many other things.12 They show in 
fascinating detail how cultural change can be rather fast, and decidedly 
non-random: typically, across just half a dozen links of the chain, the 
learned content changes in patterned ways. The contents go from being 
essentially random in the first generation to having the rich structure 
seen in real cultural representations: communication systems become 
grammatically regular; rhythms acquire the regular pattern of strong 
and weak beats you see in all music; and complex random statistical 
scatters are reduced to simple, memorable stereotyped relationships.
I love these experiments. They show us how culture evolves. But 
there is no selection going on. There can be none by design, since every 
participant has exactly one cultural ancestor and exactly one cultural 
descendant. The bit due to selection in the Price equation is therefore 
exactly zero. The rich, non-random shaping of the content that we can see 
in these experiments must be entirely due to average transformation—
the way that human participants actively shape the information they are 
exposed to, in accordance with their purposes, strategies and biases—
and not at all due to selection. That’s a key difference from genetic 
evolution. And it raises the question: if you can get good experimental 
analogues of cultural change in an experimental set-up that excludes 
12  Kirby S., H. Cornish and K. Smith. (2008). Cumulative cultural evolution in the 
laboratory: An experimental approach to the origins of structure in human language. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 105: 10681–86, https://
doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0707835105; Ravignani, A., T. Delgado and S. Kirby. (2017). 
Musical evolution in the lab exhibits rhythmic universals. Nature Human Behaviour 
1: 0007, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-016-0007; Griffiths, T. L., M. L. Kalish and 
S. Lewandowsky. (2008). Theoretical and empirical evidence for the impact of 
inductive biases on cultural evolution. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 
B: Biological Sciences 363: 3503–14, https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2008.0146
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any selection, to what extent is selection needed to do the explanatory 
work for cultural evolution in the wild?
§
They say hard cases make bad law. But there ought to be a similar adage 
for easy cases and bad generalizations. By choosing the cultural cases 
that best fit the analogy between genetic evolution and cultural change, 
we overestimate how good the analogy is overall. In the example 
of word forms considered until now, there are some rather atypical 
circumstances that obtain. It is reasonable to assume that one learns 
one’s word forms early in life, and hangs on to them thereafter. So the 
ancestor-descendant links go in one direction only, from older to younger 
people. But this is not the general case. Consider the cultural evolution 
of scientific ideas. I have learned a lot about science from my long-term 
collaborator Melissa Bateson. But I have also transformed what I have 
learned from her, using my own particular cognitive operations, and 
back-influenced her in turn. And then of course she has reflected on 
and transformed those ideas still more, influencing me again. So who is 
ancestor and who descendant? How will we deal with this if we wish to 
maintain some parallel between genetic evolution and cultural change?
We could say that a person becomes a new individual in respect of 
any particular cultural trait every time they have a change of idea. So 
Melissa Bateson of 2017 is a cultural descendant of, among others, Daniel 
Nettle of 2016, in the domain of scientific ideas. But Daniel Nettle of 2016 
is a cultural descendant of Melissa Bateson of 2015. So we would have 
to admit that Melissa is one of her own cultural grandparents in the 
domain of scientific ideas. Maybe that’s ok. But it means that, for culture, 
Melissa does not just have indefinitely many different fitnesses. She is 
also indefinitely many individuals (some of whom are ancestors to some 
of the others in some domains). And if that weren’t complex enough, 
many of those individuals are alive at the same time. She wrote articles 
twenty years ago that are still influencing biological ideas in January 2017 
via a route other than what she believes in December 2016 (she may even 
have forgotten what they say). I hope it’s clear that the moment you have 
the possibility of repeated and continuous learning over the life-course 
(let alone literacy), the whole question of ancestry, descent, and fitness 
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becomes really rather difficult to track; and culture has potential dynamics 
that cannot be captured with models inspired by beanbag genetics.13
§
Let’s take another example close to my heart: the cultural evolution of 
my local cross-country running league. If cultural Darwinism can do 
anything, I really want it help me here, because this venerable institution 
shows clear evidence of descent with modification, plus evidence of 
adaptation to human purposes, over the course of its 120-year history.14 
Like other Victorian running leagues, it began with ‘hare and hounds’ 
pursuit races. (This is the origin of the name ‘harriers’ in the names of 
many running clubs in the English-speaking world, and also the source 
of the term ‘steeplechase’: routes were not fixed, but a small number of 
‘hares’ would head across the countryside for visible landmarks like 
church steeples, jumping streams and fences, pursued by the pack of 
‘hounds’.) The runners in the pursuing pack were not racing against 
each other for most of the run. They would deliberately stay together 
in a peloton until a final competitive sprint for around the last mile, 
whose sudden onset was orchestrated by a special runner called the 
Whipper-In. After 1950, this system was simplified to ‘all out’ racing: 
the participants all competed against one another from gun to tape, not 
just for the final sprint; the hares and Whipper-In were abandoned.
A subsequent innovation was a handicap system, whereby runners 
who finish high up in one race must start with a handicap in subsequent 
races of the season. This keeps things challenging for the fastest 
people, whilst providing some hope for the slower ones. The handicap 
system applies only to league matches—there is also one cup match 
a year, where everyone goes off together. The rules for promotion to 
a higher handicap in league matches are not symmetrical with those 
for demotion: you can increase your handicap after every match, but 
only decrease it at the end of the season. This means that the first group 
to set off gets smaller and smaller as the season goes on, as more and 
more people attract handicaps. Thus, people who would have no hope 
13  See Strimling, P., M. Enquist and K. Eriksson. (2009). Repeated learning makes 
cultural evolution unique. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 
106: 13870–74, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0903180106
14  The authoritative source is Jenkins, A. (2016). Whipper-In: The Northumberland and 
Durham Paperchase League, the Early Years, the Forerunner of the North East Harrier 
League (Alnwick: Wanney Books).
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of winning in the first match of the season do so in the last. Then there 
are complex rules for how the team’s score arises from the positions of 
individual runners (it’s a team sport); and, a very recent innovation, 
there are several divisions for teams, with rules for team promotion and 
demotion from their division.
I could go on, but I hope you can see that there is an exquisite cultural 
order here that has emerged by the slow reshaping of institutional 
tradition to conform to human needs and desires. Is there any way 
we can fit this slow reshaping into a Darwinian framework? It’s not 
clear that there is variation and selection, since there has only ever been 
one cross-country league in Northeast England. So there aren’t really 
competing variants with higher or lower fitness. After all the whole 
point of an institution is that at any given time, all individuals have to 
sign up to exactly the same rules. I suppose we could say that in some 
sense the rules of cross-country are in competition with other things 
people could spend their Saturday afternoons doing; perhaps the rules 
of cross-country have a fitness relative to golf, say, or gardening. But 
this is rather different from the genetic evolution of nose length, where 
noses of a given length are in competition with simultaneously-present 
noses that are slightly shorter or longer, driving nose length up an 
adaptive gradient of nose length.
And then there is how change works. There’s modification, but is 
it usefully thought of as inheritance plus mutation? There is a league 
committee, who are bound by a written constitution. The committee 
sits down at the end of the season, looks at what went well and what 
people complained about, and uses reason and argumentation to decide 
whether there is anything they want to change. So you could perhaps say 
that there is a kind of virtual variation and selection process, whereby 
the committee simulate in their minds various alternative possibilities, 
then choose the one that seems best for the sport. That would be rather 
evolution-like in way, with the exceptions that the variants with lower 
fitness never get to actually exist outside of committee meetings.
Given that there is only one set of rules, the ancestor for each rule 
in each season seems to be the corresponding rule in the previous 
season—faithful inheritance, with agreed rule changes playing the 
role of mutation. But maybe that’s not right. For example, the recently-
introduced divisional system for teams, with its rules for promotion and 
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demotion, is clearly similar to the rules that do the same job for the 
Football League. So perhaps the cultural trait we should be thinking 
about is not ‘the rule system for cross-country running’ but ‘divisional 
systems in competitive sports’. Then we could talk of the fitness of 
divisional systems being high, as they have colonized new sports like 
cross-country running. But there might be things in some sports which 
are a bit like divisional systems, fashioned somewhat in the style of such 
systems, but not exactly the same as them. How would these contribute 
to the cultural fitness of the people who advocated a divisional system 
for the Football League? Would they count towards it, or not?
There are harder cases still. I fully expect within a few years, there 
will be pressure for women and men to run the same course (currently, 
senior women run two laps and senior men three). If this happens it will 
reflect the broader social concern about gender equity that we currently 
see, for example, in the debate about wages in the UK. Harriers bring 
that broader cognitive and political framing into their leisure activities. 
If gender-equalization happens, then we are effectively saying that 
the value of a trait in cross-country running (course length) has been 
influenced by the existing trait-value, plus a general concern about 
gender equity that is otherwise manifest in entirely different domains 
of human activity. This has no parallel in genetic evolution. It is as if 
you said: the two heritable influences on the length of my nose are 
the length of my father’s nose, and my mother’s sense of humour. But 
culture is pervasively like this. Cognition ranges promiscuously across 
domains and activities, seeking partial resemblances and relevant 
reasons, recombining, tidying up, reconstructing one thing in the light 
of another. This makes even identifying what the traits under cultural 
evolution are, as well as delineating who is culturally ancestral to whom, 
very complex at best.15
§
It is time to limp, bloodied but still determined, towards some more 
general conclusions. For genetic systems, transmission is achieved by 
15  Claidière and colleagues provide a way of addressing some of this through their 
notion of hetero-impact: a feature in one cultural generation can have a causal 
impact on a different feature in the next. See Claidière, N., T. C. Scott-Phillips and 
D. Sperber. (2014). How Darwinian is cultural evolution?. Proceedings of the Royal 
Society B: Biological Sciences 369: 20130368, https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2013.0368
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content-indifferent replication mechanisms; and the relationships of 
ancestor and descendant are straightforward in all cases, and the same 
for all traits. This allows us to bypass the details of how transmission 
is actually achieved, and go straight to a special type of explanation in 
which fitness, and the relationship of different organismal designs to 
fitness, do all the explanatory work. Evolutionary biologists have special 
names for the thinking that underlies this special type of explanation: 
beanbag genetics (idealizing genes to understand their dynamics in 
populations); ultimate reasoning (thinking about fitness consequences 
of a structure rather than the mechanisms that make it); the phenotypic 
gambit (ignoring the genetic architecture of the traits under study); and 
the behavioural gambit (assuming brains can deliver whatever is good 
for fitness without worrying how they might do so). And because you 
can do these special types of thinking for all traits, there is a coherent 
sense in which there is one evolutionary theory: one tightly-integrated, 
portable system of tools for working out change in any genetic system. 
The setting aside of the details of how transmission actually works is 
only a provisional strategy; and the worry is often voiced within biology 
that you can’t entirely get away with it. In the end, the details of the 
available mechanisms are probably going to matter for what happens.16 
Still, people have been able to do a lot by making the idealizations and 
thinking at the ultimate level.
In the cultural case, transmission is achieved by human action 
and human thought. Humans are very far from indifferent about the 
contents of their acts and thoughts. The function of DNA replicase is to 
replicate DNA, but the function of humans is not to replicate culture. 
The function of humans is to be humans. This is a crucial difference. 
It means humans have all kinds of characteristic interests, strategies, 
goals, biases, priors, intuitions, and so forth. They apply shaping forces 
to whatever they transmit, sometimes unconscious and automatic 
ones, sometimes deliberate and reasoned ones; sometimes through 
individual action, sometimes through institutions. If it seems like 
humans unreflectively replicate just whatever society is doing, that’s 
only because we focus on atypical cases. In the case of which side of 
16  See for example Fawcett, T. W., S. Hamblin and L. A. Giraldeau. (2012). Exposing 
the behavioral gambit: the evolution of learning and decision rules. Behavioral 
Ecology 24: 2–11, https://doi.org/10.1093/beheco/ars085
74 Hanging on to the Edges
the road to drive on, for example, my only interest in choosing one is to 
choose the same one as everyone else in the country. So for that trait, 
humans are remarkably obedient replicators of the society they live in, 
and a basically arbitrary norm is stable indefinitely. But most traits are 
not like that. Mostly, I have interests and biases that go beyond the mere 
desire for my behaviour to be the same as everyone else’s.17
The shaping forces in culture will be different for every trait. So too 
will the relationships of ancestor to descendant: you learn different 
things in different ways. So too will the dynamics: you learn some 
things once and for all; others you continuously update through your 
life. There is thus no very general expectation we can form, for example 
that humans will hold such beliefs as maximise their cultural fitness, 
or anything like that. This is not a counsel of despair. I am not just 
saying ‘it’s all very complex’, or that we are limited to a kind of post-
hoc or qualitative historical interpretation of cultural change, without 
hope of bringing it under the umbrella of natural science. Some of the 
transmission experiments described above show that this is not so. 
We can still formulate and test explanatory causal principles for the 
properties and dynamics of human cultures. But we need to begin from 
an appropriate framing of the problem in order to do this. I don’t think 
that the failure for the ‘beanbag’ move to become widespread for culture 
in the way it did for population genetics is due to the intransigence 
or perversity of social scientists. I think it is due to substantive and 
interesting differences between the genetic and cultural cases.
So am I saying, in short, that there can be no such thing as cultural 
evolutionary theory? There can certainly be cultural evolutionary theories. 
One can—indeed, one must—model cultural regularities and cultural 
change as the population-level emergent consequences arising from 
the ways individual people learn, communicate, influence one another, 
think, remember and forget. And formal, computational and empirical 
tools are required in order to do this. Much of the scholarly enterprise 
known as ‘cultural evolution’ is simply the attempt to provide these 
tools, without necessary commitment to the idea that cultural change is 
a narrowly Darwinian process. My worries here leave this work and its 
motivation intact. But note the difference from the genetic evolution case. 
17  For an approach to cultural evolution in whose spirit this paragraph was written, 
see Morin, O. (2015). How Traditions Live and Die (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
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Whereas in genetic evolution, empirical knowledge of the transmission 
mechanisms in each case can be bypassed, in the cultural case, empirical 
knowledge of the transmission mechanisms in each case is precisely 
what you need to have in order to be able to build your explanation. 
You can’t possibly understand how the repeated application of human 
cognitive biases shapes supernatural ideas without first studying in 
detail what those cognitive biases are. And your theory will only be as 
good as your characterisation of the cognitive or interactive processes 
that are doing the explanatory work. Theory is therefore dependent on 
knowledge of the transmission mechanisms in each individual cultural 
case, in a way that it is (arguably) not for genes.
It follows that there will be as many cultural evolutionary 
explanations as there are domains across which human cognition 
and human interaction are different. Thus, there can be a cultural 
evolutionary theory only in a weak sense, meaning the general set of 
recipes used in such explanations. These recipes will actually be rather 
varied, and will only work when made up with fresh ingredients from 
empirical psychology, cognitive science, politics, sociology, and so forth. 
This is rather different from the somewhat stronger sense in which there 
is an evolutionary theory in organismal biology. And that means if we 
wish to unify the social science disciplines, which surely we must wish 
to do, we must develop a slightly different banner under which to do it. 
I would put human action, or more generally human cognition, rather 
than cultural selection, at the heart of that enterprise.
I worry that I have spent a lot of this meditation being rather negative, 
so perhaps I should end instead by being positive: about humans, and 
about culture. Culture is not like DNA. It is the residue of past cognition 
and past interaction; a residue that is available to cognitively complex, 
socially interacting, purposeful, reasoning beings. And we are really 
good at doing things with this residue. The operations we perform 
on it are not limited to its reproduction. We can perpetuate it, yes, but 
also extend it, adapt it, discuss it, contest it, refuse it, restructure it, or 
redesign it; not in its interests, but in our own. The human capacity for 
purposive agency using the raw material embodied in culture is the 
resource a sensible progressive politics needs to be built upon. And it 
is the capacity that makes human culture, and indeed human beings, 
extraordinary.

5. Is it explanation yet?
What we say sounds like an explanation—but really it is a 
terrible jumble that we are making up as we go along.
–Nick Chater1
One of the most devastating rejoinders you can give an academic is to 
characterise what they have offered you by way of an explanation as no 
more than a re-description of the phenomenon at hand. For example, 
let’s say I am interested in the knotty problem of why people of lower 
socio-economic position are less likely to successfully quit smoking 
compared to those of higher socio-economic position.2 I could offer you 
the insights of the theory of planned behaviour, one of the most popular 
theories in this kind of area.3 The theory says (very roughly) that people 
do healthy things when they want to do them, they think they should 
do them, and they think they can do them. So perhaps the reason 
people of lower socio-economic position are less likely to successfully 
quit smoking is either (a) they don’t so much want to; (b) they don’t so 
much think they should; and/or (c) they don’t so much think they can. 
All of these are testable: I could go off and ask a load of people, and 
come back with some results. Let’s say, hypothetically, I find that it’s 
mainly (b). Hurrah, I say, I have now explained the social gradient in 
smoking cessation—in terms of a social gradient in the belief that it is 
normatively desirable to cease smoking. 
Here’s where your wounding rejoinder comes in. All you have done, 
you say, is to re-describe the social gradient of interest—poorer people 
are less likely to quit smoking—as a social gradient in the extent to 
1  Chater, N. (2018). The Mind is Flat: The Illusion of Mental Depth and the Improvised 
Mind (London: Penguin, p. 28). 
2  Kotz, D. and R. West. (2009). Explaining the social gradient in smoking cessation: 
It’s not in the trying, but in the succeeding. Tobacco Control 18: 43–6, https://doi.
org/10.1136/tc.2008.025981
3  Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes 50: 179–211, https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(91)90020-t
© 2018 Daniel Nettle, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0155.05
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which people believe they should quit smoking. But where does that 
social gradient come from? Perhaps people of lower socio-economic 
position don’t feel so much normative pressure to quit smoking because 
fewer of them successfully do so…but wait, isn’t that where we started? 
As so often in social science, we have end up at a place where the thing 
being invoked to do the explaining (the explanans), does not seem 
entirely independent of the thing we wish to explain (the explanandum). 
And, more pressingly, you want to ask: where the hell did the explanans 
come from anyway? What explainans that? (Sorry.) To account for one 
pattern, I offered you another, but that other one seems immediately to 
cry out for a deeper explanation, an explanation that stands entirely free 
of the phenomena we are studying. 
This is about the point where people like me, who advocate 
evolutionary, aka behavioural-ecological, explanations for patterns 
of human behaviour, pipe up. What we tend to say at this point is 
something along the lines of: what you other social scientists offer is 
some kind of proximate explanation for the phenomenon at hand: another 
phenomenon that stands immediately prior to the original one in the 
chain of causation. That’s fine, but it only kicks the can one pace down 
the road. What we will need sooner or later is to show how the behaviour 
pattern in question arises from more general principles of surviving and 
reproducing in different kinds of environments: an ultimate explanation. 
For example, we might point out that people doing dangerous manual 
jobs or living in hostile environments tend to die anyway, for other 
reasons, before the age at which smoking starts to really kill you. Thus, 
the payoff for foregoing the pleasures of smoking may be less for them 
than for people living in under other conditions.4 And we assume that 
people respond, sooner or later, to payoffs in the currencies of survival 
and reproduction. This kind of explanation has a few things going for 
it: it’s non-obvious; it uses information not contained in the original 
observations; and it connects to broader expectations about evolved 
Darwinian creatures, such as that they should suit their behavioural 
strategies to the ecological circumstances they experience. 
This ultimate explaining is a good thing, but we do tend to be rather 
smug about it. Look at you lot, rearranging your proximate deckchairs 
on the deck, we seem to imply, whilst we alone are looking beyond 
4  See The mill that grinds young people old, this volume.
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the prow, to the causally primal iceberg looming out of the sea. This 
book is about honest self-assessment, though, and in this spirit, I have to 
make the following admission about us evolutionary folk: the ultimate 
explanations we proffer are sometimes not as ultimate as we make 
them out to be. They also suffer from a lot of the same vagueness and 
indeterminacy as the more proximate frameworks we like to claim we 
are going beyond. It’s healthy to admit this. And it’s also healthy to 
understand that in science, with the possible exception of theoretical 
physics of the most fundamental kind, it’s always the case that your 
explanations will themselves require deeper explanations in their turn 
(yes, even for us evolutionary folk). One person’s explanans always ends 
up being someone else’s explanandum. It’s a food web of indefinite size, 
stretching off in every direction. 
§
This whole business of explanation is very much tied up with having 
something called a theory. The function of theories is sometimes said to 
be able to predict future cases, at least up to relative statistical likelihoods. 
There is some truth in this, but at least as important a role for theories 
is to shed light on why things happen. For example, say I passed a vast 
archive of historical social and economic variables, and the results of 
elections from the same countries in the same years, through a machine-
learning algorithm, to try to find regular relationships. Afterwards, I 
find the algorithm can predict election results in novel cases with 75% 
accuracy. Would I then have a theory of electoral outcomes? Not, it seems 
to me, without a lot more work. I would have to show which variables 
the machine-learning algorithm had given most weight to, and then 
relate these to some kind of general conception of humans as decision-
makers: what they like, what they don’t like, when they stick, when 
they shift. The aggregate behaviour of the electorate might not read off 
from thinking about a single representative voter; different sectors of 
the electorate might have different experiences and might respond to 
them in different ways, and there could be complex social dynamics at 
play. My theory might need to take this into account. Nonetheless, to 
have a theory, I would need not just to gain predictive statistical power 
over election outcomes, but also to gain epistemic power: the ability to 
state in comprehensible terms why elections turn out as they do, using 
some generalizations about voters, their voting, and their interactions. 
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Theories are devices that come in diverse kinds. The kind of theory 
lay people imagine scientists having is what I will call the Newtonian. 
The properties of a Newtonian theory, in my sense, are as follows. Only 
minimal and general properties of the situation are needed as inputs for 
the theory to do its work. If you are going to fire a cannonball into the 
air, on earth, then I can tell you that if you fire it off on flat ground at 45o 
at an initial velocity of 100 metres per second, it will travel about 1,020 
metres and reach a maximum height of 255 metres at the mid-point of 
its flight. It will do this because it will be decelerated in the vertical 
dimension of its motion at a known constant rate due to earth’s gravity. 
It doesn’t matter whether the ball is black or pink or bears the colours 
of West Allotment Celtic; whether you do it on a Wednesday, under 
Scandinavian egalitarianism, or in anger at being spurned by your lover. 
The theory has no real wiggle room from person to person. If two 
scholars apply Newtonian mechanics to the same problem, they must 
both conclude with the same predictions. If they don’t, at least one of 
them has simply made a mistake. It should be relatively straightforward 
to look at the working and see where this has occurred. There is no: 
‘she’s a Newtonian, but she brings a more modern sensibility and a 
command of the African evidence to the picture, and so she concludes 
the ball will fly 1,023 metres rather than 1,020’. The theory is a somewhat 
stable historical object. The Newtonian mechanics of today is just the 
same as the Newtonian mechanics of 100 years ago, and makes exactly 
the same predictions (there is only one possible prediction for a given 
set of inputs). We learn more about the world over time, for example 
that the theory doesn’t do such a good job for things that are very small 
or moving very fast, but the theory itself is a fairly definite and stably 
identifiable entity. 
Not all things that get called theories have the Newtonian properties. 
Take, for example, ‘social practice theory’.5 As I understand it, this 
theory presents an alternative both to rational actor models, which see 
people as free decision-makers with inherent preferences that they seek 
5  See Schatzki, T. (1996). Social Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); 
or Reckwitz, A. (2002). Toward a theory of social practices: A development in 
culturalist theorizing. European Journal of Social Theory 5: 243–63, https://doi.
org/10.1177/13684310222225432. These two texts have rather different things in 
mind. This reinforces the point I am making, since I have seen them both cited 
as descriptions of what social practice theory, or the theory of social practices, 
contends. 
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to satisfy, and acculturation models, which say that people do what 
their culture or society conditions them to do. The basic premise of 
social practice theory is that people will do what seems best to them, 
but are not asocial, cultureless, pastless, bodiless, and omniscient 
decision-making demons as implied by some micro-economic models. 
Instead, what seems best to them is limited by the habits, rules, norms, 
and understandings that they have absorbed through their daily lives 
in their social environments, that they also play an unwitting role in 
perpetuating. They are agents, but agents situated within a particular 
local field of social practices, a field that cannot be stood outside, or 
reinvented from scratch. 
I’ll call theories like this recipe-for-a-recipe theories. Their properties 
are a mirror-image of the Newtonian ones. Let’s say we want to 
understand how people will respond to a social change, such as 
petrol being made 10% more expensive due to concerns about carbon 
emissions and climate change. Social practice theory does not make a 
simple general prediction, like ‘car use will fall by 17%’. Instead, it says, 
we would need to know a lot of things about the context. How is car use 
embedded in people’s daily practices; what social rules are there; what 
are normative pressures on them; what practical knowledge do they 
have of alternative modes of transportation; and so forth. The theory 
does not give us a prescriptive recipe for cooking up a prediction, as 
Newtonian mechanics did. Instead, it points us toward a flexible but 
not completely open-ended list of ingredients we ought to seek more 
information on in order to begin studying the problem, and hence make 
an appropriate recipe to then cook up a prediction (or more likely, 
retrodiction). The theory does not uniquely pre-specify what the relative 
proportions of these ingredients will be for the present case, nor how 
they will interact. It follows that two scholars can both employ social 
practice theory competently and without error, and yet come up with 
very different expectations, not just for two slightly different cases, but 
even for the very same case. There can be different emphases within the 
broad envelope of the theory, and the theory itself will drift over time, 
with different elements becoming more or less central. 
The corollary of the comforting elasticity of recipe-for-a-recipe 
theories is that it is quite hard to say that they are wrong. If the cannonball 
in our previous example doesn’t fly in a parabola and go 1020 metres plus 
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or minus a few centimetres, then Newtonian mechanics gets chucked 
out as a theoretical framework for projectiles on earth. Discipline for 
social practice theory is more nebulous: almost any pattern of findings, 
ex post, can be parsed in a way that is compatible with the theory. The 
theory itself can update in the light of new evidence and new priorities; 
or it can fall from use in favour of some other recipe for making recipes 
that, like a new musical style, seems more interesting to the current 
generation. It might at best be shown to be more or less useful; there is 
almost no observation I can think of that would inflict it a critical blow. 
There’s a third type of theory I would like to mention, and that’s the 
inductive. An example is the ‘purse versus wallet’ theory.6 This theory 
says that increasing household income through giving it to mothers 
has greater positive effects on childrens’ outcomes than via giving it to 
fathers, because of different ways the two genders spend their money. 
Unlike a recipe-for-a-recipe theory, it’s pretty clear what this theory 
predicts for a given case within its domain (maybe not the size of the 
effect, but certainly its direction). Unlike Newtonian mechanics though, 
the main grounds for this theory seem to be largely, ‘we have looked at 
some previous cases, and that’s how it often worked out before’, rather 
than any more general principles. (A quibble: Newton had undoubtedly 
looked at some previous projectiles and seen that they flew in parabolas 
prior to coming up with his theory; and perhaps you could found the 
‘wallet versus purse’ theory on some more general first principles to 
do with the two sexes and evolutionary fitness. Nonetheless, the two 
cases do feel rather different.) So now we have defined three species of 
theory: Newtonian; recipe-for-a-recipe; and inductive. It’s time to ask: 
when we construct evolutionary theories of human behaviour, which 
species of theory are we constructing?
§
When we make the evolutionary gambit, we sincerely feel Newtonian. 
It feels as if by beginning our Introduction ‘Evolutionary theory 
predicts…’, we have connected our claims to the might of biological 
science, and specifically to the considerable epistemic and formal power 
6  Discussed by Cooper, K. and K. Stewart. (2013). Does money affect childrens’ 
outcomes? A systematic review. The Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Downloaded 
from: https://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/default/files/jrf/migrated/files/money-children-
outcomes-full.pdf
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of Darwinian algorithms. But in reality, lots of ‘evolutionary’ theories 
about human behaviour are far from Newtonian, and don’t have such 
solid explanatory or formal support as you might think. They are really 
just recipes for recipes, or patterns discovered by induction, and a 
good theoretical biologist would still want to ask ‘yes, but under what 
conditions would that evolve?’. In this regard, we are not so different 
from any other kind of social scientist. I have a case study that illustrates 
this very clearly: the recent enthusiasm for ‘life history theory’ as an 
explanation for diverse human behavioural phenomena from risk-
taking to obesity, schizophrenia to savings. If you want to see the kind of 
research I am talking about, just type ‘life-history theory’ or ‘life-history 
strategies’ into your literature search engine of choice and follow up the 
recent human-focused references. 
When human behavioural scientists invoke ‘life history theory’ as 
an explanatory framework, there are a number of related things they 
might actually be up to. I will call three prominent ones ‘enterprise 1’, 
‘enterprise 2’, and ‘enterprise 3’. Not all work on ‘life-history theory’ 
falls into any of these enterprises. Moreover, I have no objection to any 
of them—indeed, have contributed to some—but the role being played 
by the term ‘theory’ within them does bear some examination. 
Enterprise 1: often, what researchers invoking life-history theory 
are doing is asking whether the behaviour under study covaries with 
a number of other traits, particularly those to do with the timing of 
reproduction (for example, age at first menarche, age at first sexual 
intercourse, or age at first childbearing). The idea here is that human 
psychological and reproductive traits, rather than each varying 
independently, covary along a principal axis, the ‘fast-slow continuum’.7 
At the fast end, we have early maturation and childbearing, along 
with which allegedly go a high rate of future discounting, proneness 
to violence and coercion, impatience, obesity, certain moral and social 
attitudes, and even certain psychiatric disorders. At the slow end, we 
have late childbearing, high parental investment, and all the opposite 
7  For a reviews and critiques of enterprise 1, see: Copping, L. T., A. Campbell and 
S. Muncer. (2014). Psychometrics and life history strategy: the structure and 
validity of the High K Strategy Scale. Evolutionary Psychology 12: 200–22, https://
doi.org/10.1177/147470491401200115; and Gruijters, S. and B. Fleuren. (2018). 
Measuring the unmeasurable: The psychometrics of life history strategy. Human 
Nature 29: 33–44, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-017-9307-x 
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behavioural and psychological traits. Sometimes the mere demonstration 
that different traits covary along a principal axis is presented as if this 
were an explanation of these traits, and also a confirmation of the utility 
of life-history theory. There are, however, lots of reasons things might 
be correlated with one another, and demonstrating a correlation is very 
different from explaining it. 
Enterprise 2: Sometimes scholars invoking life-history theory are 
doing more than just establishing covariation between traits. They are 
also trying to demonstrate that those traits relate to the ecology in which 
people live. In particular, they may be testing whether ‘fast’ behaviours 
are differentially likely to occur in places where life prospects are poor 
or uncertain.8 This relates to an intuitively appealing argument that 
if the environment is harsh (for example, uncontrollable mortality is 
high), then you need to get on with life quickly and at least get some 
reproduction done while you can, whereas if the environment is benign 
you can take longer and invest more in temporally distant outcomes. 
Note that enterprise 2 is in principle independent of enterprise 1: it 
could be that traits covary along a principal axis, but for some other, 
completely different kind of reason than the one argued in enterprise 2. 
Enterprise 3: If ‘fast’ behaviours occur particularly in ‘harsh’ 
environments, there are a number of ways this could come about, from 
the slow march of genetic selection at one extreme to rational real-
time decision-making at the other extreme. Enterprise 3 concerns the 
particular claim that experiences in the first few years of childhood 
are particularly important in setting how ‘fast’ or ‘slow’ a person turns 
out later on.9 The idea here is that people are born not knowing what 
their adult environment is like, but that things like the stability of 
the family, how their parents behave, and so forth, serve as cues that 
over evolutionary time have carried useful information about their 
adult worlds. Thus, natural selection has favoured mechanisms that 
8  See for example: Nettle, D. (2010). Dying young and living fast: Variation in life 
history across English neighborhoods. Behavioral Ecology 21: 387–95, https://doi.
org/10.1093/beheco/arp202
9  See for example: Brumbach, B. H. et al. (2009). Effects of harsh and unpredictable 
environments in adolescence on development of life history strategies: A 
longitudinal test of an evolutionary model. Human Nature 20: 25–51, https://doi.
org/10.1007/s12110-009-9059-3
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effectively say ‘if this crazy stuff is going on in childhood, I need to get 
ready for a world where I am going to need to be a fast adult’. 
There’s actually a lot of evidence compatible with the idea that 
childhood adversity affects reproductive behaviour and many other 
adult outcomes besides: with that I have no quibble. I just want to point 
out that enterprise 3 is not deducible from the other two enterprises. 
You could believe that there is a fast-slow continuum, but that it is not 
related to environmental harshness; that there is a fast-slow continuum 
related to environmental harshness but childhood experiences do 
not serve as cues to speed you up or slow you down; or that there is 
a fast-slow continuum and childhood experiences move you along it, 
but for reasons that have nothing to do with those experiences being 
evolutionarily valid cues to prevailing environmental harshness. So 
which of these various enterprises is the core claim of ‘life-history 
theory’; and, more importantly, which of the various enterprises has its 
explanatory basis in evolutionary theory?
§
There is an area of evolutionary biological theory called ‘life-history 
theory’. In fact, it is not any single theory, but a body of mathematical 
methods for making theories, theories about how natural selection 
would shape patterns of growth, reproduction and ageing under 
different ecological circumstances.10 These methods have been applied 
to many different scenarios, and the general conclusion seems to be: 
all kinds of different things can evolve, depending on the details of the 
ecology and demography. And that seems to be borne out in nature: we 
see everything from salmon that go out in a single blaze of reproductive 
glory, to puffins that do a little bit of reproduction year after year for 
ages. There certainly are life-history models that show that if the risk of 
uncontrollable mortality is high, one should expect early reproduction 
to evolve, even at the expense of growth or self-repair.11 This prediction 
depends on a lot of things, though: small tweaks in assumptions about, 
10  Stearns, S. C. (1992). The Evolution of Life Histories (New York: Oxford University 
Press) is a classic text, and possibly more widely cited than read. 
11	 	For	example,	Cichoń,	M.	(1997).	Evolution	of	longevity	through	optimal	resource	
allocation. Proceedings of the Royal Society: B 264: 1383–8, https://doi.org/10.1098/
rspb.1997.0192 
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for example, what limits population growth, and when in the life cycle 
mortality acts, can lead to the prediction that higher mortality will delay 
reproduction, or have no effect.12
Because of this, it is not really correct to say ‘life-history theory 
predicts X…’. Really what one ought to say is ‘this particular life-history 
model, using this particular set of assumptions, predicts X…’. Then 
as well as testing prediction X, you would also want to establish that 
the assumptions were appropriate for the system you were working 
on. Now you might argue in the following way: in practice, we know 
that animals facing higher mortality regimes often evolve earlier 
reproduction. We know this not just from correlational evidence, but even 
from experimental evolution.13 So the best class of theoretical models is 
probably the class that correctly recovers this phenomenon. I have some 
sympathy with this argument, but note that theory and evidence have 
changed places. Rather than life-history theory predicting a priori that 
this phenomenon will occur, we see that phenomenon often does occur, 
and then use that discovery to fix the theory. So it is not so much a case 
of ‘life-history theory predicts that environment harshness will lead to 
the evolution of earlier reproduction…’ as ‘in practice, environmental 
harshness often leads to the evolution of earlier reproduction, and this 
motivates us to search for selective reasons why that might be true’. 
If you say ‘life-history theory predicts that environment harshness 
will lead to the evolution of earlier reproduction…’, as we often do in 
enterprise 2, then you are using the word ‘theory’ in an inductive, not a 
Newtonian sense. 
What about enterprise 1, the idea that multiple different behaviours 
covary along a ‘fast-slow’ principal axis? Authors in enterprise 1 are 
12  This specificity was given vigorous restatement recently by Baldini, R. (2015). Harsh 
environments and ‘fast’ human life histories: What does the theory say? BiorXiv, 
https://doi.org/10.1101/014647 
13  Correlational evidence: Promislow, D. E. L. and P. H. Harvey. (1990). Living 
fast and dying young: A comparative analysis of life-history variation among 
mammals. Journal of Zoology 220: 417–37, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-7998.1990.
tb04316.x. Experimental evolution: Reznick, D. A. et al. (1990). Experimentally 
induced life-history evolution in a natural population. Nature 346: 357–9, https://
doi.org/10.1038/346357a0. What the experimental work actually shows is that 
greater predation risk only leads to the evolution of earlier reproduction if the 
predation acts in the adult, not the juvenile, stage of life. This supports the main 
conclusion of the theoretical models—that what evolves depends on the details of 
the demography. 
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unanimous in expressing the idea that the existence of such a principal 
axis is a basic prediction of life-history theory. Kimberley Mathot and 
Willem Frankenhuis recently conducted a systematic review of relevant 
models and concluded, perhaps surprisingly, that ‘there is, at present, 
little formal theory’ relating to the reasons why a single fast-slow 
principal axis would evolve.14 If there is ‘little formal theory’ on the 
question, one has to ask, why do so many people believe the existence 
of such an axis to be a basic prediction of life-history theory?
The origins of the idea of the fast-slow continuum are in fact 
empirical more than theoretical. If you get empirical data on different 
species, for variables like age at first reproduction, litter size, duration of 
gestation, and duration of lactation, and stick them into a big correlation 
matrix, then empirically you discover that there is a principal axis, with 
late, slow and long species at one end, and early, fast and short species 
at the other.15 So we can only really say that the axis is predicted by 
theory if by theory, we mean induction. What is really an empirical 
regularity has somehow morphed into being widely considered a 
theory. But importantly, in the original empirical analyses, the unit was 
the species, not the individual, and all the traits entered into the analysis 
were reproductive ones. The idea that you would get a single axis when 
comparing different individuals of the same species, and in particular 
that non-reproductive behavioural traits would also fall along this same 
axis as reproductive ones, is certainly out there in the literature of non-
human biology, but not clearly supported by current evidence.16 
It follows that when we do enterprise 1 in humans, we are not testing 
a prediction stemming directly from formal evolutionary theory in some 
Newtonian manner. We are taking an empirical pattern of co-variation 
seen across species, and arguably perhaps within some non-human 
species, and then looking for something vaguely analogous in human 
behavioural variability. I don’t think there is necessarily anything wrong 
14  Mathot, K. J., and W. E. Frankenhuis. (2018). Models of pace-of-life syndromes 
(POLS): a systematic review. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 72: 41, p. 11, https://
doi.org/10.1007/s00265-018-2459-9
15  Promislow, D. E.L. and P. H. Harvey. (1990). Living fast and dying young: A 
comparative analysis of life-history variation among mammals. Journal of Zoology 
220: 417–37, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-7998.1990.tb04316.x
16  See Royauté, R. et al. (2018). Paceless life? A meta-analysis of the pace-of-life 
syndrome hypothesis. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 72: 64, https://doi.
org/10.1007/s00265-018-2472-z
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with doing this, but one has to wonder in what sense we are ‘using life-
history theory’ or ‘testing the predictions of life-history theory’. And 
indeed, one has to wonder exactly what the theoretical entity is that is 
subject to potential falsification here. Let’s say we do an empirical study 
of a whole set of psychological traits within a human population and 
find that they don’t really vary along a single axis. What exactly would 
be the endeavour whose credibility is undermined? Evolutionary life-
history theory? Its application to humans? The generalization from 
reproductive traits to these particular psychological traits? It is not clear.
§
So far I seem to have argued that ‘life-history theory’ as it gets used in 
application to human behavioural traits is really a kind of extension of 
an inductive regularity, rather than a Newtonian theory. Actually, it’s 
not even always that: it’s sometimes a recipe for a recipe. My exemplar 
here is interesting experiments showing that people from different 
childhood backgrounds seem to respond very differently, in terms 
of their behavioural intentions for the future, to imagined scenarios 
evoking a world of harshness and scarcity.17 So far so good, but these 
experiments are explicitly framed within ‘life-history theory’. Thus the 
implication is that life-history theory either predicted these different 
responses a priori, or at least provides some major explanatory insight 
into them. 
Life-history theory here is clearly being interpreted in terms of 
enterprise 3: there are fast and slow ways of behaving, and your childhood 
affects where you are on the continuum. Fine. But the experiments have 
two independent variables: childhood experience, and the imagined 
scenarios (either harsh world, or control). All enterprise 3 says here 
is ‘somehow childhood experience will turn out to matter’. Equally 
compatible with the general contention of enterprise 3 would be: only 
childhood experience, and not the content of the current scenario, affects 
behavioural intentions; childhood experience and the current scenario 
17  Griskevicius, V. et al. (2011). The influence of mortality and socioeconomic status 
on risk and delayed rewards: A life history theory approach. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 100: 1015–26, https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022403; Griskevicius, 
V. et al. (2011). Environmental contingency in life history strategies: The influence 
of mortality and socioeconomic status on reproductive timing. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 100: 241–54, https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021082
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both matter, and their effects are additive; or they matter synergistically 
in some kind of way (adverse childhood experience deadens you to cues 
of current harshness, or childhood experience sensitizes you to cues of 
current harshness). In short, ‘life-history theory’, as the phrase is being 
used, would be compatible with any conceivable pattern of results other 
than the one in which childhood experience does not matter at all. Thus, 
I have to ask: what sense of ‘theory’ is it, when ‘life-history theory’ as 
applied in this instance is compatible with most of the possible empirical 
outcomes? 
I think the answer is that ‘life-history theory’ is being used as a 
recipe for a recipe. It denotes the general expectation that behaviours 
can be thought of as concerning doing things soon and fast, or later 
and slowly, and that one’s childhood experience will make some kind 
of difference to one’s propensities along this continuum. Exactly what 
kind of difference, and how childhood experience will combine with 
other situational factors, is a matter for further determination. The 
theory does not say. This is fine, I suppose, but we need to take away two 
things. First, this kind of theorising has only the vaguest of connections 
to the formal body of life-history models constructed by evolutionary 
biologists. And second, ‘life-history theory’ as used here is no more 
Newtonian than any other social-science theory. In fact, it looks almost 
exactly like the theory of life-course epidemiology, which I have written 
about elsewhere.18 Life-course epidemiology basically says, all the 
things that happen to you over the course of life, including in particular 
childhood, are going to affect patterns of health and disease. How the 
different influences combine (additively, non-additively, etc.) is subject 
to further determination; indeed, the theory itself will be narrowed 
down in this regard according to what we find out empirically. 
§
What lessons do I take away? First, narrowly, to people like me who 
want to apply evolutionary ideas to human behaviour. We shouldn’t be 
so sloppy as to say ‘Evolutionary theory predicts X…’, or ‘life-history 
theory predicts X…’ Evolutionary theory can predict a lot of things. 
18  Nettle, D. and M. Bateson. (2017). Childhood and adult socioeconomic position 
interact to predict health in mid life in a cohort of British women. PeerJ 5: e3528, 
https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj.3528
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Instead, if what we mean is ‘the evolutionary model by Bloggs (2018) 
makes the prediction, that, under assumptions 1, 2 and 3, X will happen’, 
then we should say exactly this. If what we mean is ‘Empirical findings 
from non-human animals suggest that X often happens’, then we should 
say that and cite the evidence. And if what we mean is ‘I happened on 
some patterns that I want to endow with the gravitas and authority of 
the most famous and respected meta-theory in the life sciences because 
it makes them sound better’, then, well, that’s just bad. 
Another take-home is that we should actually do more life-history 
modelling, indeed more mathematical modelling in general, to try to 
provide stronger theoretical underpinnings to the observations we make. 
Mathematical models are only heuristic devices, and they don’t solve 
all your scientific (or even theoretical) problems. They are very useful 
though, as instantiations of what your theory really is: formalising makes 
a theory into a stable, reproducible entity that can easily be queried. 
Models are useful in forward-engineering from starting assumptions to 
predictions, because verbal arguments are notoriously ambiguous, and 
informal intuitions about what would follow from what are often just 
wrong. Having a mathematical model is a way of showing rigorously 
that if I make this particular set of assumptions, then the prediction 
to which I am led is exactly the following. Rather than: once I got the 
data (or someone else gathered some data) I realised that quite possibly 
the predictions of my theory were not necessarily the ones I originally 
thought they were. And models are useful in reverse-engineering, from 
phenomena back to explanation. Say aggression is correlated with the 
risk of predation. Maybe there is some adaptive reason these two things 
get coupled. Now, under what ecological and demographic assumptions 
could such a coupling emerge? Then you can start to ask whether those 
assumptions seem plausible for ancestral humans (or whatever system 
you are studying). 
I should note, however, that even if we made such models, even if 
those models made predictions, even if we tested those predictions, 
and those predictions were supported, it still would not be (complete) 
explanation yet. The classic models of life-history theory, indeed of 
behavioural ecology in general, are mostly only approximations. That’s 
because they have no explicit population genetics, or only something 
very simplified. Yet what would actually evolve, presumably, would 
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be alternate forms of genes in populations, populations where many 
genes were interacting and traits had a complex genetic basis. So even 
when we are done with making optimality models that explain to our 
satisfaction why men are more aggressive than women, or people in 
harsh environments reproduce at a young age, a whole other group 
of people, theoretical evolutionary geneticists, would see that just as 
a heuristic starting point, a sketch of a proposal still to be properly 
explained. And they would need their own theories and models to do 
their bit. Explanation is never done: it’s just passed along the row. It 
reminds me of a conversation I once heard between two physicists. One 
said that he had been able to prove mathematically that some effect 
should occur under some set of circumstances. ‘I mean prove to the 
satisfaction of a physicist, of course’, he added. Proof to the satisfaction 
of a mathematician was a completely different issue. 
A similar point can be made about providing a mechanism. People 
often say to us behavioural ecologists, yes, that’s an interesting 
evolutionary theory, but what’s the mechanism by which it would be 
delivered? I was studying early-life adversity and ageing in starlings.19 I 
was pleased with myself because we were measuring oxidative stress, a 
possible ageing factor, at the cellular level. I explained my plans to some 
cellular biologists. Interesting, they said. If you did find a difference in 
oxidative stress, what do you think the mechanism would be? What? 
Oxidative stress was, for me, the mechanism. Indeed, it was about the 
most mechanistic I had ever got. For them, my oxidative stress measure 
was just some crude phenotypic summary. How the oxidative damage 
to lipids picked up by the assay actually came about was a hole where 
a mechanism needed to be placed. Will it never end? Probably not. Just 
as one person’s explanans is another person’s explanandum, one person’s 
mechanism is clearly another person’s black box. 
More broadly, it’s clear that when researchers use the term ‘theory’, 
they are not referring to a homogenous class of entities. It would perhaps 
be helpful to use more precise terminology to refer, respectively, to 
specific hypotheses, inductive generalizations, mathematical models, 
recipes, recipes for recipes, and so on. Given the indefinitely large 
19  Nettle, D. et al. (2015). An experimental demonstration that early-life competitive 
disadvantage accelerates telomere loss. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences 282: 20141610, https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2014.1610
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food-web in which we all operate, it would also be quite handy if theories, 
like buses, had an origin and destination clearly displayed on them. The 
theory of planned behaviour, for example, is a well-formed inductive 
theory whose destination is behavioural decisions, and whose origin 
is immediate psychological factors like beliefs and intentions. It never 
claimed to serve earlier stations on the line, and should not therefore be 
criticized for not doing so. A theory might usefully say: I’ll pick you up 
at known regularities of individual human cognition, and drop you off 
at cross-cultural regularities in the content of literary stories. If you want 
to get on any earlier (e.g. where do the known regularities in individual 
cognition come from?), you will need to take an additional bus. 
This picture casts an unflattering light on the idea, sometimes raised 
with rather messianic zeal, that the human sciences might one day be 
unified under a single grand theory. That idea is like saying that every 
bus stop in the city should be served by the same bus: hardly a recipe 
for getting from A to B any time soon. Surely the unification we should 
be looking for is not that a single bus goes everywhere, but rather 
that, using a network of buses that is reasonably well integrated, it is 
eventually possible to get from any starting point to any destination, 
using several types of theory along the way. The vision is the one 
beautifully expressed by Melvin Konner in the preface to The Tangled 
Wing:20
A good textbook of human behavioral biology, which we will not 
have for another fifty years, will look not like Euclid’s geometry—a 
magnificent edifice of proven propositions deriving from a set of simple 
assumptions—but more like a textbook of physiology or geology, each 
solution grounded in a separate body of facts and approached with a 
quiverful of different theories, with all the solutions connected in a great 
complex web.
And by the way, in closing, this for me is where we can shed a bit 
more light on the special explanatory status of evolution for the life 
sciences, and therefore for their subset the social sciences. We all know 
Dobzhansky’s famous dictum ‘Nothing in biology makes sense except in 
20  Konner, M. (2003). The Tangled Wing: Biological Constraints on the Human Spirit (2nd 
ed., New York: Holt, p. xv). I am grateful to Karthik Panchanathan for introducing 
me to this quote. 
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the light of evolution’.21 Continuing with my affordable public transport 
analogy, we could read this dictum in two ways. The strongest reading 
is the requirement that every bus, whatever its destination, must have 
evolution as its origin point. Even I, an enthusiast, can see that this is 
much too strong a requirement to be sensible. The second reading gives 
evolution a weaker, but still rather special, status. If you rode each bus 
back to its point of origin, and there picked up another bus and rode 
that one back to its origin, and so on and on, then wherever you started 
out, evolution would sooner or later, in one way or another, be the place 
you ended up. You might visit a lot of different and exotic locations 
along the way, but you can’t really avoid getting back to evolution at 
some point, because we are embodied creatures who arose through a 
historical process that also produced the other organisms with which 
we share the earth. ‘What we are supplying’, as Ludwig Wittgenstein 
put it, amount in the end to ‘remarks on the natural history of human 
beings’.22
21  Dobzhansky, T. (1973). Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of 
evolution. American Biology Teacher 35: 125–9, https://doi.org/10.2307/4444260
22  Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, section 415).

PART TWO
6. The mill that grinds young 
people old
One and the same cause 
Wears out our bodies and our clothes
–Bertolt Brecht, A worker’s speech to a doctor
I am in the cemetery again. It’s a good place to meditate on the 
conditions of life, and on the relationships between biology and 
social science. This is the cemetery of ‘neighbourhood B’, one of the 
fieldwork sites of my ethnographic project Tyneside Neighbourhoods.1 
That project was about life. Here I am reflecting on ageing and death. 
Neighbourhood B is in Newcastle upon Tyne. Walking distance 
from two huge universities, from a large teaching hospital, a 
cycle ride from offices of regional and national government, it 
is nonetheless one of the most deprived places in Britain. People 
working in dangerous heavy industries lived and died here. Later, 
the neighbourhood atrophied along with the industries that bore 
it. Its population declined and its future became unclear. It is not 
a bad place. It persists quietly because there is nothing else it can 
do, persists despite stagnation and economic precariousness for its 
residents, squalor in its structures, and ever-greater retrenchment 
of its public services. The cemetery is an odd mixture of municipal 
decline and gaudy activity. The fine mausoleum and other elaborate 
Victorian buildings are all falling down. Maintenance is limited to 
some movable iron fencing panels to keep people out. Pigeons roost 
in collapsing roofs. The older headstones have fallen over, or else 
been laid down before they injure someone. But many of the younger 
headstones—black marble and gilt—are islands of activity in the 
1  Nettle, D. (2015). Tyneside Neighbourhoods: Deprivation, Social Life and Social 
Behaviour in One British City (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers), https://www.
openbookpublishers.com/product/398/, https://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0084 
© 2018 Daniel Nettle, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0155.06
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grass. Fading children’s bears, balloons, photos, withering flowers, 
hand-written messages—some of these on the graves of people who 
died twenty or even thirty years ago. 
The place is written through with human biology, for what could 
possibly be more biological than the cessation of our organismality, 
the cessation of all of those metabolic and physiological processes 
that make us someone rather than an inanimate object? Yet this is 
also a place rich in social meaning and social pattern. This is not 
an accidental coupling, some unlikely final juxtaposition of two 
worlds—the ‘social’ and the ‘biological’—that in life flow separately, 
have little fundamentally to do with one another. This place derives 
its social meaning from the very fact that death (and therefore life) 
is a biological process. Its social meaning is incomprehensible if not 
grounded in that fact. That is what brings the mourners with their 
balloons and their bears, the undeniable and impassive biology of 
the situation. But though these deaths were biological events, their 
determinants (or the determinants of their immediate determinants) 
belong very clearly in the domain of the social. Here in the cemetery, 
there is no space between the biological and the social. The graves 
mark their indissoluble unity, which was as true in life as it was in 
death. 
§
Wandering around, I am struck how many of these people died young. 
Here’s Susanna E., died at 44; Gemma G., aged 10; Jay R., clearly a 
big Newcastle United supporter to judge from his headstone, aged 
19. Here’s Paul C., dead at 33, next to his dad James, dead a couple of 
years earlier at age 55. There are several graves of babies. Life round 
here seems, if not nasty and brutish, then certainly short. Of course, I 
could be guilty of confirmation bias, of noticing the stand-out young 
ones. So I get interested and start to collect some data. 
I complete a survey of the graves dating from 1990 onwards, 
noting sex and age at death. It is not perfect, since I get lost crossing 
and re-crossing the cemetery, and some more recent deaths are put 
into older established family graves, confusing the inclusion criteria. 
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Still, I end up with a sample of nearly 200 deaths. With this sample I 
can estimate the probability density function for age at death. What 
this function tells you is not the probability of dying at any particular 
age (you would need data from the living for that). What it tells you 
is, given that you died, the probability of being any particular age at 
the time. This is a relevant consideration for life; we’ve all got to die 
at some age, and it would be nice to have a sense of the distribution 
of likelihoods for what that age will be. 
The resulting density is shown in figure 1. It looks different for 
men and women, which we ought to expect. The average age at death 
is about 61 for men, and nearly 69 for women. 61 years. The current 
(2014) life expectancy at birth for Afghanistan is 60.2 More important 
than the low average is the variability in ages at death. As a man from 
round here, it is most likely that my age at death will be in the 60s, 
but it could be any age, from the day of my birth onwards. As you 
can see from figure 1, the likelihood of death coming in my twenties 
is really not negligible. For the women, late seventies is the most 
likely time, but again, it could well be earlier (though not as likely 
to be under 40 as is the case for the men), just as it could be later. A 
statistic that expresses this imprecision in when we are going to die 
is the standard deviation of age at death. The mean of 61 says that the 
average age at death of all the men is 61, but the standard deviation 
of age at death of almost 20 years says that a typical individual’s age 
at death is higher or lower than the average by two decades. So you 
could be 41, or 81, without being in any sense exceptional. 
2  Information from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN 
This is all very atmospheric, you might say, but not very scientific. 
This is one cemetery with no comparison data. Not everyone who dies is 
buried here; maybe there are biases towards memorializing those who 
died young. Quite right of course, but the cemetery is just an illustration 
of something we know to be true from much more systematic national 
data. Poor people die relatively young in contemporary Britain. The size 
of the disparity depends a little how you do the calculation. If you do 
it by individual social class, it is probably around 6 years for men and 
 996. The mill that grinds young people old
Figure 1. Estimated probability density functions for the male and female ages at death in 
Neighbourhood B cemetery, graves established since 1990, survey of January 23rd 2017.
5 years for women.3 If you do it by place, comparing not individuals by 
their occupation, but communities by their overall levels of deprivation 
and want, the disparities are more like 8 and 6 years.4
§
We first meet Paris, in Dickens’s A Tale of Two Cities, in an extraordinary 
passage at the beginning of Chapter 5. In the neighbourhood of St. 
Antoine, a cask of wine has been dropped and broken in the street. 
Suddenly, there are the inhabitants, scooping wine with their hands 
from between the cobble stones; making dams out of mud to drink the 
resulting pool; mopping wine up with handkerchiefs to squeeze into 
the mouths of their infants; even champing on wine-rotted fragments of 
3  Trend in life expectancy at birth and at age 65 by socio-economic position based on 
the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification, England and Wales: 1982–1986 
to 2007–2011. Office for National Statistics statistical bulletin released 21st October 
2015. Downloadable from www.ons.gov.uk. 
4  Inequality in Health and Life Expectancies within Upper Tier Local Authorities: 
2009 to 2013. Office for National Statistics statistical bulletin released 20th November 
2015. Downloadable from www.ons.gov.uk. 
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barrel. They leave whatever they were doing, the painful drudgery of 
their daily lives, in mid-action, for a transitory wine frolic, an expected 
carnival. 
The people of St. Antoine, Dickens tells us, had undergone a terrible 
grinding and re-grinding in the mill of poverty. But what kind of mill is 
the mill of poverty? Dickens: ‘The mill which had worked them down, 
was the mill that grinds young people old’. The mill of poverty is a mill 
of ageing: the effect of poverty is to age you faster. This is an important 
idea, not least because it suggests how an intuitively ‘internal’ and 
‘biological’ process, ageing, is profoundly affected by the indubitably 
‘social’ processes of deprivation and inequality happening beyond the 
body envelope. 
§
I want to take Dickens’ analysis of St. Antoine seriously, in two ways: 
first, the effects of poverty should be considered as ageing; and second, 
that the spontaneous frolic with the windfall of wine—the behaviour of 
the residents of St. Antoine—is somehow systematically connected to 
the ageing effects of poverty. 
What evidence could we adduce in support of the idea that the 
effects of poverty constitute ageing? We need to define what ageing is. 
Biologists define ageing as the deterioration of an individual’s biological 
performance over his or her life. Influential current theories of ageing 
suggest that this decline is due to the accumulation, in the body, of 
unrepaired damage.5 DNA becomes oxidated and unreadable; key 
populations of stem cells lose capacity; mechanisms lose their shape and 
capacity to rebound; all due to the continuous assaults of chemistry and 
physics upon our bodies. There is no internal ticking clock; organisms 
are not programmed to self-destruct after some particular delay. For 
this reason, the pace of ageing can vary wildly from individual to 
individual.6 It is not time per se that it is doing the work: it is the net 
5  Kirkwood, T. and S. Austad. (2000). Why do we age? Nature 408: 233–8, https://doi.
org/10.1038/35041682 
6  Belsky, D. W. et al. (2015). Quantification of biological aging in young adults. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112: E4104–10, https://doi.org/10.1073/
pnas.1506264112 
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effect of the rate at which damage accumulates, and the activities of the 
body to repair it. 
So what evidence is there that poverty can accelerate ageing? Well, 
there is no greater decline in biological performance than becoming 
dead, so in one sense, if death comes earlier for poor people (and we 
have already seen that it does) then ageing is by definition faster. But we 
can see it clearly in declines in performance short of death, what medics 
call morbidity, as well. Poor people are in worse health than rich people 
at all ages, but importantly their health goes downhill with time more 
rapidly through adulthood. We can distinguish statistically between 
expectancy of life—the number of years you can expect to be alive at 
prevailing rates of mortality—and expectancy of health, which is the 
number of years of good health you can expect to have at prevailing 
rates of morbidity and mortality. Whilst the life expectancies of poor 
English communities are 6–8 years less than those of rich ones, the 
health expectancies are nearly 17 years less, for both sexes.7 In the most 
deprived English neighbourhoods, health expectancy is only about 50. 
In my neighbourhood B, fully one third of 18–65 year olds have a serious 
longstanding health problem.8 Deprivation and the deterioration of 
physical health as the years go by are so closely associated that you 
could almost use the latter as a measure of the former. 
It is not just medical symptoms that show an effect of poverty: it is 
also underlying physiological processes. There is increasing interest in 
the idea that we should measure people’s biological age (that is, where 
they are in the inevitable arc of biological performance) rather than just 
their chronological age, which is a very poor approximation for what is 
really happening to them.9 We can do so using suites of ‘biomarkers’, 
namely bodily measurements that have the properties of (a) changing 
on average with increasing chronological age; and (b) predicting time 
7  Figures from Inequality in Health and Life Expectancies within Upper Tier Local 
Authorities: 2009 to 2013. Office for National Statistics statistical bulletin, released 
20th November 2015. Downloadable from www.ons.gov.uk. 
8  Nettle, D. (2015). Tyneside Neighbourhoods (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, p. 
115), https://www.openbookpublishers.com/product/398/, https://doi.org/10.11647/
obp.0084 
9  Levine, M. E. (2013). Modeling the rate of senescence: Can estimated biological age 
predict mortality more accurately than chronological age? Journals of Gerontology, A 
68: 667–74, https://doi.org/10.1093/gerona/gls233 
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until death better than chronological age does. One set of such markers 
measure inflammation. Inflammation is part of our immune response to 
injury and infection, and such the capacity to mount an inflammatory 
response is an adaptive one. With age though, the background levels in 
our bodies of molecules involved in the general inflammatory response 
increase. The levels of these molecules predict future serious disease 
better than chronological age does. Thus, inflammation markers in 
the blood (C-reactive protein and interleukin-6 are the most widely 
measured) serve as markers of biological age. 
Many studies have found that poor people show higher levels of 
these inflammation markers than rich people, and not just when they 
are old.10 It’s true in mid-life, decades before most people die, and it is 
even true in adolescence.11 The study on adolescents examined what it is 
about the lives of the less privileged that best explained (in a statistical 
sense of explain) their greater inflammation. The answer is sobering: 
they experience less happiness. 
§
‘If I’d known I was going to live this long, I would have taken better 
care of myself’ is one of those quips with something so satisfying about 
it that it ends up attributed to many different people. It makes a kind 
of sense: the extent to which we orient our behaviour toward the future 
depends on how likely that future is to ever come about. Indeed, this is 
one of the key principles of some evolutionary theories of ageing. The 
mouse that invests so much in repairing its DNA that its DNA would 
continue to replicate fine for 10 years has probably wasted its effort. In 
the wild, 90% of mice are gone within 1 year anyway, from predation 
10  E.g. Gruenewald, T. L. et al. (2010). Association of socioeconomic status with 
inflammation markers in black and white men and women in the coronary artery 
risk development in young adults (CARDIA) study. Social Science and Medicine 
69: 451–9, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.05.018; Koster, A. et al. (2006). 
Association of inflammatory markers with socioeconomic status. Journals of 
Gerontology A 61: 284–90, https://doi.org/10.1093/gerona/61.3.284; Nettle, D. (2014). 
What the future held: childhood psychosocial adversity is associated with health 
deterioration through adulthood in a cohort of British women. Evolution and Human 
Behavior 35: 519–25, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2014.07.002 
11  Chiang, J. et al. (2015). Socioeconomic status, daily affective and social experiences, 
and inflammation during adolescence. Psychosomatic Medicine 77: 256–66, https://
doi.org/10.1097/psy.0000000000000160 
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or cold. So mice have evolved to spend no more on DNA maintenance 
than necessary; instead, what they are really astonishingly good at is 
making baby mice while the sun shines. Engineers apparently get it too. 
An urban legend has Henry T. Ford instructing his engineers to tour the 
scrapyards of American looking for parts of his cars that never wore out. 
They found that the king-pins of the scrapped cars invariably still had 
life in them. His response: make the king-pin less well.12 
Now we turn back to the residents of Dickens’ St. Antoine, with 
their impromptu carnival of the spilt wine. They are conforming to 
an established stereotype about poor people: they value immediate 
opportunity (dropping what they were doing to consume during the 
day) over preparing for the future (the sawing of the wood stands 
neglected). Gillian Pepper and I recently reviewed the evidence that this 
stereotype contains a germ of truth: people living in poverty in Western 
countries do favour the present relative to the future more than their 
affluent co-citizens, in a number of different ways.13 This orientation to 
the present is underpinned by a kind of fatalism and a belief in the role 
of chance. For many commentators these attitudes, these ‘poor choices’, 
become something to condemn morally, or attempt worthily to educate 
away, a psychological failing of poor people that is the root cause of 
their poverty. 
But there is another side from which you can look at this. Here in my 
neighbourhood B cemetery, I ask myself: why not? Say I am a member 
of the C. family, whose graves I have just been looking at. The dad got 
55 years, the son got 33. How much effort would I choose to make in, 
say, saving for a pension. Neither even reached the statutory pension 
age. Would I have smoked? Well, nicotine is a stimulant, giving you 
a pleasant buzz, and the really bad consequence, lung cancer, doesn’t 
really start to hit until after age 45.14 Half of deaths from lung cancer 
12  This story can be found in many places, but was probably introduced into the folk 
culture of biology by Humphrey, N. (1976). The social function of intellect. In Growing 
Points in Ethology (P. P. G. Bateson and R. A. Hinde eds., Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 303–17).
13  The evidence is reviewed in Pepper, G. V. and D. Nettle. (2017). The behavioural 
constellation of deprivation: Causes and consequences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 
40: e314, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x1600234x
14  See: http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/health-professional/cancer-statistics/
statistics-by-cancer-type/lung-cancer/mortality#heading-One 
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are in the over 75s. You see the point: a lot of the decisions that poor 
people make start to make a kind of sense. Gillian Pepper struggled to 
find a name for this ‘making a kind of sense’. She didn’t want to use the 
term ‘adaptive’, since this has a technical meaning in biological theory, 
a technical meaning that was close but not identical to what she meant. 
She didn’t want to use the term ‘rational’, since this can mean a number 
of different things, and for many, connotes the result of very extensive 
conscious deliberation, which she did not want to imply. So she settled 
on ‘contextually appropriate response’. Living with a bias towards the 
present is a contextually appropriate response to the reality of poverty. 
Gillian (and I) are agnostic about whether this response is extensively 
reasoned through, or more automatic and sub-conscious, or a bit of both. 
The best worked-through case of contextual appropriateness is the 
age of childbearing. The really big difference between the rich and the 
poor in Britain is not in how many children they have, but in when 
they have them. On average, this differs by at least a decade between 
the richest and poorest districts.15 We can see this very clearly in the 
cemetery. Here’s the grave of Nora W., dead at 23 but already a mum; 
Maureen O., dead at 49 but already a nana (grandma); Tommy D., dead 
at 62 but already a great-grandfather. You have to get on with it to 
keep the generation time this short. Commentators are fond of morally 
chastising the poor for their reproductive decisions, and laying all kinds 
of social ills at the door of early childbearing.16 This is quite unjustifiable: 
the extremely late reproduction of middle-class people causes far more 
by way of medical problems and costs.
Instead, let us put the problem the other way around. It’s quite a 
widespread human desire to hold one’s grandchildren, to care for 
them whilst one is still hale and living. Those very commentators 
who lambast teenage mothers would probably endorse this aspiration 
whole-heartedly. In a paper a few years ago, I entered into the following 
thought experiment: Say I was a young woman and wanted to be able to 
expect, assuming my life and that of my daughter followed the average 
15  Nettle, D. (2010). Dying young and living fast: variation in life history across 
English neighborhoods. Behavioral Ecology 21: 387–95, https://doi.org/10.1093/
beheco/arp202
16  In the UK, early childbearing was a media and public policy obsession for a while, 
and then just as mysteriously dropped out of interest. See Arai, L. (2009). Teenage 
Pregnancy: The Making and Unmaking of a Problem (Bristol: Policy Press). 
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trajectory, to be alive and in good health until my oldest grandchild was 
five years old. When would I need to start childbearing? The answer 
for the poorest decile of English neighbourhoods: about 22. And that 
is almost exactly the age when people in those neighbourhoods do 
start childbearing, on average. As Arline Geronimus argued in a classic 
paper from years ago, young women who live lives of deprivation seem 
to know what they need to do, and so they do it.17
What about if I live in the median English neighbourhood? 28. 
Again, that’s about what people actually do. And if I lived in the most 
affluent neighbourhoods? I could wait until after 30. And look; there 
we are. Enormous demand for IVF and egg-freezing, coming from rich 
neighbourhoods, because the rising health expectancies of the rich have 
prolonged the contextually appropriate schedule. That’s fine; but let us 
not stigmatise the contextually appropriate behaviours of those who 
have to live their lives under different circumstances. 
§
Isn’t there a horrible circularity to this whole argument? You say that 
the poor smoke, don’t adhere to medications, bear children young, and 
eat badly because they won’t be alive long enough to see the negative 
consequences of these behaviours. But surely, the reason they won’t 
live so long is exactly that they smoke, don’t adhere to medications, eat 
badly, etc. So you seem in some way to be explaining their lifestyle by 
their lifestyle, which does not seem very satisfying. 
This objection should not be hastily dismissed. When we do 
epidemiological studies of the relationship between social class and 
health or mortality, we always find that poor people fare worse than 
rich. Some of this is indeed because they are more likely to smoke. 
So you control statistically for smoking. Some of it seems to be due 
to poorer diet. So you control for diet. Some of it seems to be due to 
patterns of physical activity. So you control for physical activity. And 
it’s true, the burden of excess mortality and morbidity is reduced by 
controlling for these things, maybe reduced by about a half. It is not 
reduced to nothing, though. However many voluntary behavioural 
things you control for, there is always a residuum of excess mortality 
17  Geronimus, A. T. (1996). What teen mothers know. Human Nature 7: 323–52, https://
doi.org/10.1007/bf02732898
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and morbidity hanging over poor people. This, Gillian Pepper and 
I would argue, is the structural bit, the bit fundamentally due to too 
few material resources and too many demands, the bit that poor people 
cannot control except by not being poor (and if they had an available 
option of not being poor, we assume they would mostly take it up). 
Our argument turns on this structural bit of health risk, this 
uncontrollable bit, being substantial. This structural excess health risk 
due to poverty is like predation and cold for wild mice; just there as 
part of the ecology, to be adapted to rather than opted out of. And you 
adapt to it by rebalancing between present and future consequences. 
Many of the arguments between left and right over the consequences 
of poverty are about the relative importance of the structural-ecological 
bit and the voluntary-behavioural bit of health risk. On the right, we 
decry people for being irresponsible, for not making better choices, not 
getting on their bikes to improve their lives. On the left, we are prone to 
point to structural sources of disadvantage, and invoke the criticism of 
having a victim mentality. The truth is that both bits are important. The 
account Gillian and I outline, though, hands an explanatory primacy 
to the structural-ecological bit. The presence of this structural increase 
in mortality and morbidity risk reduces the payoff for voluntary 
investments like adhering to medical recommendations, avoiding 
smoking, and so forth, and increases people’s relative valuation of 
present enjoyment. 
The voluntary-behavioural bit is important, though. In fact, 
it is responsible for a cruel irony I dubbed in an earlier paper the 
‘exacerbatory dynamic of poverty’.18 Because of their structural-
ecological disadvantage, the poor have less incentive than the rich to 
invest in their future health; but then the consequence of this reduced 
investment is to widen the health gap between the two groups to more 
than it structurally needs to be. And if the voluntary-behavioural 
choices of one generation partly determine the structural-ecological 
situation of their children, then we have scope for an inter-generational 
system of disadvantage that can self-perpetuate, and is hard to unravel. 
What is pretty clear, though, is that just putting larger warning labels on 
18  Nettle, D. (2010). Why are there social gradients in preventative health behavior? A 
perspective from behavioral ecology. PLoS ONE 5: e13371, https://doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pone.0013371 
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cigarettes and sweet foods is much like improving the sign-posting to 
the lifeboats on the Titanic. It is naïve for policy-makers or anyone else 
to assume otherwise. 
§
Dickens’ description of St. Antoine is characteristically evocative. 
Hunger and deprivation is written into the visual environment—in the 
ancient faces, the inadequate clothing, the dilapidation and litter, the 
poor foods on sale. All of these serve as ‘grim illustrations of Want’. It is 
240 years since the time Dickens was writing about, and 160 years since 
he wrote, but as I stroll around neighbourhood B, I muse on how little 
has changed. I instantly know that this is a poor neighbourhood, from 
the terrible litter, the state of the buildings, the clothes people wear, 
the things they are doing, as well as the headstones in the cemetery. 
The environment seeps information; information stares down from the 
chimneys, starts up from the kerb; it is written in the shops, the houses, 
the gardens. 
In recent years I have become interested in the information that is 
freely available just by being somewhere. For me as a researcher, it is 
a resource. These days we under-do the simple acts of observation, the 
collection of this free information, which is why I am frequently to be 
found here counting passers-by, documenting whether doors are open 
or closed, tabulating litter or recording ages from headstones. These 
simple acts get neglected in an era of standardized surveys, controlled 
experiments, big data, focus groups, and discourse analysis. This is a 
shame—whatever your research predilections, it seems to me that the 
point of departure for research should always be the organism in its 
environment. Indeed, the organism in its environment (or individual in 
their context) is a shared starting point that unites behavioural biology 
and social science. So you can’t do much better than put yourself in the 
environment, and ask: what do my study subjects see every day? What 
do they hear? What do they smell? Collect the information they collect, 
and it might help you begin to understand what they feel, why they do 
what they do. 
It is not just the researcher who needs to harvest information. It is 
the study subject too. We come into this world with, within important 
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limits, fairly open priors about what it will be like. So we have to detect 
our local environment, and cut our behavioural cloth accordingly. 
For this reason, characterizing the types of information available to 
the organism, the cues it can use to calibrate itself, is an important 
theoretical focus in behavioural biology.19 I would like to see more 
explicit consideration of it in social science research too: the precise 
quantification of the information freely available to people in their daily 
lives, in their ordinary social environment. We know that poor people 
have different attitudes about the future than the rich, and Gillian and 
I have argued that these attitudes are contextually appropriate. But 
how do people know what is the correct attitude to develop for their 
particular ecology? 
They are taught it, one might say. People tell them how they should 
behave. Or they imitate. Well, maybe, to a point. But I think there is a 
far greater role than we usually acknowledge for non-verbal inference 
based on sensory cues in the material environment. We know this is 
how visual perception works. What we receive is a set of cues of 
contrasts, surfaces and edges; what we infer is a world of objects and 
motion. By the same token, when we walk around neighbourhood B 
we see second-hand shops and litter and the mausoleum falling down 
(and, one morning as I ambled by, a wash-basin come crashing out of a 
closed upstairs window); what we receive is information. This is what 
life is like, will be like in the future. It doesn’t need explicitly saying, or 
teaching, or pointing out. It is there, and you can no more not receive it 
than you can avoid perceiving a football as continuing to exist when it 
rolls behind a parked car. 
This brings me back to the graves where I started. Every one of these 
deaths was a meaningful cue, never forgotten, to the living: to sons, 
daughters, siblings, friends. That’s what could await me. Gillian carried 
out a study where she showed that more experience people had of 
bereavement, the more they devalued the distant future, and the sooner 
19  See for example McNamara, J. M. et al. (2016). Detection vs. selection: Integration 
of genetic, epigenetic and environmental cues in fluctuating environments. Ecology 
Letters 19: 1267–76, https://doi.org/10.1111/ele.12663; Frankenhuis, W. E. and K. 
Panchanathan. (2011). Balancing sampling and specialization: An adaptationist 
model of incremental development. Proceedings of The Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences 278: 3558–65, https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2011.0055 
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they wanted to start a family.20 This makes perfect sense. The living can 
harvest information from death. 
Perhaps this can answer another puzzle for us: the extraordinary 
elaboration of death in neighbourhood B. Although the cemetery itself 
is neglected and gracelessly dilapidated, many individual graves are 
tended and celebrated to a striking degree. Marble headstones that look 
remarkably expensive feature photographs, engravings of caravans, 
or pet dogs, or Newcastle United shirts. The flowers, balloons, bears, 
reindeer and cards are clearly renewed. And it is not just within the 
cemetery. It is very common as one walks around the West End to find 
flowers and cards tied to lamp-posts, railings or benches. Someone fell 
here. Someone loved this spot. I have not done a systematic study, but I 
don’t believe you would find this degree of attention to death in a more 
affluent area. 
There is only one conclusion you can come to: these deaths mean a 
lot round here. What does it mean for something to mean something? 
That’s a rather involved philosophical question, but there are deep 
conceptual links between meaning, information, and uncertainty. A 
death means a lot if it carries a lot of information. And a death can 
only carry a lot of information if there is something about death we 
are uncertain about. For example, if every person died on the morning 
of their 79th birthday, there would be no information in age at death. 
We would be under no uncertainty about it. We would not say ‘taken 
from us too soon’ or ‘sudden and unexpected loss’. We would not be 
shocked. But we have seen that in this cemetery, the standard deviation 
of age at death is 20 years. In other words, there is a lot of variation, 
probably more variation than would be true in an affluent place. Hence 
the neighbours live under uncertainty about when they are going to 
die. As a result, every death is informative. And when something is 
informative, you look at it for longer. You remember it for longer. You 
keep coming back here.
20  Pepper, G. V., and D. Nettle. (2013). Death and the time of your life: Experiences 
of close bereavement are associated with steeper financial future discounting 
and earlier reproduction. Evolution and Human Behavior 34: 433–9, https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.08.004 

7. Why inequality is bad
Macro-level data are characterized by inherent 
limitations in what they can tell us about individual-
level processes. 
–Thomas V. Pollet and colleagues1 
Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett’s book The Spirit Level: Why More 
Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better caused something of a stir when 
it was published in 2009.2 The thesis of the book is clear from its title. 
What many were struck by was the vast range of statistical evidence 
that the authors brought to bear in defence of their central claim. For 
outcome after outcome—life expectancy, physical health, mental health, 
crime, teenage births, social trust—they showed the same pattern. 
Economically equal countries such as Japan and those of Scandinavia 
have the best societal outcomes; the unequal USA fares badly; and there 
is a graded relationship across the countries in between. The average 
income of a country (as long as it is reasonably high) explains little of 
the variation in health and social problems; it is the inequality of the 
distribution of income amongst inhabitants that matters. Never can you 
have encountered a single explanatory factor that turns out to matter for 
so many outcomes, and, intriguingly, turns out to matter in exactly the 
same way for all of them.
The purpose of this essay is not to dispute that inequality is bad. 
I agree with Wilkinson and Pickett on this point—the evidence is 
incontrovertible, and they performed a major intellectual service in 
placing the issue of inequality so centrally on the political table. My 
interest lies more in their argument for why inequality is bad. They 
have a particular take on this, which we will get to below. It may 
have some merit. However, there is a more parsimonious alternative 
1  Pollet, T. V. et al. (2014). What can cross-cultural correlations teach us about human 
nature? Human Nature 25: 410–29, p. 412, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-014-9206-3
2  Wilkinson, R. and K. Pickett. (2009). The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost 
Always Do Better (London: Penguin).
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explanation for their central results that merits equal consideration. 
What interests me is why they don’t really discuss this alternative in 
their book (even to refute it), despite the fact that they must be well 
aware of it. 
The centerpiece of Wilkinson and Pickett’s evidence is a series of 
scatterplots, backed up with regression analyses, showing that more 
inequality (on the x-axis) goes with lower average levels of good 
stuff (like trust) or higher average levels of bad stuff (like mortality 
or crime) on the y-axis. Figure 2 reproduces a couple of them. The 
remarkable thing about these scatterplots is how similar they all 
look to one another; however diverse the outcome, you always end 
up with a roughly linear relationship, with some (aptly enough for 
a scatterplot) scatter, and a few interesting cases that look like they 
are doing a bit better or worse than you might predict. As a working 
scientist who understands how messy data are, I find myself crying 
out for one analysis that didn’t work out that way. If it’s a non-trivial 
association, it ought to sometimes not be there, or else you start to 
worry that it is somehow an artefact of the method. (Spoiler alert: it’s 
not an artefact of the method, but it may be the inevitable product of a 
very general principle about money, as we shall see later). 
The important thing to appreciate about these scatterplots is the 
following: the data points on them are not individual people. They 
are large aggregates of people, sometimes countries as in figure 2, but 
also in some of their analyses, US states. In some sense, this has to be 
so, because inequality is not a property of any individual person: it is 
necessarily a group-level property, exactly because it concerns how 
stuff is shared out across the social group. I have no objection to the idea 
that group-level properties such as the inequality of the distribution of 
national wealth affect the well-being of individuals. Clearly, they do. 
It’s just that we have to be very careful about reasoning from statistical 
relationships that exist at the aggregate level, such as between countries’ 
inequalities and their average health outcomes, and processes going on 
in individual bodies and minds. 
Wilkinson and Pickett’s explanation for the universal association 
between high inequality and poor welfare is an appealing one, and it is 
roughly the following. In societies where there are large gulfs between 
people, no-one can feel secure. Everybody is stressed: not just those 
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Figure 2. Scatterplots of (top) country-level average life expectancy against income 
inequality, and (bottom) percentage of adults who are obese against income inequality, 
at the bottom the heap, but also those in other social positions, who 
constantly need to feel worried about slipping down into penury, and 
feel they have to battle to hang on to their currently favourable position. 
redrawn from The Spirit Level. I have omitted most of the country names for clarity. 
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In short, everyone is worse off when there is more inequality because 
everyone is more stressed about either moving up, or staying where 
they are. In a more equal world, these kinds of stresses and motivations 
are relaxed, making way for more balanced and healthful approach 
to life. This in turn leads to fewer negative emotions, more trust and 
compassion, better mental health, better physical health, less crime, and 
so on. 
Appealing as this narrative is, note what it has done. It has explained 
an association that exists at the aggregate level (comparing nations to 
each other) by a process in individual minds, by simply transposing 
the pattern we see when we compare groups into the head of every 
individual. As figure 2 shows, at the level of countries, you find poorer 
average well-being where inequality is higher; Wilkinson and Pickett 
explain this by saying that for every individual, their well-being goes 
down if the level of inequality in the surrounding society is higher. 
That could be true, but it need not be true to explain patterns like those 
in figure 2. We are entering the terrain here of the dreaded ‘ecological 
fallacy’ (the fallacy of assuming that an association at the aggregate 
level is reproduced within each individual), and related ‘Yule-Simpson 
effect’ (statistical relationships at one level of aggregation can be absent 
or even reversed at a different level of aggregation). Much has been 
written about these issues.3 
The quantities on the y-axes of figure 2 and the other scatterplots in 
The Spirit Level are rates or averages for the country or state. Differences 
in rates or averages can come about in a number of different ways. To 
obtain the high rate of obesity in the USA compared to Sweden, for 
example, it could be that every individual within each country has 
a particular probability of becoming obese, and that probability is 
much higher for a person from the USA than a person from Sweden. 
This would be the Wilkinson and Pickett explanation: everyone in the 
unequal USA is at a higher personal risk of obesity, because of the stress 
of the surrounding inequality, than anyone in equal Sweden. 
Here’s an alternative explanation, though. Say there are two classes 
of people. The first class is people whose incomes are too low to buy 
good diets. Regardless of whether they live in the USA or Sweden, 
they have a 50% chance of becoming obese. The second class is people 
3  See Pollet, T. V. et al. (2014). What can cross-cultural correlations teach us about 
human nature? Human Nature 25: 410–29, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-014-9206-3
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whose incomes are high enough to afford good diets. Regardless of 
whether they live in the USA or Sweden, they have a 10% chance of 
becoming obese. These two classes are both present in both countries. 
Individuals of neither class are directly personally affected by the level 
of inequality in their country; all they need ‘know’ is whether they have 
enough money to buy a good diet or not, and this determines their 
risk of obesity. The difference between the countries arises from their 
different compositions in terms of the two classes. Sweden, say, consists 
of 95% people in the ‘high enough income’ category, and 5% of people 
in the ‘not high enough income’ category, whereas the USA consists of 
more like 50%: 50%. That could certainly produce the pattern shown in 
figure 2. And it’s not a ridiculous explanation. There is lots of evidence 
that many people in the USA are too poor to buy decent food.4 The 
thing about inequality is that it produces a big chunk of people who are 
really badly off given the general level of prices in their country. Smaller 
inequality produces a smaller chunk. 
Wilkinson and Pickett could reasonably respond that they show, 
in still other scatterplots, that the average income of a country is not a 
very good predictor of health and social outcomes (given that we are 
comparing amongst countries that are all reasonably rich). Hence, it is 
not income per se that matters, but the inequality of its distribution. 
But again, those scatterplots are based on country-level average income 
not being a very good predictor of country-level averages or rates of 
health and social problems. What I am saying is that at the individual 
level, personal income might be very important—indeed causally the 
most important thing. This is quite compatible with a country’s average 
income not telling you much about the average level of health, since 
the kind of income the matters at the individual level is not the national 
average income, but one’s own. 
§
As I mentioned earlier, the remarkable sensation one gets from reading 
The Spirit Level is how uniform a picture emerges from these scatterplots. 
4  See: Gundersen, C., B. Kreider and J. Pepper. (2011). The economics of food 
insecurity in the United States. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy 33: 281–303, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/aepp/ppr022; Ratcliffe, C., S. McKernan and S. Zhang. 
(2011). How much does the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program reduce 
food insecurity?. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 93: 1082–98, https://doi.
org/10.1093/ajae/aar026
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Every single one shows the predicted positive or negative correlation. 
It becomes an almost incantational moment, repeated throughout the 
liturgy: the unveiling of the scatterplot. You can’t help but feel that these 
plots, diverse as they are in their data sources and outcome variables, 
must be revealing a principle of great generality. They are: the question 
is, exactly what principle is it? 
The alternative to Wilkinson and Pickett’s ‘inequality around makes 
us all stressed’ explanation is the following. At the individual level, 
income has diminishing returns for the outcomes that matter in life. 
When you put it like that, it is obvious. For a man who is starving, £10 
can be the difference between living and dying; for a man who is rich, 
it is a bagatelle. For a man on a low income, £100 a month increase in 
income can be life-changing because of the material improvements he 
could make. For a university professor such as myself, £100 a month 
increase in income would, to be honest, not change my life in any very 
appreciable way. 
What does this principle—the diminishing welfare returns to 
income—have to do with why inequality is bad? Here we need to think 
hard about what happens as societies become more unequal. The income 
inequality of a country can be thought of as a measure of the dispersion 
of the income of its individual inhabitants around the average. Where 
inequality is high, the dispersion is large. Where inequality is low, the 
dispersion is smaller and every individual is tightly clustered around 
the country average. Thus, the only way for a country to become 
more unequal whilst maintaining the same average income is for the 
dispersion to increase around a fixed central point: some individuals 
have to move away from the average income in the positive direction, 
while others have to produce an equal and opposite moment by moving 
away from the average income in the negative direction. 
Now let us combine this principle with the idea that there are 
diminishing returns to having more income. Let us say that the 
relationship between an individual’s income and his or her expected 
health (and here you can substitute, trust, stress, anxiety, probability 
of teenage conception, probability of committing a crime, any of the 
outcomes you like) is as shown in figure 3. This just puts onto a simple 
function the intuition that each increment of £100 in income is a little 
less beneficial for health improvement than the previous £100. 
Now imagine we are going to increase the income inequality of the 
country without changing its average income. To achieve this, one group 
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of individuals will have their income pushed away from the average 
in the positive direction, while another group will exactly offset this 
by having their income pushed away from the average in the negative 
direction. But, critically: the people who are pushed up in income will 
experience only a very small improvement in their health, because they 
are being pushed up across a zone where the income-health relationship 
is rather flat. By contrast, the people pushed down will experience a 
larger deterioration in their health, because they are being pushed 
across a zone where the income-health relationship starts to get steep. 
So the rich will get richer, but not much healthier, and the poor will get 
poorer, and much less healthy.
Figure 3. When there are diminishing health returns to income, increasing dispersion of 
incomes around a constant average produces a big health loss for the losers but only a small 
health gain for the gainers. Health is shown on an arbitrary scale. 
So what will the average health be like for our hypothetical country 
after it has become more unequal without changing its average income? 
Well, its average health will be given by the following equation:
Average health after becoming more unequal = 
The average health it had before + 
a small improvement for those who did well in the increasing 
inequality	−
a big deterioration for those who did badly in the increasing inequality
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I hope you can see that ‘the initial thing + a small thing – a big thing’ 
has got to be of a lower value than the initial thing. In other words, 
if the relationship of income to health is of a diminishing-returns 
character, then it is necessarily the case that increasing inequality will 
make average health poorer. It is in fact a consequence of a general 
mathematical principle called Jensen’s inequality.5 For cases such as the 
obesity one, where the scatterplot shows a positive rather than negative 
trend, you have to assume that there are diminishing returns to income 
for avoiding obesity; then, the same explanation for the observed pattern 
then follows. 
§
In case you are not yet convinced, I created a simple computer simulation. 
In my simulation, we study 30 countries, and from each we sample 100 
inhabitants. The countries have the same average income per capita as 
one another (£10,000). They differ only in how unequally distributed this 
income is: the degree of dispersion around £10,000. Every individual’s 
health (measured on an arbitrary scale) is determined by the square-
root of their income (hence, diminishing returns), plus a sizeable dose 
of randomly-distributed noise.6 
It is important to stress that in this simulation, no individual ‘knows’ 
the inequality of his or her country directly. They don’t feel stressed 
by it, or fear falling into poverty, or feel the need to keep up with the 
Joneses. Their health is determined entirely by their personal income, 
plus random chance. Now, what happens when we compute the 
average health for each country, and plot it against the Gini coefficient, 
a standard measure of income inequality, for our virtual countries? 
Figure 4 shows the results from four runs of the simulation. The 
association of higher inequality with poorer welfare is always there. 
The plots could have come straight out of the pages of The Spirit 
Level. Sometimes the association is stronger, sometimes a bit weaker, 
sometimes there are intriguing outliers or apparent non-linearities. But 
5  Jensen’s inequality: Roughly, the average of a function of X is not equal to that 
function of the average of X, unless the function is linear. See Denny, M. (2017). The 
fallacy of the average: On the ubiquity, utility and continuing novelty of Jensen’s 
inequality. Journal of Experimental Biology 220: 139–46, https://doi.org/10.1242/
jeb.140368 
6  You can download the R code for running the simulation from: http://www.
danielnettle.org.uk/inequality-r-code/
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the point is: I have run this simulation hundreds of times. It is 17 lines 
of code (and I am not a very efficient programmer); there is no delicate 
psychology of shame and anxiety; no response of the individual to their 
psychosocial milieu; no representation of the society’s Gini coefficient in 
the head of any individual; and yet we see The Spirit Level’s central result 
every time. That’s mathematics for you. Under diminishing returns to 
income for some outcome, increasing dispersion in income will always 
decrease the aggregate level average of the outcome. This means any 
attempt to plot the correlation at the group level that is shown again 
and again in The Spirit Level is condemned to success by the laws of 
mathematics. No other assumptions about human psychology, stress, 
or anything else are required to explain this result. 
Figure 4. Income inequality against average heath for thirty simulated countries, four 
separate runs of the simulation, as described in the text.
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We have two competing mechanisms that give rise to the same aggregate-
level association: 1. More inequality in a society causes everyone in 
that society to feel worse; and 2. More inequality in a society produces 
winners and losers, and since the loss of the losers is bigger than the 
win of the winners, the average welfare becomes lower. Two competing 
mechanisms is good: this is the situation scientists like, because now 
you can try to test which is more important. 
You can test between these mechanisms. One way is to gather what 
is called multilevel data. That is, you need datasets from multiple 
countries where the health and the income of every individual (not just 
the country average) is recorded. You also need to know the inequality 
of each country. Then you fit a statistical model that simultaneously 
estimates the effects of personal income and societal inequality on the 
individual’s health. Second, and crucially, when you do this you need 
to specify that at the individual level, the relationship between income 
and health is likely to be non-linear, for example by relating health to 
the logarithm of income. 
Researchers working on the association of inequality and health are 
well aware of the danger of the ecological fallacy, and for this reason, 
they have conducted studies using multilevel data. In general, they 
haven’t done a very good job of estimating curvilinear relationships 
between income and health at the individual level. Epidemiologists 
seem keen on doing this by dividing income up into bands; this does 
allow for non-linearity, but dividing a continuum into bands always 
loses information, and therefore risks underestimating the magnitude 
effects of personal income. But anyhow, that’s how they tend to do it. 
In some studies, effects of societal-level inequality remain statistically 
significant after accounting for individual income, while in others they 
do not. For example, in two of three studies reviewed by Kawachi et al.,7 
there is no association between society-level inequality and individual 
health once the effects of personal income have been taken into account. 
In the third study,8 there is some evidence for an effect of inequality on 
7  See Kawachi, I. and B. P. Kennedy. (1999). Income inequality and health: pathways 
and mechanisms. Health Services Research 34: 215–27, p. 217. Download at: https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1088996/ 
8  Kennedy, B. P. et al. (1998). Income distribution, socioeconomic status, and self-
rated health in the United States: multilevel analysis. British Medical Journal 317: 
917–21, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.317.7163.917
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health after accounting for personal income, but, (a) the effects of societal 
inequality are much weaker than the effects of personal income; and 
(b) the negative effects of societal inequality on health after accounting 
for income are strongest in the poorer sectors of societies. In fact, there 
is no evidence for a negative effect of inequality on the health of the 
richest people in societies. Findings are similar in other studies. So when 
people model the problem properly, they have to conclude that, at the 
very least, a big part of the mechanism linking inequality to average 
well-being is simply the distribution of personal incomes.9
§
If I am leaning towards the ‘diminishing returns from individual income’ 
mechanism being the main one in accounting for the cross-national 
pattern, I fear you might think I am saying the following: ‘Wilkinson 
and Pickett are wrong. Inequality is not really bad for societal outcomes. 
It is really just that there are diminishing returns to individual income. 
The group-level correlation is a kind of statistical artefact’. 
On the contrary, I am saying: Wilkinson and Pickett are right that 
inequality is really bad for societal outcomes. Its negative effects may 
operate via a slightly different individual-level mechanism than they 
suggest. The group-level correlations between inequality and outcomes 
embody with the force of necessity a general truth that politicians should 
be aware of. Increasing inequality really is bad for societal outcomes 
exactly because there are diminishing returns to income. In general, in 
an affluent society, if you enact policies that make your society or group 
less equal, then well-being will get only a bit better for the winners, 
but well-being will get a lot worse for the losers. As a consequence, the 
9  An even better approach than having multi-level observational data is using some 
kind of experiment or natural experiment. That is, we need to study a situation 
where people’s experience of inequality is randomly varied without altering 
their actual incomes. It’s hard, but there are some very interesting attempts to 
do it by studying the neighbours of lottery winners (Agarwal, S. et al. (2018). 
Does the relative income of peers cause financial distress? Evidence from lottery 
winners and neighboring bankruptcies. Working Papers of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia WP: 18–16, https://doi.org/10.21799/frbp.wp.2018.16), or by creating 
artificial micro-societies (Krupp, D. B. and T. R. Cook. (2018). Local competition 
amplifies the corrosive effects of inequality. Psychological Science 29: 824–33, https://
doi.org/10.1177/0956797617748419). These kinds of research seem to me to give us 
the best window we can have on the causal properties of inequality itself. 
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aggregate well-being will be worse than it was before. Moreover, your 
social group will have to deal with all the knock-on costs of having sick, 
demoralized, hungry and desperate people around. 
So, far from being a debunking of the idea that inequality is bad, 
this meditation leads me to affirm that inequality is bad. Indeed, it is 
potentially radical in its implications. The idea that the life returns to 
income might rather generally be diminishing is an argument in favour 
of reducing inequality (just as much as Wilkinson and Pickett’s account 
is). More specifically, it is an argument for progressive taxation, and 
other redistributive mechanisms (taking from the rich, for whom it 
won’t make much difference, and giving to the poor, for whom it could 
be life-changing). It is also a direct challenge to our prevailing cultural 
assumption that making a lot of money is a sensible and beneficial 
general aspiration for life. 
I rather like the diminishing returns explanation for another reason. 
Accounts of why deprivation is bad for health have taken a rather ‘soft’ 
turn of late, in some quarters. If you want to read up on this, it’s the 
debate between the psychosocial comparison account and the neo-
materialist account of health inequalities.10 The neo-materialist position 
is fairly obvious: disadvantage is bad for health because you can’t 
afford decent housing, food, eye tests, and so on. For the psychosocial 
comparison camp, what’s bad about disadvantage is that it produces 
feelings of shame, worthlessness and other negative emotions that arise 
when we compare ourselves to others. 
It’s true enough that experiencing disadvantage gives rise to negative 
emotions. You can document this in as many surveys as you like. As 
a causal decomposition of why poverty and deprivation might be 
harmful, though, the focus on negative feelings is rather bourgeois in its 
sensibilities. It almost says: I can’t imagine that anyone is really poor in a 
country like contemporary Britain, not poor enough to actually starve or 
shiver or contract consumption or anything. It is just that, subjectively, 
coming last in the race makes people feel bad. But the idea that no-one 
in Britain has absolute problems of poverty—material rather than just 
10  See Lynch, J. W. et al. (2000). Income inequality and mortality: importance to 
health of individual income, psychosocial environment, or material conditions. 
British Medical Journal 320: 1200–4, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.320.7243.1200 and a 
response by Marmot, M. G. and R. G. Wilkinson. (2001). Psychosocial and material 
pathways in the relation between income and health: A response to Lynch et al. 
British Medical Journal 322: 1233–6, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.322.7296.1233 
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subjective disadvantage—is a failure of imagination. If I may say so, it’s 
a failure of imagination particularly easy to succumb to if you aren’t 
poor yourself, and live in a neighbourhood where no-one is poor. In 
the West End of Newcastle, there are people, today, who do not have 
enough to eat. They don’t have enough money to heat their homes or 
dress well. These are absolute material problems. Bad feelings are at 
most the canary in the coalmine. 
So whilst both psychosocial experience and material wants may 
have important roles to play, I have a personal bias towards the neo-
materialist approach. This is related to my gravitation towards the 
diminishing-returns-to-income account of the group-level correlation 
between inequality and societal outcomes. It is a little dismissive, 
even trivializing, of the experiences of poor people to characterize 
their difficulties as largely constituted by negative subjective feelings. 
Their problems—as they see them—are largely constituted by not 
having enough money to live on, given how much everything costs.11 
Similarly, I am uneasy with the argument that increasing inequality 
has hurt me, a university professor, as much as it has hurt a person on 
the minimum wage (I had to step over a homeless person on the way 
to the opera!). It hasn’t really. The inconvenient truth is that many of 
the policies that have made the lives of poor people in Britain worse 
have been popular with the upper-middle classes, who perceive their 
lives to be made better, not worse, by them. The problem is that their 
gain has been more than offset by big losses for others. This raises 
questions of fairness, as well as the chaos of picking up the consequent 
social problems. 
§
11  There is a wealth of research evidence supporting this claim. See for example: 
O’Brien, M. and P. Kyprianou. (2017). Just Managing? What it Means for the 
Families of Austerity Britain (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers), https://www.
openbookpublishers.com/product/591, https://doi.org/10.11647/obp.0112; Daly, M 
and G. Kelly. (2015). Families and Poverty: Every Day Life on a Low Income (London: 
Policy Press), https://doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781447318828.001.0001; 
Garthwaite, K. (2016). Hunger Pains: Life inside Foodbank Britain (London: Policy 
Press), https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1t89f84; Taylor, A. and R. Loopstra. (2016). Too 
Poor To Eat: Food Insecurity in the UK, downloadable from https://foodfoundation.
org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/FoodInsecurityBriefing-May-2016-FINAL.
pdf. 
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Wilkinson and Pickett are very good researchers who are no doubt 
well aware of the theoretical issues—Jensen’s inequality, the ecological 
fallacy, and so on—we have discussed so far. They don’t talk about them 
in their book though. They just put forward their preferred mechanism 
and then give us scatterplot after scatterplot. This is despite the facts 
that: (a) diminishing welfare returns to individual income also predicts 
scatterplots showing the same pattern as their account; and (b) this has 
been widely known and agonized over in the technical literature for 
decades.12 
I suspect this means Wilkinson and Pickett are smarter academics 
than I am, for two reasons. First: people in general (people like politicians, 
students, activists and the general public, as well as colleagues) will 
believe and reproduce an argument they find easy to understand and 
remember. Wilkinson and Pickett want you to believe and reproduce the 
idea that inequality is bad (as do I!). Wilkinson and Pickett’s mechanism 
linking societal inequality to individual health is easy to understand 
and remember. The diminishing returns thing is not. 
Humans find reasoning about certain kinds of processes hard. One 
kind of process they find particularly hard is that requiring what the great 
biologist Ernst Mayr called ‘population thinking’.13 Population thinking 
requires tracking the way groups of things (biological populations, 
societies) change their aggregate properties over time through changes 
in their composition, not changes to any of their constituent individuals. 
Population thinking is effortful to do. It is easier to conflate the properties 
of the individuals and of the group in one’s mind, essentially to make 
the group itself a kind of representative individual. 
For example, there is a large literature on popular understanding of 
biological evolution.14 This literature shows people struggling to grasp 
12  An early reference to relevance of diminishing returns to personal income for 
aggregate welfare is found in Melville, L. (1939). Economic welfare. The Economic 
Journal 49: 552–3, https://doi.org/10.2307/2224836, and the principle is a standard 
one in welfare and taxation economics. Its application to the present issue is 
discussed, inter alia, by Ecob, R. and G. Davey Smith. (1999). Income and health: 
What is the nature of the relationship? Social Science and Medicine 48: 693–705, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0277-9536(98)00385-2
13  Mayr, E. (1982). The Growth of Biological Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press).
14  Shtulman, A. (2006). Qualitative differences between naive and scientific 
theories of evolution. Cognitive Psychology 52: 170–194, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
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that what happens in evolution is continual change in the proportions 
of individuals with different characteristics in the population, not 
necessarily change to any of the individuals themselves. The individual 
animals and plants are just being how they are; they don’t know anything 
about the species or the direction of evolution. People find it easier to 
conflate what is happening at the individual level and at the species 
level. They believe that the species adapting to desert conditions over 
evolutionary time implies that individuals get better at living in deserts 
during their lifetimes (it needn’t); or they endow the species itself with 
needs, drives, goals and so forth, properties that actually belong to 
individuals (‘lemming X did something for the good of its species’). In 
short, people find it a lot easier to understand how one individual gets a 
longer neck by stretching it, than how the necks of giraffes could extend 
by a metre over evolutionary time without any individual changing 
their neck-length in their adult life, and despite offspring having the 
same length of neck as their parents on average.
The difficulty with population thinking crops up in trying to 
understand social phenomena, too. This may explain the widespread 
persistence of the ecological fallacy in social science research. I cannot 
tell you how many times I have tried to remember and transmit the 
following famous example. Amongst senators from the Northern states, 
a higher proportion of Democrats than Republicans voted for the 1964 
Civil Rights Act. Amongst senators from the Southern states, a higher 
proportion of Democrats than Republicans voted for the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. Amongst all the senators in the senate combined, a higher 
proportion of Republicans than Democrats voted for the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act. Eh? That can’t be right. Actually, it is. It’s quite straightforward. 
Most of the Republicans were from Northern states, where the support 
for the 1964 Civil Rights Act was high; more of the Democrats were from 
the South, where support was low. I can hang onto this one for about 
five minutes…no, it’s gone again. 
The difficulty with population thinking, I suspect, is why Wilkinson 
and Pickett’s explanation for why inequality is bad has got such cultural 
legs. It says: the same thing is going on in the head of every individual as 
cogpsych.2005.10.001; Nettle, D. (2010). Understanding of evolution may be 
improved by thinking about people. Evolutionary Psychology 8: 205–28, https://doi.
org/10.1177/147470491000800206 
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is going on the level of whole groups. As the inequality gets greater, the 
individual=group feels worse. No population thinking required. What 
happens is the same for every individual in the group, and the group-
level correlation is just an individual-level correlation. By contrast, the 
diminishing-returns requires non-linear functions, and averages being 
affected by some people moving in one direction with one effect, and 
other people moving another way with different effects. It’s not catchy. 
It replaces a simple universal principle with a murky, nerdy statistical 
argument that could prove a cultural cul-de-sac. That does not help the 
cause. 
The second reason that Wilkinson and Pickett’s argument is a 
shrewd one is that it appeals directly to the self-interest of rich people. 
‘You too would be directly, personally better off if inequality were 
reduced’, it says. ‘Feeling stressed? Try lower inequality!’ By contrast, 
the diminishing returns story says: ‘you, the rich, might be slightly 
worse off under reduced inequality, but some other people would be 
much better off’. Wilkinson and Pickett offer us a free lunch for all; 
diminishing returns offers to make some (small) losers and some (big) 
gainers. Appealing to the self-interest of influential people is a smart 
move. It seems to have become much more normative in recent decades 
to assume that people can only be motivated to action by appealing 
to their self-interest. I doubt this is true: humans have complex moral 
emotions and perceived self-interest is certainly not the only factor 
influencing their endorsement of courses of action. But in the current 
climate, Wilkinson and Pickett’s argument is pragmatically effective. 
This is especially true since those who stand to gain most from 
reductions in inequality—poor people—have been systematically 
demonized, portrayed as undeserving, feckless, and not like us, in the 
cultural representations of recent decades.15 This cultural situation risks 
making the argument that it is mostly poor people who would benefit 
from reducing inequality backfire rather badly. The argument that the 
rich would benefit too looks a better bet. 
§
15  See Jones, O. (2016). Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class (London: Verso).
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I conclude this essay, as so often, in a state of profound unease. I find 
myself quibbling with the details of Wilkinson and Pickett’s explanation 
of why inequality is bad, even though I admire their work and wish 
it to succeed in its broader social agenda. It would be easy, by raising 
complex alternative statistical explanations, to give succour to those 
who wish to dismiss the evidence that inequality is bad altogether. 
And there are plenty of those, such as Conservative former government 
minister David Davis, whose response was apparently: ‘It’s bullshit 
[…]. It’s bullshit […] I think it’s one of those fashionable, stupid ideas. 
It’s easy to sell a book, but I don’t think it stands up’.16 
If there is something you deeply believe, is it better to promulgate 
a simple explanation for it that people will immediately understand, 
support and remember, but is maybe a little simpler than what you, as a 
researcher, suspect to be really going on? Or is it better to be quite open 
about the uncertainties, the complexities, and the diversity of possible 
mechanisms that could underlie the phenomena we observe? Which 
one, ultimately, will increase the longevity and fecundity of the central 
idea? The media has for the most part made its mind up about this: I 
knew a TV producer who admitted to me that whenever an academic 
says, ‘There are several possible reasons. First…’, he quietly stopped his 
camera recording. No need to waste tape.
The issue is about the inherent complexity and uncertainty of 
scientific knowledge. As academics trying to make an impact on life, we 
could opt to express our doubt and uncertainty only behind closed doors, 
in lab meetings and the privacy of our studies; maybe in the technical 
literature, behind a screen of algebra. Then we could go out into to the 
world having decided what we believe, packaging it comprehensibly 
and appealingly, and defending it on all fronts with a greater certainty 
than we might privately hold. Or else, as I rather naïvely tend to do, 
we could stumble around in the world, incoherent and uncertain, with 
all our doubt, our qualifications, our evidential gaps, our multiple 
alternative mechanisms, our ‘on the one hand’s and changes of heart, in 
plain sight. It’s a difficult problem. 
16  Quoted in Jones, O. (2016). Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class (London: 
Verso, p. 83). 

8. Let them eat cake!
Of all the preposterous assumptions of 
humanity over humanity,  
nothing exceeds most of the criticisms 
made on the habits  
of the poor by the well-housed, well-
warmed, and well-fed. 
–Herman Melville, 
Poor man’s pudding and rich man’s crumbs
I had an interesting experience lately. Evidence shows that poor people 
tend to be somewhat more impulsive, anxious, irritable, and aggressive 
than rich people. I wrote a paper suggesting a hypothesis for why this 
might be the case.1 Maybe, I suggested, they are just hungry. That is, at 
the time of completing the survey, or over the period of being observed, 
perhaps people with lower incomes are more likely to be hungry, or are 
hungry a greater proportion of the time, than richer people in the same 
sample. That could explain the observed correlations. 
Hunger could explain the correlations because, quite separately, 
there are established literatures showing that when people—or animals 
of other species too—are hungry, they become more impulsive, anxious, 
irritable, and aggressive. In other words, hungry people show the very 
same suite of characteristics that is attributed to poor people in studies of 
socioeconomic differences. And the good thing about hunger is that we 
are not limited to correlation: we can manipulate hunger experimentally, 
within the same individuals, and show that hunger actually causes a 
shift to greater impulsivity etc. You just have to go without food for 
half a day. You can try it for yourself: it is one experiment I can pretty 
much guarantee will be successful. So, the hypothesis in my paper 
was based on two links: one from low income to hunger, and a second 
1  Nettle, D. (2017). Does hunger contribute to socioeconomic gradients in behaviour?. 
Frontiers in Psychology 8: 358, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00358
© 2018 Daniel Nettle, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0155.08
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from hunger to the suite of characteristics like impulsivity, anxiety, 
irritability, and aggression. The second of these links is absolutely rock 
solid, and unequivocally causal. The first link—that low income leads 
to greater hunger—relies on inference from more correlational types of 
data, but the evidence suggesting it is compelling too, as we will see. As 
I saw it then, I had taken a mystery—poorer people are more impulsive 
and irritable, for currently unknown reasons—and, by my hypothesis, 
demystified it into two steps, both of which we had prior grounds for 
believing to be correct. This left us with a simple, eminently testable 
scientific hypothesis, namely: the known relationships between income 
and hunger, and between hunger and impulsivity, irritability, etc., 
suffice to explain the observed correlations between poverty on the one 
hand and impulsivity, irritability etc. on the other. 
So there I was feeling moderately pleased with myself. I didn’t claim 
that my hypothesis was correct (we don’t currently know that), but I did 
review the reasons for considering it, and discuss the ways it ought to be 
tested, without prejudice as to what the results of those tests would be. 
Feeling I had done what good scientists are supposed to do, I turned in 
my paper, and looked forward to the peer reviewers patting me on the 
head. Did they?
They did not. Generally, they hated it. More precisely, most of them 
hated most of it. I know because the scientific publishing industry 
gave me a number of opportunities to sample again from the pool of 
possible peer reviewers—as many samples as it took to finally find two 
who didn’t hate it, or at any rate were generous enough to let the ideas 
get stated. Most of the reviewers who didn’t completely hate all of it 
nonetheless wanted me to add multiple nuances of the ‘there are likely 
to be many factors involved’ kind. Authors of academic papers will 
be familiar with having to do this. You might think that such demand 
for nuance tends to improve theory, but Kieran Healy, in a robustly 
titled recent paper, has made a strong case to the contrary. The free-
floating demand to add in more factors, he argues, ‘typically obstructs 
the development of theory that is intellectually interesting, empirically 
generative, or practically successful’, since it makes every theory more 
like every other one, and less easy to put to the test.2 
2  Healy, K. (2017). Fuck nuance. Sociological Theory 35: 118–27, p. 118, https://doi.
org/10.1177/0735275117709046
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Of course, the problem may have been that I didn’t write the paper 
well enough. But it felt like something more interesting was occurring. 
I have, often in my life, for various reasons, ended up writing bad ‘on 
the one hand…’ papers that blather on inconclusively about various 
esoteric topics without presenting any clear or socially important take-
home ideas; papers that are all things to all readers; papers that contain 
nothing you could actually act on. The peer reviewers have usually 
loved these papers. To me, the hunger paper was worth much more 
than all those disappointing efforts combined. But the disappointing 
efforts are published in much more ‘esteemed’ journals, and seem to 
have been much better received, than the hunger paper. This is not 
an isolated case: Many academics will tell you that the papers they 
most value and are most proud of are the ones they have most trouble 
publishing, whilst their derivative, arcane or trivial ones sail through. I 
want to understand why. 
§
Part of the reason for the poor reception of the hunger paper may be 
to do with intuition interference. I had an intuition that one particular 
experience—hunger—could be doing quite a lot of the work in 
explaining some of the subtle ways the poor behave differently from 
the rich. But I unrolled my idea on a terrain where others—specifically, 
the peer reviewers—already had quite developed intuitions about 
other constructs that could be important. ‘What about parenting?’, they 
asked. What about social norms? What about stress? What about the 
perception of relative disadvantage? Indeed. Some of these things might 
turn out to be nested within the hunger idea (there’s a social norm in 
some social groups of being impulsive; but why did the social norm get 
established; perhaps because people in those groups are often hungry). 
Some are alternatives to my idea. But really, this reviewer reaction comes 
down to: ‘my intuitions wouldn’t have had me starting from there’. It’s 
hard to know how to respond. You feel like saying: why don’t you start 
from where you want to start from and see how far you can get, and I 
will start from where I want to start from and do likewise, then we will 
compare notes when we meet? But it’s hardly a flaw of my paper that 
it is about what I want it to be about, not what you want it to be about. 
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A related refrain that arose in these discussions was: but surely a 
hypothesis that simple is likely to be wrong? Well, I agree. That’s one of 
the reasons I felt so pleased with myself for having written the paper. 
Because science, I’ve heard, is about saying things that have the potential 
to be wrong. We even have a posh term for it: falsifiability. Essentially, 
science consists in making statements that have the potential to be 
judged, when all the evidence is in and the debates have been had, to be 
definitely wrong. If it couldn’t be definitely wrong, it’s pseudoscience. 
I have over-simplified here; I have articulated what is known to 
philosophers as naïve falsificationism. But more subtle positions in 
the philosophy of science still come down to scientific theories being 
different from non-science in their eventual ‘discreditability’ by the 
accumulation of evidence. 
It seems to me to follow from this that the simpler your claim—
the fewer constructs, linkages and relationships, the fewer degrees of 
freedom and reciprocal loops—the better you are probably doing in 
terms of scientific theorising. This point doesn’t go down well in some 
of the waters in which I swim. People have a fondness for a kind of 
exhaustiveness in their theorising. They will earnestly present their 
‘theory’ as a kind of flow diagram, with numerous boxes labelled 
things like ‘parenting’, ‘social norms’, ‘perceived disadvantage’, ‘social 
comparison’, and so forth. Pretty much every box has an arrow going 
to the outcome, and to pretty much every other intermediary box. 
Some pairs of boxes have reciprocal arrows. Some of the peer reviewers 
wanted me to change my paper from a statement of a simple hypothesis, 
to a review of the many factors likely to be involved in socioeconomic 
differences in behaviour, ideally with a ghastly diagram of the type 
described above as its figure 1.
Now the question is: in a thousand years, is my simple hunger 
hypothesis, or one of these many-factors-influence-the-outcome-and-
also-each-other hypotheses, more likely to be left standing? The hunger 
hypothesis, presumably, is more likely to have failed. But rather than 
seeing that as a limitation, should we not see this as a good thing? 
There’s a chance for the hunger hypothesis that in a thousand years we 
will be able to conclusively say: here’s a possibility that people thought 
about, but turned not to be the answer (or not the whole answer). That’s 
a kind of progress. For the many-factors theories, I think the most likely 
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answer is that in a thousand years, as now, it won’t really be possible 
to say whether they are still standing or not. This is because more or 
less any observation we make in the next thousand years is going to 
be compatible with such theories; weakly compatible, since the theories 
can accommodate so many slightly different patterns of covariance 
between the various things we measure. And many of the linkages in 
these theories are pretty much bound to be there (for example, poor 
people will always make negative social comparisons between their 
own situation and that of other people in society), regardless of whether 
there is any causal importance to them or not. I suppose I felt dismayed 
that the flaws laid at the door of the hunger hypothesis (its mono-
factorial nature; its ignoring of many constructs currently discussed in 
the literature; its simplification of a complex reality) were exactly what 
I had most liked about it. 
This is partly a question of taste. People vary in their tastes for 
stark simplicity versus swelling encampments or baroque twirls in 
explanations. And differences in taste, as Pierre Bourdieu observed years 
ago, often demarcate and reinforce fault lines between social groups.3 A 
taste for simple models that can be exactly stated in a small number 
of equations demarcates many economists from their colleagues in 
most other social sciences. More generally, the veneration of theoretical 
simplicity versus reticulation constitutes a marked style difference 
between scientific communities. (“Hey Isaac. This gravity thing. There 
have got to be more factors than that in the motion of the planets…
maybe motion itself feeds back to influence gravity through a nexus of 
reciprocal autopoiesis…”). As Bourdieu understood well, when you 
violate a distinction of taste, you can end up cast out from the social 
group that promotes that distinction. This is what kept happening to 
my paper. 
§
As well as a general distaste for very simple hypotheses, my hunger paper 
seemed to tap into something more interesting; namely, an incredulity 
about the possibility that people in developed countries could really 
be hungry; that their hunger could be real and important, or could 
3  Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press). 
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explain what they do. This incredulity appears to be widespread, and 
it doesn’t stop at academics. Kayleigh Garthwaite nicely documents the 
incredulity amongst commentators and politicians in the contemporary 
UK, in her recent book Hunger Pains: Life Inside Foodbank Britain.4 For 
example, faced with evidence of the massive increase in people in the 
UK relying on emergency food aid, former Conservative politician 
Edwina Currie was simply incredulous that people could actually be 
hungry. ‘We should feel cross about [how many people are going to 
food banks], all of us’ because ‘…they’ve just never learned to cook…’, 
and, surreally, ‘the moment they’ve got a bit of spare money, they’re 
off getting another tattoo’. I know it’s hard to understand, Edwina, but 
people with tattoos can be hungry too. 
When I ask people to give reasons for their incredulity about people 
being hungry in affluent countries like Britain and the USA, they usually 
respond in one of two ways: 1. but poor people are often overweight, so 
they can’t really be hungry; and 2. but they have large televisions. Both of 
these arguments are weak. 
Argument 1: it is perfectly possible to be overweight all of the time, 
and hungry quite a lot of the time. Just think about it. Say that your 
cash-flow is very tight, so that for the later part of each week or month 
you don’t have money to buy sufficient food and you go hungry, but 
when your benefits or wages arrive at the beginning of the month, you 
suddenly can buy food. What would you do? You would immediately 
go and buy as much affordable energy-dense food as you could, and 
you would quite understandably overeat. You’ve been hungry all week! 
You would probably buy food that is high in sugar and fat, because this 
gives you easily the most calories to the pound or dollar.5 It could well be 
that, averaged over the whole month, you consumed more calories than 
you needed and stored some of your intake as fat; but nonetheless, for 
substantial parts of the month, you were hungry. It is well known that 
hunger and obesity tend to coexist within the same families, for exactly 
4  Garthwaite, K. (2016). Hunger Pains: Life Inside Foodbank Britain (Bristol: Policy 
Press). Edwina Currie quotes from p. 68, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1t89f84 
5  Drewnowski, A. and S. Specter. (2004). Poverty and obesity: the role of energy 
density and energy costs. American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 79: 6–16, https://doi.
org/10.1093/ajcn/79.1.6; Jones, N. R. V. et al. (2014). The growing price gap between 
more and less healthy food: analysis of a novel longitudinal UK dataset. PLoS ONE 
9: e109343, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0109343 
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this reason; the extensive social-science literature on the topic refers to 
this as the ‘hunger-obesity paradox’.6 There is even some evidence that 
participation in food stamps programmes leads to greater weight gain, 
basically because the monthly timing of the arrival of the food allowance 
makes for a cycle of hunger and overeating.7 The coexistence of hunger 
and fatness is not even a specifically human thing: if one group of birds 
is given constant access to food, whilst a matched group has its food 
taken away for periods of time, it is the group with constant access that 
remains thinner. The group with periodic hunger tucks in when it can, 
and stores extra calories as fat.8 
Argument 2: Argument 2 is similar to argument 1 in failing to 
appreciate the temporal aspects of poverty. Just as being obese only 
means that some of the time you were able to buy enough calories to eat 
more than you expend, having a large television or other consumer 
good only means that at least once in the past few years you had a couple 
of hundred pounds to spare. And that’s perfectly possible, since what 
characterises the precarious poor in affluent societies is not that they 
never have resources, but that their resources fluctuate close to the edge. 
All of us experience resource fluctuations; my bank balance is a couple 
of thousand pounds lower at the end of the month than the beginning. 
But in my case, the fluctuations are predictable, and anyway of no 
consequence to me, since I operate so far above the threshold where 
I would have to go hungry. A person experiencing less predictable 
fluctuations (for example due to inconstant employment or benefits 
6  Dietz, W. H. (1995). Does hunger cause obesity?. Pediatrics 95: 766–7, downloadable 
from: http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/95/5/766; Scheier, L. M. (2005). 
What is the hunger-obesity paradox? Journal of the American Dietetic Association 
105: 883–5, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jada.2005.04.013; Nettle, D., C. P. Andrews 
and M. Bateson. (2017). Food insecurity as a driver of obesity in humans: The 
insurance hypothesis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40: e105, https://doi.org/10.1017/
s0140525x16000947
7  DeBono, N. L., N. A. Ross and L. Berrang-Ford. (2012). Does the Food Stamp 
Program cause obesity? A realist review and a call for place-based research. Health 
and Place 18: 747–56, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.healthplace.2012.03.002
8  Ekman, J. B. and M. K. Hake. (1990). Monitoring starvation risk: Adjustments of 
body reserves in greenfinches (Carduelis chloris L.) during periods of unpredictable 
foraging success. Behavioral Ecology 1: 62–7, https://doi.org/10.1093/beheco/1.1.62; 
Witter, M., J. P. Swaddle and I. C. Cuthill. (1995). Periodic food availability and 
strategic regulation of body mass in the European Starling, Sturnus vulgaris. 
Functional Ecology 9: 568–74, https://doi.org/10.2307/2390146
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delays) and/or operating closer to the edge, might well have the odd 
moment when things were looking better, and they then understandably 
wanted a TV to watch, but also lots of moments when fluctuations took 
them to the very edge. At these times they would have to go hungry. In 
fact, there is abundant evidence of poor people in Britain pawning their 
consumer goods during down-fluctuations in order to buy food, and 
having to buy them back again at inflated rates during up-fluctuations.9
So, in short, it is very easy to envisage patterns of resource 
fluctuations over time that would leave a person overweight and with 
a large television; and yet still often hungry, because their income 
was insufficient to buy food every day (see figure 5). But figure 5 is 
a hypothetical example. Is there empirical evidence that hunger is 
widespread amongst poorer people in affluent countries? This is where 
the rubber hits the road as far as my hunger hypothesis goes, of course; 
if there is not, then the hypothesis has no prospect of working. But the 
answer is that there is such evidence, and plenty of it. 
In the USA, for example, social and nutritional surveys routinely 
measure the constructs of ‘food insecurity’ and ‘food insufficiency’.10 
These are questionnaire measures based on items like ‘In the last 12 
months, did you or other adults in the household ever cut the size of 
your meals or skip meals because there wasn’t enough money for food?’ 
or, for households with children, ‘Do your children ever say they are 
hungry because there is not enough food in the house?’. Based on these 
measures, around 16% of US households come out as food insecure, and 
21% of children are classified either frequently hungry or at risk of being 
hungry. But, importantly, the percentages are much higher amongst 
those on low incomes: about 40% of households are food insecure, and 
50% of children frequently hungry or at risk from hunger. 
9  Garthwaite, K. (2016). Hunger Pains: Life Inside Foodbank Britain (Bristol: Policy 
Press), https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1t89f84; O’Brien, M. and P. Kyprianou. (2017). 
Just Managing? What it Means for the Families of Austerity Britain (Cambridge: Open 
Book Publishers), https://www.openbookpublishers.com/product/591, https://doi.
org/10.11647/obp.0112
10  See Nettle, D. (2017). Does hunger contribute to socioeconomic gradients in 
behaviour?. Frontiers in Psychology 8: 358, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00358, 
for more details of the evidence reviewed in this passage. 
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Figure 5. A hypothetical pattern of resources over time that would leave me with a large 
television and overweight, yet often hungry. Assume that when the money in my pocket 
is above threshold A, I can afford to go and buy myself a television or other reasonable 
consumer comforts. When it is between thresholds A and B, I can buy enough food to 
consume many more calories than I expend, especially by buying cheap energy-dense foods 
high in sugars and fats. When it is below threshold B, I can’t afford to buy enough decent 
food to avoid hunger.
It doesn’t stop there. Over forty-three million Americans are enrolled 
in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP); in other 
words, they receive food stamps because they cannot procure enough to 
eat. Yes, forty-three million: that’s around 14% of the population. There 
is also a vast panoply of non-governmental food-assistance programmes 
and food pantries. In the UK, the largest single charitable food bank 
organization, The Trussell Trust, fulfilled 1.18 million referrals for 
three-day emergency food packages in the year to March 2017.11 
And although the Trussell Trust is the largest provider of emergency 
food aid, it is by no means the only one. ‘Holiday hunger’ is a widely 
reported problem amongst those on low-incomes. During school term, 
children receive free meals at school. In the holidays, the adults at home 
need to provide food for them. They may not be able to afford to do 
this, or in order to do so, they may need to go hungry themselves. In a 
recent survey of UK primary school teachers, 78% said they had seen 
11  Information from Trussell Trust website: https://www.trusselltrust.org/
news-and-blog/latest-stats/end-year-stats/ 
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evidence that some children in their classes were going hungry during 
the holidays, and 37% said they had seen instances of malnutrition 
amongst children returning to school.12 An all-party committee of the 
UK Parliament investigated hunger and food poverty in Britain in 2014 
and concluded that hunger was a ‘permanent fact of life’ in the UK’s 
poorest communities.13 
I could go on, but I think you see my point. In the richest nations on 
earth, a lot of people are hungry a reasonable amount of the time. Those 
on low incomes are particularly likely to be hungry. Thus, if you sample 
a cross-section of the UK or US population at any moment in time, quite 
a few of them will be hungry, particularly those whose households are 
poorer. And that’s all my hunger hypothesis needs. 
§
When I started working on hunger, I assumed that the incredulity 
people have about the hunger of others was something specific to very 
affluent societies like twenty-first century Britain and the USA. In these 
societies we have so often been told, by the media for example, that 
our problems are problems of overabundance, that we just can’t get our 
heads around the fact that this is not true for everyone. In earlier times 
or poorer countries, such incredulity would not exist. 
As I go on though, I begin to appreciate that the incredulity might 
be a symptom of something much more general. After all, the original 
‘Let them eat cake!’ was uttered by someone who lived at a time where 
famines were quite familiar, who had been told the peasants had no 
bread. Now, I say uttered by someone, because there is no evidence 
that it was really Marie Antoinette, the person to whom it is most often 
attributed. The phrase was actually put in the mouth of an unnamed 
‘grande princesse’ by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Confessions. And 
what this great princess is supposed to have actually said is: ‘Qu’ils 
mangent de la brioche!’ which might be better rendered as ‘let them 
12  See https://www.teachers.org.uk/news-events/conference-2017/
nut-survey-holiday-hunger 
13  Quoted in Garthwaite, K. (2016). Hunger Pains: Life Inside Foodbank Britain 
(Bristol: Policy Press, p. 2), https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1t89f84. See also: 
Taylor, A. and R. Loopstra. (2016). Too Poor To Eat: Food Insecurity in the UK, 
downloadable from https://foodfoundation.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/
FoodInsecurityBriefing-May-2016-FINAL.pdf
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eat brioche!’. But these textualities aside, the point is that even in a 
world where famine was a familiar occurrence, someone who was not 
hungry could not get her head around some other people in the same 
society being hungry. And this is not the only example. Apparently 
when Emperor Hui of China (over a thousand years ago) was told his 
people were starving because they had no rice, he reportedly said ‘Why 
don’t they eat ground meat?’. In the food riots that accompanied the 
Corn Laws of nineteenth-century England, magistrates were often keen 
to point out that the hungry rioters were not entirely destitute, and 
belonged to respectable trades, trying to suggest by this that what really 
drove them was not hunger, but avarice or malice.14 This is Edwina 
Currie avant la lettre. Incredulity that others could really be hungry, or 
that hunger could be the real wellspring for their behaviour, seems to be 
general and long-standing. 
This relates to a point made by George Loewenstein in a memorable 
article on ‘visceral factors’ in human decision-making.15 By visceral 
factors, he means states like hunger and thirst, amongst others. 
Loewenstein’s first, surely correct, argument is that these factors have a 
big influence on the decisions we make. His second argument is perhaps 
a more unusual one: when we are not in the grip of such states, we are 
not good at mentally simulating the decisions we would make if we 
were. We don’t get it. A corollary is that when we ourselves are not in 
the grip of a visceral factor, we just can’t understand the behaviour of 
other people who are. Why are they doing that, we ask? They’ve got 
tattoos!
I have become aware of the force of Loewenstein’s argument in my 
everyday life. I periodically find myself near the finish line of a 10k 
road race or half-marathon, waiting to cheer my beloved wife home. 
Sometimes I can see that, in the final few hundred metres, she is not far 
behind a rival, or is in contention for a personal best time. When it’s not 
clear whether she will prevail, I sometimes find myself thinking, ‘Why 
doesn’t she just…run a bit faster?’. I know she is capable of running a 
14  Sutton, J. (2016). Food Worth Fighting For: From Food Riots to Food Banks (London: 
Prospect Books, p. 23). 
15  Loewenstein, G. (1996). Out of control: Visceral influences on behavior. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 65: 272–92, https://doi.
org/10.1006/obhd.1996.0028
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bit faster. I almost resent it as a caprice that she doesn’t, and I have to 
censor myself. But of course, in that moment, I’m not fatigued. The reason 
she doesn’t run a bit faster is that she is exhausted. When I am running, 
I get exhausted too. But somehow, when I am not fatigued myself, the 
right intuition doesn’t come to me, and all the wrong ones (Is she really 
trying?) come to mind. 
This visceral-state-blindness relates to a classic psychological 
phenomenon known as the fundamental attribution error.16 The 
fundamental attribution error refers to our default position, when 
confronted with people’s behaviour, of attributing it to their personality 
or enduring dispositions, rather than their current situation. We 
systematically neglect the temporal fluctuations in people’s states, in 
favour of assuming they are just always like that. The fundamental 
attribution error is poorly named, because sometimes, often even, it 
produces the correct attribution rather than an erroneous one. So it’s 
better thought of as an explanatory style; one that may be reasonable 
or prudent on average, but in particular instances leads us to neglect 
powerful situational influences—such as hunger, itself a product of 
the powerful influence of having no money right now. That’s why 
commentators are so prone to argue that reliance of food banks must 
reflect poor moral character, or poor planning, or that ‘they never 
learned to cook’, when I am afraid the true situational culprits are 
staring us in the face. 
I don’t know why we would be so bad at mentally simulating the 
influence of visceral factors on ourselves and others. It would seem to 
me very useful to be able to detect and anticipate such regularities in 
behaviour, but Loewenstein’s argument suggests that we aren’t good at 
it. And perhaps that’s why the reviewers had such a problem with my 
hunger paper; an intuition blank around the possibility that a simple 
visceral factor could really be what is at work. Because really my paper 
was radical in its implications. You know poor people, it said; they’re 
just the same as you, only hungry. If you were hungry, you would behave 
like them; and, most importantly, if we could ensure that everyone in 
society had secure daily access to abundant and nutritious food, these 
social differences would simply and instantaneously disappear. No 
16  Jones, E. E. (1979). The rocky road from acts to dispositions. American Psychologist 
34: 107–17, https://doi.org/10.1037//0003-066x.34.2.107 
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complex arguments about the culture of poverty; no arcane theories 
about anomie, epistemes or structuration; no feedback loops. The issue 
would just go away. As I said earlier, this hypothesis may well not be 
correct. It probably isn’t correct. But it’s an interesting and audacious 
claim that you could actually do something with. Why would it be bad 
to try to test it to destruction?
§
This has got me to thinking: are hunger and food systematically 
neglected, as topics of investigation or sources of explanation, across 
the contemporary human sciences? I suspect perhaps they may be. For 
example, celebrated cross-cultural studies have shown that subjects from 
different societies across the world vary in their behaviour in artificial 
social dilemmas known as economic games.17 In these games, people 
can either contribute to a social good, or behave more selfishly, and 
others can choose (or not) to punish them for selfishness. In the cross-
cultural studies, the observed behaviour varies substantially within 
the sample from any one study site, as you would expect, but there are 
also statistical differences between samples from study sites located in 
different societies. Of all the various ideas that have been put forward 
to explain the variation across study sites, I have not encountered the 
proposal that people in some study sites are on average hungrier than 
those in others at the time of testing. The idea makes some sense: the 
diverse sites studied subsist on everything from hunting and gathering 
to the Western diet, so there would surely be variation between as well 
as within sites in what, how much and how recently people have been 
eating. 
Recently, my student Sam Fraser created laboratory micro-societies 
of volunteers, in which the participants were randomly assigned to 
either have breakfast as usual, or to skip it. They played one of the same 
economic games as used in the cross-cultural studies. Sam found that 
in the ‘hungry’ micro-societies as compared to the breakfasted ones, 
17  Marlowe, F. W. et al. (2008). More ‘altruistic’ punishment in larger societies. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 275: 587–90, 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2007.1517; Henrich, J. et al. (2010). Markets, religion, 
community size, and the evolution of fairness and punishment. Science 327: 1480–4, 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1182238 
142 Hanging on to the Edges
there was less punishment of selfish behaviour, and as a consequence of 
this, more selfish behaviour went on.18 The cross-cultural finding is that 
participants from smaller-scale societies are less likely to punish selfish 
behaviour; and where there is less punishment of selfish behaviour, 
more selfish behaviour goes on. All that would be needed to use Sam’s 
(admittedly preliminary) finding to explain the cross-cultural ones 
is a demonstration that participants from smaller-scale societies are 
more likely to be hungry at any given moment, which does not seem 
an entirely unreasonable idea, given that such societies are generally 
impoverished and disconnected from the global food system. But as far 
as I am aware, the many variables measured in cross-cultural studies do 
not include what the participants had for breakfast. Researchers leap 
instead for explanations that are less visceral, but also less grounded 
in what we actually know of how the individual, embodied human 
decision-maker functions. 
This is just one example of food-blindness in the contemporary 
human sciences. If you start going on about the hunger drive and control 
of feeding, as I am prone to do, you feel like a behaviourist throwback 
to the 1950s. The textbook models of human cognition hardly seem to 
consider hunger as an input or eating as an output. Hunger and eating 
are seen, perhaps, as marginal or low-level ‘biological’ processes, barely 
even cognitive, not as interesting as spelling words or working out how 
likely people are to become bank tellers. In the vast literatures on human 
judgement and decision-making, the judgements and decisions studied 
are often about money, but almost never about food. This is curious, 
because most human societies through history have lacked money, 
but not a single one has lacked eating. A good argument can be made 
that the mechanisms with which we make monetary decisions actually 
evolved to deal with food options. It’s only by a secondary exaptation of 
them, in contemporary societies, that we can decide between financial 
dilemmas. It’s not clear to me why food and eating aren’t more central 
topics. Many a times a day, you make life-and-death decisions about 
what to put in your stomach, and generally you do it so remarkably well 
that the process goes unnoticed. When was the last time your survival 
18  Fraser, S. (2018). Effects of hunger on human cooperation. (MRes dissertation, Newcastle 
University).
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depended on a correct inference about whether someone was a bank 
teller or not?
Faced with all this, it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that the 
contemporary human sciences are written by the well-fed. Hardly 
experiencing the state of hunger, academics can’t imagine hunger 
and food as central issues in human life. Hungry? You just go to the 
canteen, neat and quick, then you can get straight back to work on 
social identity. A particularly disappointing non-player at the table here 
is the paradigm known as evolutionary psychology. With its keenness 
on relating contemporary psychological processes to their evolutionary 
origins, and exploring continuity with other species, you would think 
evolutionary psychology would make hay in the fields of hunger and 
eating. But there is really rather little work done on the topic.
This is rather odd, given that evolutionary psychology can hardly be 
accused of neglecting another visceral factor: sex. It sometimes feels like 
evolutionary psychology is mainly about sex, in particular the choice of 
how and with whom to have it. I don’t know much about your ancestors, 
but what I can be sure of is the following. Each of them managed to have 
sex, with someone of approximately the right species, at least once in 
their lives. By contrast, they had to procure and select several thousand 
calories of appropriate food every single day, never starving and never 
poisoning themselves, for tens of years. Put like that, what ratio of 
evolutionary psychology research papers on the psychology of hunger 
and food to the psychology of mate choice and sex, ought we to expect? 
And look at the ratio we observe. 
What this tells us is that evolutionary psychology, so far, is mostly 
the cultural invention of affluent college students and those who interact 
with them. Perhaps when you are nineteen, privileged and live on a 
college campus, you are rather more concerned about who your next 
sex partner will be than where your next meal is coming from. You can’t 
imagine this to be anything other than the normal state of affairs for 
humans. And so there is a great deal of evolutionary psychology research 
about dating and hooking up, and then a bit about stuff like making 
friendship groups and working in teams; and not a lot about hunger, 
poverty, domination, social conflict, infirmity, death. This may be part 
of the reason for evolutionary psychology’s image problem amongst 
social scientists. Social scientists’ (philosophically unnecessary) dislike 
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of evolutionary psychology is partly founded on (sometimes wilful) 
mischaracterisation and misunderstanding of its premises, as has been 
well discussed.19 But another part of it is simply due to evolutionary 
psychology’s topical obsessions, which seem frivolous to those who 
work amongst poor, ageing, threatened or socially marginalized people, 
or on pressing societal issues. I have been trying to argue for a number 
of years that the best thing evolutionary psychology could do for its 
image problem would be to show up at the debates about poverty and 
inequality within our affluent societies.20 And if that means we don’t 
get so much time to worry about optimal breast size or the significance 
of how far apart one’s eyes are, I for one would accept that as collateral 
damage.21 
Alright. Here endeth the lesson. Enough self-righteousness from me. 
I need lunch. 
19  For example by Kurzban, R. and M. G. Haselton. (2010). Making hay out of straw: 
Real and imagined controversies in evolutionary psychology. In J. Barkow (ed.), 
Missing the Revolution: Darwinism for Social Scientists (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 149–66), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof: oso/9780195130027.003.0005 
20  Not all evolutionary psychology deserves the criticism I have voiced here. Special 
mention to venerated pioneers Martin Daly and the late Margo Wilson, e.g. Wilson, 
M. and M. Daly. (1997). Life expectancy, economic inequality, homicide, and 
reproductive timing in Chicago neighbourhoods. British Medical Journal 314: 1271, 
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.314.7089.1271 
21  Though for the record, your assessment of optimal breast size seems to depend 
on how hungry you are: Swami, V and M. J. Tovée. (2006). Does hunger influence 
judgments of female physical attractiveness? British Journal of Psychology 97: 353–63, 
https://doi.org/10.1348/000712605x80713
9. The worst thing about poverty 
is not having enough money
If the poor are poor due to bad choices 
or preferences, then providing them 
with additional income alone will not 
necessarily achieve any observable 
improvements
–Randall Akee and colleagues1
In his 2015 speech to the Conservative party conference, then-Prime 
Minister David Cameron vowed to use his remaining time in office 
to mount an all-out assault on poverty in the UK. A worthwhile 
aspiration, indeed; and not an aspiration we necessarily expect to hear 
from Mr. Cameron’s side of the political spectrum. As it turned out, Mr. 
Cameron’s remaining time in office was not to be very long. In less than 
a year, he had burnt his wings in the EU referendum and disappeared 
without trace. I want to talk about an interesting feature of his anti-
poverty evangelism, though: central to his planned assault was the idea 
that poverty was not entirely, perhaps not even mainly, about money. 
The intellectual work behind the Cameron approach to poverty was 
carried out in the preceding years, primarily by the Centre for Social 
Justice (CSJ) think-tank.2 The CSJ’s analysis is, like the curate’s egg, good 
in parts. The CSJ quite rightly stresses that low incomes are correlated 
with a whole raft of non-income problems. Low-income families are 
disproportionately likely to be affected by: addiction; alcoholism; family 
instability; criminality, anti-social behaviour; educational failure; and 
1  Akee, R. K.Q. et al. (2015). How does household income affect child personality 
traits and behaviors? NBER Working Paper No. 21562, p. 16, https://doi.org/10.3386/
w21562
2  See for example their 2012 policy paper ‘Rethinking child poverty’ (https://
www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/library/rethinking-child-poverty) and their 
27th March 2013 blog entry ‘It’s not all money, money, money’ (https://www.
centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/csj-blog/its-not-all-money-money-money). 
© 2018 Daniel Nettle, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0155.09
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so on. So there is a manifold of social issues that cluster together, and 
make life unpleasant or difficult for certain parts of the population. The 
CSJ rightly argues that if you just raised poor people’s incomes, whilst 
making no impact at all on the unequal burden of these other problems, 
you would not have cracked the problem of social disadvantage in its 
entirety. 
The CSJ then proposes that we measure poverty, not just by the 
amount of money people have, but by a basket of indicators including 
all these other things like alcoholism, family instability, and so forth. 
This proposal has, as far as I can see, no merit whatever. It is one thing 
to acknowledge that poverty is correlated with all kinds of non-income 
issues. Maybe it is even causally connected to those other issues. 
But the best way to guarantee that you will never be able to tease 
out the linkages is to measure poverty in such a way that confuses it 
with the other issues at the outset. Let me take an example: suppose 
I am interested in how ocean temperature relates to coral bleaching. 
Because I feel these things are linked, I could propose to measure ocean 
temperature by a raft of different indicators including the extent of 
coral bleaching. The one thing I would now be unable to do is find out 
whether ocean temperature is related to coral bleaching. I have simply 
muddled them by assumption; having done so, it becomes impossible 
to study the relationship between them, because you can’t even identify 
the two phenomena you wish to relate. Thus, whilst I and many social 
scientists would concur that well-being is not just about income, claiming 
that poverty is not just about money is a bit like saying that hyperbolas 
are not just about a plane intersecting both halves of a double cone. Isn’t 
that, kind of, how you know you are talking about a hyperbola rather 
than something else? 
If we set aside the CSJ’s definitional peculiarities, though, we see 
that there is an interesting idea in there somewhere. Poverty, they say 
(presumably with the income definition of poverty in mind in this 
instance), is often ‘a symptom of deeper social issues’. What do we mean 
when we say ‘a symptom’? Typically, a symptom is: (a) one of a network 
of associated phenomena, as in ‘symptoms include swelling, fever and 
rash’; and (b) by implication, not the one you want to go for if you want 
to causally manipulate the system, as in ‘it’s best to treat the cause 
rather than just the symptoms’. So really, the CSJ is making an empirical 
claim, namely: if you want to lessen the well-being burden due to the 
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inter-related network of poverty, family breakdown, addiction, and so 
forth, then raising income is not the most effective strategy. Instead, we 
need to tackle the other nodes directly. Incomes will follow in turn, as 
better-functioning families get their lives into order and become more 
economically productive. In fairness to the CSJ, this is hardly a laissez-
faire recipe for benign neglect of poor people. It gets the government off 
the hook in terms of the moral case for direct redistribution of cash. But 
for the government seriously to take on the mantle of responsibility for 
the family relationships, narcotic consumption, educational attitudes, 
and normative behaviour of every individual in the land is a mind-
blowingly interventionist, not to mention very expensive, aspiration to 
hold. 
The CSJ then, has put out there a big idea. No problem with that. It’s 
just that there is a growing consensus in social science for the opposite 
view: if you want to deal with the manifold of social problems faced 
by poor people, both here in the UK and in developing countries, just 
giving people money is actually a pretty effective strategy. Accepting 
this opposite view does not come easily to me. I attained my political 
consciousness in a third world development movement which was 
pretty much predicated on the aphorism, ‘give a man a fish, and he will 
feed himself for a day; teach a man how to fish, and he will feed himself 
for a lifetime’. It’s hard for me to accept that just giving out fish can 
possibly be right. I am going to spend the rest of this essay reluctantly 
conceding that it could be. 
§
Let’s all admit, for the sake of argument, that low income, family 
breakdown and addiction are related to one another. I don’t just mean 
that they are correlated. I mean that there are real causal linkages 
from each of them to both of the other two. Low income increases the 
likelihood of developing addiction, and of families breaking down; 
addiction increases the likelihood of family breakdown, and of losing 
income; and family breakdown increases the likelihood of losing 
income and of developing an addiction. It’s a mutually reinforcing 
trio of problems: a dynamical system. Now let’s say you want to make 
the world a better place. Where would you do best to put your dollar? 
You can choose between directly raising incomes; providing addiction 
treatment programmes; and providing family counselling. 
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One of the things you need to consider is the magnitude of the 
effect of changing one of the variables on each of the other two. For 
example, if you can reduce family breakdown, to what extent do income 
and addiction then improve? The CSJ hypothesis is, in effect, that the 
knock-on impact of reducing family breakdown or addiction for income 
would be rather large, but the effect of raising income on the other two 
problems would be small. Perhaps it would even be zero, or negative, 
as previously poor people went out and frittered away their newly-
acquired cash on social bads like drugs. They wouldn’t know how to use 
the money sensibly. So naturally, the CSJ concludes that raising incomes 
alone is not the best approach. 
The examples we are going to see suggests that they have it the 
wrong way around. Raising the incomes of poor people, even absent 
any other changes, can have a surprisingly large positive impact on 
all kinds of social and behavioural problems, and hence well-being. 
It does not eliminate all social problems, of course: nothing we know 
of does that. Nonetheless, it can do a lot to reduce the non-income 
wellbeing disparity between rich people and poor people, as well as, 
more obviously, the income disparity. It makes sense that, other things 
being equal, raising incomes is likely to be the most effective way of 
perturbing the dynamical system of social and family problems. That’s 
because giving people cash is remarkably efficient, especially if you do 
it in some fairly non-bureaucratic way. There’s a few cents in the dollar 
for administration and banking charges, but beyond that, the more 
money you transfer to poor people, the more their incomes go up. The 
efficiencies of family counselling and drug treatment programmes are 
likely to be much lower. I am not saying these initiatives don’t work at 
all; I am sure they do. But you have to recruit and train up counsellors 
and staff. These people are typically much more middle-class than 
the people we are trying to target. They need decent compensation 
packages, and that costs a lot, typically much more than a poor family 
earns. For overseas development, they need to be flown in and housed. 
Then they have got to access the populations with the need. And even 
assuming they manage to do this, their help only has a certain degree of 
success; plenty of families go through family counselling and still break 
up anyway; plenty of addicts receive treatment but don’t escape their 
addiction. So it would probably be fair to speculate that the efficiencies 
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of non-income forms of aid directed at poor people are typically lower 
than that of direct income support.
§
The same people and places tend to have the lowest incomes, the 
poorest physical and mental health, the most crime, the lowest trust, 
more behaviour problems, and so on. However, this does not in itself 
help you decide on the best remedy for poverty. Both the CSJ and the 
cash-first hypotheses are consistent with there being a manifold of 
positive correlations of all the different kinds of life-crapness. If you 
want to get anywhere in adjudicating between the two hypotheses, you 
need something like the scientific experiment. In an experiment, you 
hold everything else constant, and perturb one variable (for example, 
income) in the absence of any other change. Then you see what effects 
follow on the outcomes that interest you. Hold on, you say, that’s all 
very well. But social scientists can’t do experiments. People’s incomes 
never change without their education, culture, or other aspects of 
their behaviour changing too, in uncontrolled ways. Social, political 
and economic life just go on, and we social researchers are limited to 
documenting them and interpreting their fluxes. 
The situation is actually not quite as bad as this. Sometimes one 
factor does get changed, pretty much independently of all the others, 
and for reasons that are largely exogenous to the system. Social scientists 
spend a great deal of time studying these situations, and the results 
come as close to a decomposition of causality as you could reasonably 
hope for. The gold standard scenario is the randomised control trial, the 
true scientific experiment applied to a social policy innovation. More 
and more of these are now done. But even where randomised control 
trials have not yet proven possible, there are nearly-as-good sources 
of causal inference: natural experiments or quasi-experiments. These are 
situations where some change occurs that is outside the researcher’s 
control (this is how it differs from a true experiment), but nonetheless 
alters just the variable of interest, and just for some people but not for 
some other, comparable ones. When a social policy is introduced into 
one jurisdiction but not a similar neighbouring one, then as long as the 
reason for the introduction happening where it did is not reducible to 
any existing characteristic of the jurisdictions, then you have a kind of 
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natural experiment. And social policy changes sometimes happen for 
the strangest and most random of reasons. 
My favourite quasi-experiment comes from the Great Smoky 
Mountains study. This began as a fairly run-of-the-mill longitudinal 
study of psychiatric problems, addictions and problem behaviours 
amongst young people in parts of Western North Carolina, beginning 
in 1993, and continuing as the young people grew into adults. But it 
became something far from run-of-the-mill in 1996. A fair proportion 
of the participants were Native Americans from the Eastern band 
of Cherokee. In 1996, a casino was opened on their reservation land 
(Native American reservations are outside state gaming laws). Some of 
the profits were put back into the band community, and the mechanism 
chosen for doing this was basically a Universal Basic Income: all adult 
band members received an equal portion, in the form of semi-annual 
cash payments, for which they did not have to do anything other than be 
themselves. Small at first, these payments had risen to $9000 per person 
per year by 2006, enough to very substantially raise household incomes 
in that part of the world. And for Eastern Cherokee youth, there was a 
large lump sum to be held in trust and collected on their 18th birthdays. 
It’s important to appreciate that, before the payments began, the 
Eastern Cherokee had the usual poverty smorgasbord: as well as their 
incomes generally being low, there were lots of problems of addiction, 
anti-social behaviour, and family strife. It was classic CSJ stuff. And if 
the CSJ hypothesis were right, then the cash payments, which after all 
did nothing at all but lodge a cheque, would not have helped with all 
these other ‘symptoms of something deeper’. Things could have even 
got worse. Suddenly having cash in the bank, and lacking the family 
stability and life skills to know what to do with it, you might have 
expected the newly cashed-up young people to drop out of school (who 
needs to work when you are given money for nothing?), and turn to 
drink, drugs and gambling. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
There are several good studies of what happened to the Eastern 
band of the Cherokee, so here I will focus a few of the most noteworthy. 
Elizabeth Jane Costello and colleagues systematically compared 
young men and women from Cherokee families with non-Cherokee 
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of the same age from the Great Smoky Mountains cohort.3 These non-
Cherokee were effectively the control group. Not a very good control, 
you might say, since the non-Cherokee were bound to differ from the 
Cherokee in many non-income ways. However, the researchers could 
turn here to the fact that they had data from Cherokee of different age 
cohorts. The oldest cohort had benefited rather little from the casino 
scheme—the lump sum payable at 18 only started to cumulate in 1996, 
so those turning 18 in 1998 got only a very modest amount, and had not 
benefited from increased parental income for very long either. So the 
differences between the oldest cohort of Cherokee and oldest cohort of 
non-Cherokee tells you something about the status quo ante casino. By 
contrast, the youngest Cherokee, turning 18 in 2002, received $35,000 
on their birthday, besides which their parents had had quite large sums 
coming in for all of their teenage years. So if cash does anything good for 
non-income outcomes, you should see the youngest cohort of Cherokee 
doing better relative to their non-Cherokee peers than earlier cohorts 
of Cherokee had done. This is a variant of what is called a ‘difference 
in differences’ study design, because any causal impact of the money is 
going to change the differences between Cherokee and non-Cherokee 
outcomes between the oldest cohort (not much casino cash), and the 
youngest cohort (lots of casino cash). 
And the differences were indeed different. Looking at the oldest 
cohort, by the time of study, 41% of Cherokee had experienced some 
kind of psychiatric disorder, against 31% of non-Cherokee. Much of this 
was made up of or included some kind of substance dependence (35% 
of Cherokee, against 29% of non-Cherokee). The rates of diagnosed 
‘behavioural disorder’ (which is often a catchall for minor criminality 
and anti-social behaviour) were five times higher in the Cherokee than 
the non-Cherokee. But remember these were the Cherokee cohort who 
had benefited only marginally from the coming of the casino. In the 
youngest cohort, who had benefited very substantially from casino 
money, not only had the Cherokee caught up with their non-Cherokee 
brethren, but they had surpassed them. The differences were all in the 
opposite direction: any psychiatric disorder: 31% Cherokee versus 37% 
3  Costello, E. J. et al. (2010). Association of family income supplements in adolescence 
with development of psychiatric and substance use disorders in adulthood among 
an American Indian population. Journal of the American Medical Association 303: 
1954–9, https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2010.621 
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non-Cherokee; substance dependence: 23% Cherokee against 35% non-
Cherokee; behavioural disorders three times higher in the non-Cherokee 
than the Cherokee. 
In related work, Randall Akee and colleagues looked at involvement 
in criminal activity, and at school performance, whilst the members of 
the study were still minors.4 Again by comparing those who received 
different amounts of casino transfer and those who received none, they 
were able to estimate that an additional $4000 per year of unearned 
income per year reduced the likelihood of ever getting involved in minor 
crime by 22% (for a 16 or 17 year old); and, moreover, that it increased the 
average amount of formal schooling completed by a whole year. Prior 
to the casino, Cherokee youth had worse rates of minor criminality and 
lower rates of high school completion than non-Cherokee youth. Over 
the first few years of the casino, they not only closed the gap, but went 
beyond: now they were more likely to finish high school, and less likely 
to commit minor crime, than non-Cherokee youth in the area. 
Akee and colleagues were able to do two other important things. 
First, rather ingeniously, they established that what mattered for the 
beneficial effect of the casino scheme on a household was not how far 
it was geographically from the casino, which might have been the case 
had the mechanism for the behavioural changes been, say, meeting 
lots of morally improving outside role models who had come to the 
area to use the casino facilities. (No, I don’t think that’s very plausible 
either, but the good thing about science is that you can try to test these 
possibilities against the data.) No, what mattered for the beneficial effect 
was just how much money came in to the household (you got more over 
time, remember, and the family got more the more registered Cherokee 
persons there were living in the household). The other thing the 
researchers were able to show was that a big part of the beneficial effect 
operated through creating better relationships within the household. 
The parents did not work any fewer hours as the free money increased 
(there’s one for the Universal Basic Income advocates). As their financial 
situations improved, though, they reported higher quality relationships 
with one another and with their children. And the harmony was not 
4  Akee, R. K.Q. et al. (2010). Parents’ income and children’s outcomes: A quasi-
experiment. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2: 86–115, https://doi.
org/10.1257/app.2.1.86
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achieved by trading in their feckless spouses for new models, either: 
they just got on better with whoever they were already with. This makes 
sense: put people under less strain, and it’s easier for them to get along 
well. A big way of taking the strain off is through the pocket book. 
Akee, Costello and colleagues have one further set of results 
worth highlighting. They recently delved back into the questionnaires 
and evaluations supplied by the parents and, for some variables, 
the children, of Cherokee and non-Cherokee families.5 They found, 
confirming previous analyses, that receiving the cash payments 
reduced symptoms of emotional disorders (basically anxiety and 
depression), and of behavioural disorders (basically being antisocial). 
Moreover, the researchers measured three of the ‘Big Five’ personality 
traits, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Neuroticism. The former 
two are important for how you get on in life: Agreeableness describes 
the tendency to be cooperative and get along well with others, whilst 
Conscientiousness describes the propensity to be hard-working and 
organized. The classic successful bourgeouis is pretty Agreeable, and 
highly Conscientious. The prisons are full of people who rate low 
on both traits. And guess what: the arrival of income payments was 
associated with large increases in Agreeableness and Conscientiousness 
amongst young Cherokee. No comparable personality changes over 
time were seen in the non-Cherokee members of the study, who were 
living through the same general social period, but not getting the income 
increase. 
In summary, then, the Eastern Cherokee casino income was 
‘helicopter money’, a large increase in income that descends from on 
high with no skills training, no family counselling, no conditionality, 
and no prior logic. The CSJ hypothesis predicts that its arrival shouldn’t 
have much improved the whole network of social problems. But by 
looking at how the Eastern Cherokee compare in social outcomes to 
their non-Cherokee neighbours both before the money arrives, and 
after, we can make pretty clean causal inferences about what raising 
incomes does. The evidence tells us unambiguously: relationships in 
families improve, kids stay on in school, kids become less likely to get 
5  Akee, R. K.Q. et al. (2016). How does household income affect child personality 
traits and behaviors? NBER Working Paper No. 21562, https://doi.org/10.3386/
w21562
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involved in minor crime and antisocial behaviour, addiction goes down, 
and even, most remarkable of all, people’s personalities change. Not bad 
for treating the symptoms rather than the cause, eh?
§
Our second example comes from the developing world, from Kenya’s 
Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children programme. This 
programme was a response to the fact that, due among other things 
to the AIDS epidemic, Kenya had a huge number of young people 
whose parents had died or were dying, and these young people needed 
supporting. Kenya could have spent its money in various ways: skills-
training programmes, counselling, orphanages, and so on. It chose 
another path, a completely unconditional regular cash payment to the 
household in which the young orphan was living: helicopter money. So 
again, we have a nice clean test of whether cash alone does much for 
poor people with a manifold of different social problems. And better 
still, we have a proper randomised control trial of the programme. It was 
impossible to roll the programme out simultaneously in all of Kenya. 
Thus, districts were randomised to receive the programme immediately 
(the experimental group), or in a later wave (these districts served as the 
control group at the time of the evaluation, when their orphans had not 
yet received anything).
Comparing the two groups showed that the cash transfer improved 
school attendance rates, particularly when school was costly to attend 
(e.g. when the school was far away); and particularly when the children 
were older (which is the time when there is an opportunity cost of 
going to school, instead of generating money directly or looking after 
the household).6 This is an important finding given that there was no 
conditionality in the programme whatever: the cash would continue to 
appear regardless of whether the young person stuck with school or 
not. 
What I want to focus on, though, is a nice, revealing study of 
household expenditure in the control and the experimental groups, 
6  Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team. (2012). The impact of Kenya’s Cash Transfer 
for Orphans and Vulnerable Children on human capital. Journal of Development 
Effectiveness 4: 37–41, https://doi.org/10.1080/19439342.2011.653578 
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before and after the programme.7 Experimental households spent 
more money on nearly everything once the cash started to roll in. This 
should not surprise us: after all, they had more money to spend. Here 
the researchers were able to do some clever econometric stuff, though. 
They used the pre-intervention spending data to construct a model of 
how household expenditures of different types in this population scale 
with income. This allowed them to make predictions: if this household 
behaved like a typical household in this population, then when you 
increase its income by 1500 shillings a month, how much more should 
we expect it to spend on food, how much more on healthcare, how 
much more on alcohol, etc.? The actual observed changes when the 
programme kicked in could then be compared to these predictions. In 
effect, the researchers asked, does the programme allow households 
to satisfy more completely the priorities they had anyway, or does it 
change their priorities?
When they performed this comparison, the researchers found that 
a number of categories of expenditure went up by less than expected, 
for example food. Within foods, expenditures on cheap tubers went 
down relative to expectation; it was only spending on high-quality 
foods that went up. Expenditures on alcohol and tobacco actually went 
down. Expenditure on healthcare went up relative to expectation, and 
households also saved and invested more than when the programme 
began. In short, as the cash landed, households shifted their preferences 
away from hedonic gratification (alcohol and tobacco) and immediate 
subsistence (tubers), and towards looking after their long-term health, 
and making investments. This is the riposte to the CSJ ‘won’t it be bad 
to just give poor people money when they don’t have the skills to know 
how to spend it wisely’ type of argument. They do seem to spend it 
wisely. Perhaps they are smart, and can figure out how to do so for 
themselves. Perhaps they are as smart as you, me or a development 
expert, but have had worse luck until now. 
Both the Kenya example and the Cherokee one bring to light a 
very interesting conundrum: when you give people more money, 
their expenditure on narcotic substances goes down. Given abundant 
7  Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Team. (2012). The impact of the Kenya Cash Transfer 
Program for Orphans and Vulnerable Children on household spending. Journal of 
Development Effectiveness 4: 9–37, https://doi.org/10.1080/19439342.2011.653980 
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resources, it seems, most people don’t value these things very highly. 
But, if people don’t value them very highly, then why, when money 
was short (i.e. before the cash helicopter landed), were they spending 
anything on them at all in the first place? If something has a low 
value, then surely it would get crowded out when money was tight, 
and only perhaps creep in when the money supply gets looser? This 
conundrum really gets to the heart of the matter. The CSJ view looks at 
the behaviours of poor people, such as their proneness to use narcotics, 
and sees a disposition. It then says: shovelling cash on to this disposition 
won’t do any good, and may even do harm. It’s the disposition, stupid. 
The cash-first view, on the contrary, looks at the behaviours of poor 
people and says: that’s a response to a situation. Change the situation 
(add money), and all kinds of decisions will follow suit. 
This brings to mind classic animal research on addictive substances. 
Rats or mice living alone in small barren cages will self-administer 
morphine or cocaine enthusiastically, if given the chance. It turns out 
that the very same animals living in spacious, enriched stimulating 
environments, will do so significantly less, even when the drug is easily 
available.8 In other words, the motivation to use rewarding narcotics is 
not a biologically inflexible drive in these creatures; it’s a way of coping 
with adverse environmental contexts, the lack of alternative sources 
of reward, and it spontaneously though not completely fades away as 
those contexts improve. 
This doesn’t completely deal with the argument, in the human case, 
that goes as follows: why can’t poor people just spend less on alcohol 
and tobacco in the first place? If they did so, it would be as if they were 
giving themselves a cash transfer programme. They could start to climb 
the ladder towards a better life using the money they saved, without 
having to wait for a casino to come along. This is a hard argument, but 
I expect an answer might be along the following lines. When you are 
poor, you occasionally do find yourself with a little left over, but this 
8  Alexander, B. K., R. B. Coambs and P. F. Hadaway. (1978). The effect of housing 
and gender on morphine self-administration in rats. Psychopharmacology 58: 
175–9, https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00426903; Chauvet, C. et al. (2009). Environmental 
enrichment reduces cocaine seeking and reinstatement induced by cues and 
stress but not by cocaine. Neuropsychopharmacology 34: 2767–78, https://doi.
org/10.1038/npp.2009.127; Solinas, M. et al. (2009). Reversal of cocaine addiction by 
environmental enrichment. Neuropsychopharmacology 34: 1102–11.
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surplus from the requirements of subsistence is small and temporally 
unpredictable. Thus, you can’t plan to use it in any calculated escape 
route from poverty. When it does come, quite understandably, you treat 
it as a break in the weather, a small moment to medicate yourself from 
the awfulness and difficulty of life. But what poor people do when they 
get a small and unpredictable surplus in an otherwise bleak existence 
is not indicative of what they would do if we gave them a large and 
predictable permanent surplus. Both Kenya and the Cherokee case show 
us this. When you give poor people large, reliable, long-term surpluses, 
they start to behave just like people who have been lucky enough to 
have large, reliable, long-term surpluses in the first place. They don’t 
need teaching; they don’t need conditionality or monitoring. They just 
need the money.
§
The evidence we have reviewed has implications for two sets of things 
I care about: politics, and our view of human nature. First, the politics. 
Many cynical commentators suspected that the CSJ’s de-emphasis of 
the purely financial aspects of poverty was a smokescreen for regressive 
policies. After all, if the bad thing about poverty is not the lack of money, 
then there is no compelling case for income redistribution. The proposal 
to measure poverty using non-income indicators makes it much easier 
to enact financially regressive policies and not have anyone notice that 
is what you are doing. In support of this point, the tax and benefit 
changes enacted by the Cameron government and its successor between 
2010 and now have clearly been regressive: the households in the lower 
deciles of the income distribution have seen their incomes eroded much 
more sharply (even in absolute terms, never mind proportional ones) 
than those at the top.9 So this is what the promised assault on poverty 
actually looked like: redefine poverty as being not about money, and 
then take money away from poor people. There is, I suppose, a kind of 
logic to it. 
In my view, the political implications of cases like the Eastern band 
of Cherokee are clear: we need to redistribute income and wealth more, 
9  Equality and Human Rights Commission. (2018). The cumulative impact of tax and 
welfare reforms. Downloaded from https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/
publication-download/cumulative-impact-tax-and-welfare-reforms 
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from the people at the top of the distribution to whom it brings little 
benefit, to the people at the bottom for whom, as we have seen, it makes 
a profound difference.10 So impressive are the Cherokee results that 
redistribution becomes not just a moral obligation, but a simple matter 
of pragmatics. A thought experiment: Say I tell you I’ve developed 
an intervention programme that costs a bit, but has been shown to 
reduce crime, increase educational attainment, reduce drug and alcohol 
dependency, promote family stability, and make people nicer and 
more conscientious. That sounds great you say, perhaps imagining 
fish oil supplementation, or mindfulness-based cognitive therapy. That 
intervention should be funded nationally. Now I tell you what my 
intervention is: it’s called making sure people aren’t poor. You might 
suddenly feel less keen, even if I tell you what could well be true: it’s 
cheaper and more effective than the alternatives in the long run. 
Now, what about our view of human nature? The evidence from cash 
transfers strikes quite strongly against any view in which individual 
differences in behaviour are the result of some fixed inner essence that 
is obtained early in life and inflexible thereafter (disposition, taste, 
personality, culture, or whatever you want to call it). If such fixed-essence 
views were correct, then the CSJ would be basically right: helicoptering 
cash to people would just lead them to perpetuate whatever they are 
doing already, but under looser constraints. The alternative to the fixed-
essence view places situation and context more centrally as drivers of 
people’s immediate behaviour; sees people as highly plastic in their 
tastes, strategies and decisions; and emphasises that a big part of where 
we end up in life is due to (reversible) luck.
One influential version of the fixed-essence view has genetic 
differences doing a lot of the work. You might think that your personality, 
for example, is largely due to your genetic inheritance.11 If your lineage 
is disagreeable and not conscientious, it drifts down the social ladder. 
If you are lucky enough to have agreeable and conscientious genes, you 
climb up. But this cannot be the whole story: One of the reasons I love 
the Cherokee example so much is that it shows personality, that most 
fixed- and genetic-feeling of things, changes in response to helicopter 
10  See Why inequality is bad, this volume. 
11  The evidence is reviewed in Nettle, D. (2007). Personality: What Makes You the Way 
You Are (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 1599. The worst thing about poverty is not having enough money
money. So what is going on? Are psychologists wrong about personality 
being fixed and heritable?
They are not entirely wrong, but some care is needed. There seem 
to be heritable influences on personality, as evidenced from studies 
of twins; and two people facing the same environment of poverty can 
respond to it quite differently, which might well have something to 
do with dispositional differences between them. But it is too great a 
leap to move from ‘genetic differences explain some of the variation in 
personality between individuals facing similar environments’ to ‘group 
differences in personality are best explained by variation in genes 
between those groups’. 
Let me propose the following analogy. Imagine you grow corn on 
a field uniformly rich in fertilizer. All of your corn plants will be tall, 
but some of them will be a little taller than others. The differences in 
height between your plants will probably be mainly due to genetic 
variation between them (after all, they all developed in the same benign 
environment). If you did a study of your plants at this point, you would 
conclude that variation in height is highly heritable, mainly a matter 
of genetics. Now you take away the fertilizer from half the field. The 
plants in that half of the field grow much less tall in the next year. This is 
entirely caused by the change in inputs. So although you had concluded 
that the individual differences in plant height were heritable when the 
environment was good, you have also proved that a group difference 
(between one half of the field and the other) has nothing to do with 
genetics, and everything to do with environmental factors. And so, I 
think, with people: there may well be genetic variations, but where 
we really see their importance is in explaining the residual variation 
given a constant environmental context. The environmental context for 
different social groups is nowhere near constant, though, and that’s a 
much more relevant explanatory principle for differences in average 
level across groups.
Another form of fixed-essence thinking puts culture in the place of 
genes. The argument here is that culture is a pseudo-genetic inheritance 
system: you absorb a system of behaviours via social learning in 
your childhood, and thereafter you are pretty much stuck with it. 
Social change, when it happens, is a matter of cultural mutations that 
gradually change in frequency over the course of generations, faster 
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than genetic change, perhaps, but still slower than the individual 
lifetime.12 This kind of thinking can’t really explain the Cherokee case. 
The cash changed behaviour patterns massively within a single cultural 
generation, and without (as far as we know) changing who learned 
their culture from whom. Whatever people were doing, it was not 
internalising and persisting with the behaviours they had been exposed 
to in childhood. Instead, you have to see people as strategic agents who 
change their decisions and dispositions more or less in real time as their 
environments (and their information about their environments) change. 
This does not preclude roles for norms and social transmission in an 
account of human behaviour; but it does warn us against pushing the 
analogy between cultural and genetic inheritance too far.13 
§
In spite of everything, I still find it hard to accept that the best thing I 
could do to help poor people is just to give them my money. I know 
that many other people feel the same. At the bottom of this, I think, is 
some kind of illusion of the validity of our expertise. The idea of an illusion 
of validity comes from classic work by Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky.14 Kahneman served in the psychology branch of the Israeli 
army. This branch developed expert methods for predicting who would 
make a good officer. Kahneman followed up and found that the expert 
methods for officer selection were, in fact, quite useless: you might just 
as well have chosen every third recruit and stuck a badge on them. 
Nonetheless, the psychology-branch experts remained convinced that 
their expertise was valid, and continued self-importantly to deploy 
it. As well as over-valuing our own expertise, I think we are all prone 
to under-value the expertise of people we consider unlike us, in this 
instance, poor people. 
We seem to feel sure that we have a good analysis of how poor 
people could make their lives better, so sure that we are not shy of 
12  This view is particularly clearly articulated by Mathew, S. and C. Perreault. (2015). 
Behavioural variation in 172 small-scale societies indicates that social learning is the 
main mode of human adaptation. Proceedings of the Royal Society, B. 282: 20150061, 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2015.0061
13  See The cultural and the agentic, this volume. 
14  Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological 
Review 80: 237–51, https://doi.org/10.1037/h0034747 
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coming up with advice, diagnoses, intervention strategies, and training 
programmes. On average, these may well do less good than just 
transferring the equivalent amount of money to low-income households. 
That’s hard to accept, especially for a professional academic whose day 
job is having something expert-sounding to say. It’s hard to accept 
because conceding the value of just transferring money is tantamount 
to admitting that my expertise in how to fix things is low. I might think 
I am brilliant, but in truth I would probably be really bad at living on 
the bread-line: I have not developed the skills. Poor people, on the 
other hand, are generally going to be more expert at coping with that 
context. Therefore, on average, they are probably going to make better 
decisions about how to navigate the shoals than I am. Cash transfer 
takes micro-allocation decisions out of the hands of people who don’t 
really know what they are doing (like me), and into the hands of people 
with expertise (the recipients). Accepting the case for cash transfer then, 
is really about accepting that poor people are cognitively equivalent to 
rich people, but on average more skilled; and therefore trusting them to 
make their own decisions. To do this requires letting go of the intuitions 
that give us paternalism and the idea that poor people are deficient in 
decision-making capacity. And those intuitions, I suspect, are more 
deeply embedded, even amongst progressive academics, than it is 
comfortable to admit.

10. Getting your head around the 
Universal Basic Income
Can we not find a method of combining 
[the advantages of anarchism and 
socialism]? It seems to me that we can 
[…]. The plan we are advocating amounts 
essentially to this: that a certain small 
income, sufficient for necessaries, should 
be secured to all, whether they work or not
–Bertrand Russell1
A host of positive psychological changes 
inevitably will result from widespread 
economic security.
–Martin Luther King2
Today should be the best time ever to be alive. Thanks to many decades 
of increasing productive efficiency, the real resources available to enable 
us to do the things we value—the avocados, the bicycles, the musical 
instruments, the bricks and glass—are more abundant and of better 
quality than ever. Thus, at least in the industrialised world, we should 
be living in the Age of Aquarius, the age where the most urgent problem 
is self-actualisation, not mere subsistence: not ‘How can we live?’, but 
‘How shall we live?’. 
Why then, does it not feel like the best time ever? Contrary to the 
predictions of mid-twentieth-century economists, the age of universal 
wellbeing has not really materialised. Working hours are as high as 
they were for our parents, if not higher, and the quality of work is no 
better for most people. Many people work several jobs they do not 
1  Russell, B. (1918). Roads to Freedom. Socialism, Anarchism and Syndicalism (London: 
Unwin Books, p. 80–1).
2  King, M. L. (1968). Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community? (Boston: Beacon 
Press, p. 173).
© 2018 Daniel Nettle, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0155.10
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enjoy, just to keep a roof over their heads, food on the table, and the 
lights on. In fact, many people are unable to satisfy these basic wants 
despite being in work: the greater part of the UK welfare bill, leaving 
aside retirement pensions, is spent on supporting people who have jobs, 
not the unemployed. Thousands of people sleep on the streets of Britain 
every night. Personal debt is at unprecedented levels. Many people feel 
too harried to even think about self-actualisation.
Twin spectres stalk the land, and help explain the gap between what 
our grandparents hoped for and what has materialised. These are the 
spectres of inequality and insecurity. Insecurity, in this context, means 
not being able to be sure that one will be able to meet one’s basic needs 
at some point in the future, either because cost may go up, or income 
may fluctuate. Insecurity is psychologically damaging: most typologies 
put security as one of the most basic human emotional needs.3 Insecurity 
dampens entrepreneurial activity: one of the big reasons that people 
don’t follow up their innovative ideas is that these are by definition 
risky, and they worry about keeping bread on the table whilst they try 
them out. Insecurity deters people from investing in increasing their 
skills: what if they cannot eat before the investment starts to pay off? 
It encourages rational short-termism: who would improve a house or a 
neighbourhood that might be taken away from them in a few months’ 
time for reasons beyond their control? It also increases the likelihood of 
anti-social behaviour: I would not steal a loaf of bread if I knew there 
was no danger of going hungry anyway, but faced with the danger 
of starvation tomorrow, I would seriously consider it.4 Insecurity is a 
problem that affects those who have little to start with especially acutely: 
hence the link between insecurity and inequality. 
Big problems require big ideas. Our current generation of politicians 
don’t really have ideas big enough to deal with the problems of 
widespread insecurity and marked inequality. Big ideas come along every 
few decades. The last one was about forty years ago: neoliberalism, the 
3  Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review 50: 370–
96, https://doi.org/10.1037/h0054346; Griffin, J. and I. Tyrrell (2003). Human Givens: 
A New Approach to Emotional Health and Clear Thinking (Chalvington, East Sussex: 
HG Publishing).
4  A point made by Thomas More, in his Utopia, as long ago as 1516: “[…] no penalty 
on earth will stop people from stealing, if it’s their only way of getting food”. 
Presciently, More goes on to suggest that “[providing] everyone with some means 
of livelihood” is thus a way to deal with the problem of petty theft. 
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idea that market competition between private-sector corporations would 
deliver the social outcomes we all wanted, as long as government got out 
of the way as far as possible. Interestingly, neoliberalism was not such 
an obviously good idea that politicians of all stripes ‘just got it’. It took 
several decades of carefully orchestrated deliberate communication and 
advocacy, which was not at all successful at first, to eventually make it 
seem, across the political spectrum, that the idea was so commonsensical 
as to be obvious.5 I don’t think any of the early advocates of neoliberalism 
could possibly have dreamed that after thirty years of implementation of 
their big idea, available incomes would have stagnated or declined for the 
median family; public faith in corporate capitalism would have seeped 
away; even the UK Conservative party would have to concede that market 
mechanisms did not really work as envisaged;6 or that the major UK 
political parties would both be advocating government-imposed price-
caps in an area, the supply of energy, where the neoliberal market model 
had been followed to its logical conclusion. It feels like we are washed up 
on the end of one big idea, waiting for something else to come along.
Our current politicians propose to deal with symptoms piecemeal—a 
minimum-wage increase here, a price cap there, rent-control in the 
other place; tax credits for those people; financial aid to buy a house for 
those others. At best we are dealing with one symptom at a time. Each 
piecemeal intervention increases the complexity of the state; divides 
citizens down into finer and finer ad hoc groups each eligible for different 
transactions; requires more bureaucratic monitoring; and often has 
unintended and perverse knock-on effects. For example, helping young 
people to buy a house with government financial aid only maintains 
the high levels of house prices. Vendors can simply factor into the price 
the transfer from government that they will receive. The policy would 
be much less popular if millions of pounds of taxpayer money were 
just given directly to large property development corporations, but that 
might as well be what the policy did. No, something more systemic is 
needed; an idea with bigger and bolder scope. That big, bold idea just 
might be the Universal Basic Income. 
§
5  See Bregman, R. (2017). Utopia for Realists: And How We Can Get There (London: 
Bloomsbury) on this point. 
6  For example: “We do not believe in untrammelled free markets”, Conservative and 
Unionist Party Manifesto, 2017 general election, p. 9. Downloaded from: https://www.
conservatives.com/manifesto 
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A Universal Basic Income (UBI) is a regular financial payment made 
to all eligible adults, whether they work or not, regardless of their 
other means, and without any conditionality whatever. Receiving it is 
a fundamental entitlement that comes with being a member of society: 
people can know that it will always be there, now and in the future. It 
should not be a fortune, but it should ideally be enough that no-one ever 
needs to be hungry or cold. 
The arguments for the UBI are well summarised elsewhere, and so I 
will not repeat them at length.7 All developed societies agree on the need 
to protect citizens from desperate want that may befall them, usually for 
reasons beyond their control. However, the ways we currently make 
these transfers are incredibly complex. Guy Standing reports that in the 
USA, there are at least 126 different federal assistance schemes, not to 
mention state-level ones.8 In the UK, individuals have had until recently 
to be separately assessed for unemployment support, ill-health support, 
carer support, working tax credits (which amount to low-income 
support), and so on. The new Universal Credit system only partly 
simplifies this thicket. Each conditional scheme generates a bureaucracy 
of assessment and the need for constant eligibility monitoring, at vast 
expense. 
Moreover, conditional transfers always generate incentive problems. 
If you go back into work after being unemployed, you lose benefits. If 
you are a carer and the person you care for recovers, you are financially 
penalised: you do better by keeping them ill. If your wages or hours go 
up, you lose out in benefit reductions. Under the UK’s new Universal 
Credit system, the marginal tax rate (the amount you lose of every extra 
pound you earn in the job market if you are a recipient) is around 80%, 
and that scheme was a reform designed to increase the incentive to 
work! Moreover, the 80% figure does not factor in the fact that if you 
move briefly out of eligibility, for example for some seasonal work, you 
are uncertain about when and whether you would be able to get back 
in afterwards, should you need to. This is a disincentive for taking the 
work. It is very hard to eliminate these perversities within any system 
of conditional, circumstance-specific transfers. 
7  I recommend in particular Standing, G. (2017). Basic Income: And How We Can Make 
It Happen (London: Penguin), which also provides a history of the idea. 
8  Standing, G. (2017). Basic Income: And How We Can Make it Happen (London: Penguin, 
p. 53). 
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The UBI, then, seems like a good idea. It is far from a new one. It 
has fragmentary roots in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 
the twentieth century, there was one wave of enthusiasm in the 1920s, 
and another in the late 1960s and 1970s. The second wave generated a 
positive consensus, specific policy proposals, and a certain amount of 
pilot activity, but other paths ended up being taken. The idea has never 
quite died, though. It is now back in political consciousness in a very 
big way. 
§
Why, when the UBI seems such a good idea, when it has been 
cognitively available to us for so long, when so many very clever people 
have modelled it and found it desirable, is there no developed society 
on earth in which it has been fully implemented? Partly this is because 
democratic governments, indeed societies in general, are poor at far-
reaching systemic reform, instead finding it easier to tinker with and 
tune existing systems. It’s only the political outsiders who dare propose 
massive change—they have less to lose. But it is also because human 
psychology is an obstacle to the UBI, and this is what interests me in 
this essay. As Pascal Boyer and Michael Bang Petersen have recently 
argued,9 when we (non-specialists) think about how the economy 
ought to be organized, we don’t derive our conclusions from formal 
theory, simulations, or systematic research evidence. No, we generally 
fall back on simple social heuristics, like ‘if someone takes a benefit, 
they ought to pay a commensurate cost’; ‘more for you is less for me’; 
or ‘people should only get help when they are in need’. These simple 
social heuristics are all well and good for the problems they developed 
to solve—basically, regulating everyday dyadic or small-group social 
interactions. But they don’t automatically lead us to the right conclusions 
when trying to design optimal institutions for a complex system like a 
modern capitalist economy.
Certain aspects of the UBI idea violate one of these simple social 
heuristics. In fact, the UBI sometimes manages to violate two different 
and contradictory simple social heuristics simultaneously, as we shall 
see. These violations are like notes played slightly out of tune: they just 
9  Boyer, P. and M. Bang Petersen. (2018). Folk-economic beliefs: An evolutionary 
cognitive model. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41: e158. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0140525X17001960.
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seem wrong, before one has had to think much about it. Politicians are 
afraid of these reactions; they don’t like going out to campaign and 
meeting the same immediate objections all the time. If you want to build 
a consensus for the UBI, you have to analyse these jarring notes with 
some care, and develop a counter-strategy. For UBI to go mainstream, 
a positive case will need to be made that also draws on easily-available 
simple social heuristics. If we can’t make it make intuitive sense, it will 
be confined forever to the world of policy nerds. 
Fortunately, the challenge can be met. Our simple social heuristics 
do not constitute a formally consistent system, like arithmetic (why 
would they?). Instead, they are a diverse bunch of often contradictory 
gut feelings and moral reactions each triggered by particular contextual 
cues. For example, we do have strong intuitions that people should 
not take a benefit without paying a commensurate cost, but these 
intuitions only get triggered when certain sets of features are present 
in the situation. These features include: the resource is scarce enough 
every additional unit of it is valuable to me; the resource was created by 
deliberate individual effort; the person taking the benefit is somehow 
dissimilar to me, so their interests are not closely tied in to mine; and it is 
feasible to monitor who is getting what at reasonable cost. The features 
do not always obtain: the resource might be more plentiful than anyone 
really needs; its acquisition might be mainly due to luck; the other 
people might be fundamentally similar to me, or their interests closely 
bound up with mine; or the cost of monitoring who got what might 
be prohibitive. In such situations, humans everywhere merrily and 
intuitively sign up to the proposition: the resource should be shared out 
somehow. There are a number of ways this can happen: pure communal 
sharing, where each qualifying individual just takes what they like, or 
equality matching, where every qualifying individual is allotted an equal 
share as of right. Every society has domains in which communal sharing 
or equality matching is deployed in preference to market pricing (the 
rule ‘you should only take a benefit if you pay a commensurate cost’).10
Hunter-gatherers deal with large game—chancy and producing a 
huge surfeit when it comes—by communal sharing. Even in the more 
private-property focussed Western societies, communal sharing is 
10  See Fiske, A. P. (1991). The Structures of Social Life (New York: The Free Press); and 
Rai, T. S. and A. P. Fiske. (2011). Moral psychology is relationship regulation: Moral 
motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality. Psychological Review 118: 
57–75, https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021867 
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ubiquitous. Households, for example. If I buy a litre of milk, I don’t 
give my wife a bill at the end of the week for whatever she uses. Su 
casa es mi casa. Communal sharing or equality matching happens 
beyond households too. It is anathema to suggest that the residents 
of Summerhill Square might charge passersby for the air they breathe 
whilst walking through. Very few people think that those who pay 
more taxes should get more votes. When proposals are made to move 
a resource from the domain of the communally shared or equality-
matched to the priced, there is outcry: witness the response that greets 
proposals for road tolls in places where use of the roads is currently 
free; or to charge money at the gates of the town park. The case for the 
UBI is the case for moving part—no means all—of our money the other 
way, out of conditionality and into the domain of the equality-matched. 
Getting your head around it involves framing your understanding of our 
current economic situation in such a way as to trigger the appropriate 
equality-matching intuitions. Here as in many other political domains, 
those who determine the framing of the problem get to have a big 
influence on the outcome.11 
§
Whenever one talks about the UBI, one hears the same objections, 
including:
1. How can we afford such a scheme?
2. Why should I give my money to people for them to do nothing 
in return?
3. Why would anyone work if they were given money for free?
4. Why should we give money to the rich, who don’t need it?
The first of these objections is the easiest to dispose of. There have been 
detailed recent costings for the UK, which vary in their assumptions, but 
the consensus is that introduction of a modest initial UBI scheme would 
require surprisingly little disruption to our current tax and expenditure 
11  Elcheroth, G., W. Doise and S. Reicher. (2011). On the knowledge of politics and 
the politics of knowledge: How a social representations approach helps us rethink 
the subject of political psychology. Political Psychology 32: 729–58, https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2011.00834.x 
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system; perhaps modest tax rises, perhaps no change, perhaps tax cuts.12 
If this surprises you, let me give you the following back-of-an-envelope 
calculations. There are around 65 million people in the UK, of whom 63% 
are aged between 16 and 64. Assuming that the over 65s will continue 
with their current pension arrangements instead of the UBI, that gives 
us at most 41 million adults to cater for, plus about 12 million under-16s. 
Let’s say we want to give £80 per week to each of the adults. This would 
cost £171 billion per annum. And let’s further say that we want to give £40 
per week, to the mother or other caregiver, for each child under 16. That’s 
another £25 billion, giving a nice round £200 billion in total. 
Of course, £200 billion a year is an eye-watering sum. But UK 
government expenditure in 2017 was £814 billion,13 so we are only talking 
about one quarter of what the government spends anyway. Increasing 
government expenditure by one quarter might be a rather rash move, 
but this would not be the net increase, because the UBI would produce 
savings elsewhere. The welfare bill for 2017, less retirement pensions, 
was £153 billion.14 It’s unrealistic to expect a UBI scheme to reduce this 
to zero: most UBI advocates argue for retaining some extra provision 
for the disabled, and also retaining, for the time being, means-tested 
benefits to pay housing rental in some cases (the cost of housing is so 
high in parts of the UK that many people would become homeless if this 
disappeared overnight). But certainly, we might hope to eliminate up 
to £100 billion, or 2/3, of the non-pensions welfare bill, including a very 
large part of the administrative cost. So we are already half-way there. 
At present, most UK adults are taxed at a zero rate on the first £8,164 
of earned income, 12% from £8,164 to £11,500, and 32% above £11,500. 
What this means, in effect, is that anyone earning £11,500 or more is 
effectively being given a freebie from the state of £3680, compared to 
being standardly taxed at 32% from the first pound. This figure—£3680 
per year—is, you will note, not so very far off my proposed initial UBI 
of £4160 anyway. Personal tax allowances cost the government around 
12  Torry, M. (2016). An evaluation of a strictly revenue neutral Citizen’s Income 
scheme. Euromod Working Paper Series EM5/16. Downloaded from: https://www.
iser.essex.ac.uk/research/publications/working-papers/euromod/em5–16; Painter, 
A. and C. Thoung. (2015). Creative Citizen, Creative State: The Principled and Pragmatic 
Case for a Universal Basic Income. (London: Royal Society of Arts). 
13  Information from: https://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/total 
14  Information from: https://visual.ons.gov.uk/welfare-spending/ 
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£100 billion per annum in foregone revenue.15 If my proposed UBI were 
to be introduced, it would be reasonable to ask people to pay their taxes 
from the first pound. For people like me who earn more than £11,500 per 
annum, the introduction of the UBI would then be largely neutral, my tax 
bill going up by around £4000, offset by £4000 coming separately into my 
bank account as UBI. So, if you will allow me very broad approximations, 
moving to a modest UBI would cost about £200 billion per annum, to 
be funded by about £100 billion of welfare savings, and about £100 
billion from abolishing personal tax allowances—so pretty much fiscally 
neutral. And this is just a business-as-usual analysis of the likely financial 
consequences. What advocates believe is that there will be positive 
knock-on effects: people will be able to move to more productive and 
enjoyable jobs, or start entrepreneurial activities; people have no financial 
disincentives to take casual work or increase their hours; the expensive 
negative psychological consequences of insecurity (anxiety, depression, 
addiction, maybe even crime) will improve. Thus, what you end up with 
will be a net saving for the government, not a net cost. 
The initial scheme discussed above, and other proposals like it, are 
not immediately very redistributive. Those currently receiving full 
Universal Credit would only end up with about the same as their current 
entitlement; and, as I mentioned above, for well-off people like me, the 
UBI would be almost exactly offset by the increase in my tax bill.16 So 
what is the point of such a reform? The answer has to do with security. I 
see UBI not so much as an immediate solution to inequality (you would 
have to set it very high to have a big direct effect on the inequality figures), 
but as a prophylactic against insecurity. For a wealthy person such as 
myself, there’s not much financial difference between getting a personal 
tax allowance and receiving a UBI, until my life is hit with a shock. I am 
well-off now, but I might not always be. Say I suddenly lose my job, or 
need to care for my wife. I know the UBI will continue to be there, every 
week, without any action required of my part. I can factor it into my worst 
expectations. The same is not true of the transfer effected by my personal 
tax allowance. And this, briefly, is the best response to objection 4, ‘Why 
15  Standing, G. (2017). Basic Income: And How We Can Make It Happen (London: Penguin, 
p. 131).
16  The group that would clearly benefit in income terms from a scheme such as this 
one is those just well enough off to lose conditional benefit entitlements, but still 
financially constrained: the ‘squeezed middle’. 
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should we give money to the rich, who don’t need it?’. Well, as long as 
they remain rich, then they are net payers into the system, since their tax 
bill exceeds their UBI, so we are giving them money only in an accounting 
sense. But it is still better to have them make a large tax payment in and 
concurrently take a small UBI payment out, rather than just make their 
tax rate a bit lower, because they might suddenly become non-rich at any 
moment. The UBI is ready for that moment should it come. To counter 
objection 4, we need to activate the social heuristics: ‘anyone could have 
bad luck’ and ‘everyone is potentially in the same boat’. 
There is a large difference between the knowledge that £80 a week 
will always come into my bank account, this week, next month, and for 
the rest of my life; and the knowledge that, if things go badly for me, 
I can do a complex application process, be subjected to a humiliating 
and lengthy bureaucratic examination, following which, after a delay 
of up to six weeks during which I will receive nothing, about £80 per 
week may or may not start to appear in my bank account, and could be 
withdrawn at any moment if I am ten minutes late for an interview, or 
am deemed not be sick enough or not be trying hard enough to look for 
work.17 It is ironic that the system we often refer to as ‘social security’ 
provides the exact opposite of that: it provides continual, unplannable-
for uncertainty akin to a sword of Damacles. The insecure, such as those 
waiting for benefits decisions or enduring benefits sanctions, have short-
term problems of liquidity. They lose their homes and possessions, or 
end up having to borrow money at very high interest rates. This is 
expensive and spirals them into abject poverty. Reducing insecurity 
could have an indirect effect on inequality, by stopping this spiral. 
And the health and wellbeing benefits observed in trials of UBI and 
minimum income guarantees, even over quite short periods, have been 
so massive that it is hard not to conclude that security does something 
interesting to human beings, out of all proportion to the monetary value 
of the transfer, just as Martin Luther King predicted.18 
17  One in five Universal Credit applications is rejected because of some 
procedural error, leading to many weeks with no income. See ‘Complex 
rules for universal credit see one in five claims fail’, The Guardian, 
May 12th 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/may/12/
one-in-five--turned-down-for-universal-credit-rules-too-complex
18  See inter alia: Widerquist, K. (2005). A failure to communicate: What (if anything) 
can we learn from the negative income tax experiments?. Journal of Socio-Economics 
34: 49–81, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2004.09.050; Forget, E. L. (2011). The town 
with no poverty: The health effects of a Canadian guaranteed annual income field 
experiment. Canadian Public Policy 37: 283–305, https://doi.org/10.3138/cpp.37.3.283; 
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§
What about objection 2 (‘Why should I give my money to people for 
them to do nothing in return?’). The objection has two parts: there’s a 
part about my money being my money, and a part about giving to other 
people without them doing anything in return. Both parts are important. 
First, the my money part. All societies distinguish between 
individually-owned resources and communal resources, though 
they draw the line in different places. Across societies, alienating an 
individually-owned resource from someone is morally wrong; but 
depriving people of a communal resource is equally so. The kinds of 
cues that trigger intuitions of individual ownership are: my having 
transformed the material extensively through deliberate action; the 
resource having been given to me by someone in return for something 
specific; or the resource having been in my sole possession and use 
for some time. The kinds of cues that trigger intuitions of communal 
ownership are: the resource being very abundant; its use being hard to 
monitor and police; a little of it being essential for everyone’s survival; 
and the having of it being mainly due to luck. So I think a first move you 
need to make in making the UBI make sense is to loosen the hold of the 
individual ownership schema on the money in your wage packet. 
The money in my wage packet certainly feels like a good candidate 
for individual ownership. I have worked hard to get where I have, and 
this leads to the intuition that every penny in my wage packet is mine, 
should not be given away to other people without a specific reciprocal 
service rendered. I supposed I should grudgingly admit that I have 
got some help from others in earning my salary as an academic—I 
mean it’s not quite all my own sweat. Following the logic of individual 
ownership, I should really have paid for all these inputs at point of use, 
but somehow I didn’t always do so. There’s the statistical computing 
language R, the backbone of all my research; developed by people 
I didn’t know and made freely available without me lifting a finger. 
Maybe 1p in every pound I earn is really owable to the R Foundation 
for Statistical Computing. Then come to think of it there is the computer 
Basic Income Grant Coalition, Namibia. (2008). Basic Income Grant Pilot Project 
Assessment Report Downloaded from http://www.bignam.org/Publications/BIG_
Assessment_report_08a.pdf; and Standing, G. (2017). Basic Income: And How We Can 
Make It Happen (London: Penguin). 
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itself, developed by a mixture of public and private investment mainly 
before I was born. It’s unthinkable that I could be a productive modern 
professor without this input available. So really I should attribute 2p of 
each pound I earn to having had that available. Come to think of it, I 
could not really earn anything as a professor without the existence of an 
affluent society in which enough people are freed from daily subsistence 
activities as to want to spend their time studying behavioural science. 
So I guess I owe the Industrial Revolution say 5p; and then another 3p 
to those Europeans who invented a rather good system of universities 
for students to come and study at. Oh, and I do use the scientific 
method rather a lot (say 4p distributed across a wide range of people in 
many countries over the last couple of hundred years, and another 2p 
specifically for the intellectual work of creating my discipline). And a 
couple of pence in the pound for the philosophers of the enlightenment; 
without them to make the world safe for my kind I would at best be 
a priest with low wages. And then there’s the Romans. What did the 
Romans ever do for me? Well, there’s the sanitation. And the roads….
As soon as we complete this exercise, we are forced to concede 
that what seems like my money only partly meets all the triggers for 
individual ownership (my individual labour produced it). In large part, 
it is a windfall of cumulative cultural evolution. I just got lucky to be 
born into a shared cultural and technological heritage. I can’t pay back 
to all those parties whose cultural activities contributed to my luck, 
since many of them are long gone (and besides, they are innumerable 
and diverse). But accepting that what I earn is partly due to an abundant 
social windfall created by a whole society over time, whose use and 
scope is hard to monitor, and I acquired by sheer luck, loosens the hold 
of the intuition that all my money all belongs exclusively to me. It’s 
a short step from ‘a part of what I receive from society is due to our 
common, difficult to monitor, abundant social luck’ to ‘a part of what I 
receive should be shared out’. 
So now we turn to the part about why I should give anything to 
strangers without requiring them to pay any particular cost in return. 
A popular pro-UBI argument here, which goes back to Thomas Paine, 
is that people should be recompensed for the natural heritage that has 
been alienated from them. The land has been enclosed and privatised; 
the water has been bottled and sold; you can’t just chop down the trees, 
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hunt game or build a house where you want, as you would have been 
able to do at the dawn of society. The UBI is this recompense—the 
royalty, if you will, on an inheritance that was once socially shared but 
has been taken away by civilization. This reasoning is fine, but a bit 
lofty and philosophical. I prefer a quiverful of different, more forward-
looking arguments. 
First, social transfers of some kind are necessary, and monitoring 
them under the current system is really costly. The UK government 
recently announced that it needed to review whether its rules on 
disability benefit claims had been applied correctly to recent claimants.19 
This review is estimated to cost £3.7 billion. That’s enough to give my 
proposed UBI to everyone in the town of Hexham for over 8 years. 
Not the cost of the benefit, not the cost of administering the benefit, 
just the cost of one review of whether the benefit has in fact been 
correctly administered, for a benefit that only a small fraction of the 
UK population claims anyway. Scale that up and you appreciate the 
madness of how we currently administer social transfers. 
Second, I do derive all kinds of payoffs from the welfare of others, 
even strangers. What are they? Well, I enjoy strolling around my city. 
I enjoy living in a nice orderly street. I enjoy going to the theatre. If 
my co-citizens were so hungry and desperate that they turned to 
assaulting their fellows, smashing property, not tending their yards, 
and abandoning the arts, my personal wellbeing would be directly 
reduced. I like writing books and giving lectures. It’s therefore in my 
direct interest that as many people as possible have the resources to 
read or attend these. Businesses can only flourish if there are people 
well enough off to be customers. This was the great insight of Henry 
T. Ford: he realised he could really make a lot more money once he 
paid his workers enough that they would be able to buy his cars. It’s 
the kind of reverse Ponzi-scheme trick, or perpetual motion machine, 
of modern consumer capitalism: those at the top of the pyramid need 
enough money to get down to those at the bottom of the pyramid that 
those people can buy goods and services, which means that the money 
19  See ‘Government to review 1.6m disability benefit claims after U-turn’, The 
Guardian, January 29th 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/jan/29/
government-to-review-16m-disability-benefit-claims-after-u-turn 
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comes back up to them again. Otherwise the whole thing grinds to a 
nasty halt.
One way of thinking about this is to say that, in a community, 
because of the fundamentally social character of human life, the well-
being of each individual creates a spill-over benefit for the others. It’s 
what economists call a positive externality. Because of the changes in 
behaviour that will follow from my neighbour not being in completely 
dire straits, my life improves a tiny little bit as theirs does. This 
improvement is very real and substantial, but hard to tie to any one 
act my neighbour does, and hence hard to monitor or account for in a 
ledger. 
Third, the marginal wellbeing returns to keeping all of my money 
are diminishing. Diminishing marginal returns mean that if the first 
few hundred pounds of income massively improve my well-being, 
then the next few hundred improve it slightly less, and so on. A few 
years ago, Karthik Panchanathan, Tage Rai, Alan Fiske and I produced a 
simple model of what resource distribution a selfish actor should prefer 
when there are positive social externalities, and diminishing wellbeing 
returns. We imagined a simple world where there are two actors, me 
and someone else. We put a value s on the positive externality that flows 
to me as the other person’s well-being increases by one unit. Now we 
ask: if I can decide how all the available resources get divided up, what 
allocation should I prefer? The exact numerical answer depends on 
the value of s and the degree to which marginal returns diminish, but 
generally, the result is the following. I should want to keep everything 
up until the point where I myself have got off the steepest part of the 
increasing wellbeing curve. Above that, it becomes rational for me 
to want the other actor to have the next chunk of resource, since the 
positive social externality coming to me from their large increase 
in wellbeing (they are still on the steep bit of the curve, remember) 
outweighs the rather small increase in my wellbeing I get from keeping 
it (since I am on the flatter bit of the curve).20 There is no ‘problem of 
20  Exactly, I should want the other actor to have the next unit of resource as long 
as sb > c, where s is the size of the social externality, b is the marginal wellbeing 
gain of the other actor, and c is the wellbeing gain I would receive by keeping the 
resource for myself. Nettle, D., K. Panchanathan, T. Rai and A. P. Fiske. (2011). The 
evolution of giving, sharing and lotteries. Current Anthropology 52: 747–56, https://
doi.org/10.1086/661521 
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cheating’ in this model, since we assume that the positive externalities 
arise from behavioural changes that the other party will simply want to 
make anyway as their state improves. It’s a model of mutual benefit, or 
interdependence, rather than tit-for-tat. 
This is the reasoning I would use with a well-off person to advocate 
funding a UBI from their taxes. The money you put into other people’s 
UBIs will directly increase your individual wellbeing, because in a 
society where no-one is desperate, it’s easier for the things you really 
value and derive benefit from to flourish. Furthermore, as already 
discussed, UBI offers security to you too. You may not need it right now, 
but you could do in the future. Both of these are self-interest arguments, 
where self-interest is construed sufficiently broadly. You have to be 
careful about basing all policy arguments on self-interest: it can end up 
signalling that self-interest is the only normal reason for action, which 
could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.21 Nonetheless, perhaps here 
having self-interest on side helps buttress nobler motives. Experience 
shows that the long-term success of social policies is tied to the relatively 
well-off seeing themselves as getting something from them. Where 
schemes are perceived to benefit only an ‘underclass’, different in kind 
from the people footing the bill, support is easily driven away in the 
next downturn. 
§
Objection 3 (‘Why would anyone work if they were given money 
for free?’) is based on the reasonable intuition that conditionality is 
important in motivating others to do something. One does not generally 
say to the plumber: ‘Here’s £100. I’m hoping that at some point you will 
fix my tap’. However nice the plumber might be, the incentives are a bit 
wrong here. And if people withdrew their supply of labour, the very 
affluence that can fund the UBI would be undermined. 
The best way to loosen this objection is to remind one’s interlocutor 
of two things. First, the UBI is only ever going to be basic, and people 
want more than basic out of life. If people’s life ambitions were limited 
to gaining some modest level of income of £5000 or £10000 per annum a 
year and then stopping, then frankly, the behaviour of the vast majority 
21  See Bowles, S. (2016). The Moral Economy: Why Good Incentives Are No Substitute for 
Good Citizens (Yale: Yale University Press) for discussion.
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of people in Western societies for the last century would be completely 
incomprehensible. Lottery winners almost universally continue to 
work, though often not in their previous jobs. Academics don’t work 
less when they become full professors: they work harder. The very same 
critics who say that people won’t do anything if given money for free 
also often advocate the awarding of huge salaries—millions of pounds 
per annum—to CEOs and other leaders. Admittedly, those huge salaries 
are conditional on working, whereas the UBI is not. But the fact that the 
salary allegedly needs to be so huge to attract candidates implies that 
people are motivated not just by getting a little bit of money, but by 
getting a lot. So those who advocate large salaries must believe that the 
motivation for more money holds up at levels of income way above the 
basic (at least for the right sort of people, but hey, maybe all people are 
the right sort).
Second, more important than the amount of labour people supply 
is the productivity of that labour. By this, I mean people choosing to do 
activities that are socially useful, in which they are happy, and that they 
are good at. That has to be key to maximising social wellbeing as well 
as economic stability in future. There is plenty of evidence from pilot 
schemes of the effect of the UBI (or similar policies) on labour supply. 
In the 1970s North American schemes, reductions in work hours were 
real but very modest. No-one stopped working altogether (and these 
were minimum income guarantee schemes, which provide stronger 
disincentives for work than a fully unconditional UBI).22 The slight 
reductions in labour supply overall were mainly explained by the 
behaviour of specific groups: parents took more time out of the labour 
market to look after their children; and young people were more likely 
to stay on in education, to improve their skills. Need I point out that 
these are all things that the state currently subsidizes people to do, at 
considerable cost, because they are felt to be socially desirable? In short, 
as Michael Howard has put it: ‘[In the pilot schemes] people withdrew 
from the labour market, but the kind of labour market withdrawal you 
got was the kind you would welcome’.23 In more recent trials of a full 
22  See Widerquist, K. (2005). A failure to communicate: What (if anything) can we 
learn from the negative income tax experiments? Journal of Socio-Economics 34: 
49–81, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2004.09.050
23  Quoted in Standing, G. (2017). Basic Income: And How We Can Make It Happen 
(London: Penguin, p. 163). 
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UBI in India and Namibia, overall economic activity actually went 
up, as more people were able to afford to access job markets, or began 
entrepreneurial activities on their own accounts.24 I believe that under 
a UBI scheme, work would continue, and become better: innovation, 
worthwhile work, scholarship, and the arts would flourish, whilst 
degrading or miserable jobs would have to pay people more or treat 
them better. Hardly the end of civilization as we know it then. 
If people persist with their intuition that UBI incentivizes people 
to do nothing, then the argument of last resort is the following: If you 
think it is stupid to give money to people even if they do nothing (UBI), 
then you ought to think it really stupid to give people money only 
on condition that they do nothing (the current means-tested benefits 
system). How much sense does that make?
§
There is one other great obstacle to acceptance of the UBI. People can’t 
figure out whether it is a left-wing idea, or a right-wing one, so neither 
side takes it fully to its heart. At first it seems left-wing: making the 
welfare system more humane and less conditional, transferring money 
from those with most income to those with less, is the latest tool to 
further a long-standing socialist or social-democratic concern with 
inequality and social justice. The neoliberal big idea has failed. A big 
idea based on collective action must replace it, and the UBI is part of 
that idea. 
But good UBI arguments have come from the right, too. Free-market 
economist Milton Friedman flirted with the idea, and the most serious 
Federal-level US policy initiative, the Family Assistance Plan (born 
about 1968, died about 1973) was proposed by a Republican president 
(Nixon) and largely killed off by the Democratic party.25 The right-wing 
(or libertarian) argument is that UBI massively simplifies the state, and 
could facilitate it relinquishing a lot of its micro-control over our lives. 
For example, if a UBI is there providing a protective floor for everyone, 
24  Basic Income Grant Coalition, Namibia. (2008). Basic Income Grant Pilot Project 
Assessment Report. Dowloaded from: http://www.bignam.org/Publications/BIG_
Assessment_report_08a.pdf; Davala, S. et al. (2015). Basic Income: A Transformative 
Policy for India (London: Bloomsbury), https://doi.org/10.5040/9781472593061
25  The Family Assistance Plan was not a full UBI—it was something closer to a 
negative income tax—but it did represent a move in the UBI direction. 
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does the state also need to regulate minimum wages so closely? 
Couldn’t people—protected from dire exploitation by the UBI—make 
their own minds up about what paid labour they wish to do under what 
conditions? Perhaps, going further down this line, the UBI plus control 
of law and order, is pretty much all the state needs to do, internally at 
any rate. We’ve given everyone enough to avoid starvation and be able 
to participate in economic life in a minimally sufficient way. After that, 
they are on their own: they can contract for the goods and services they 
choose in the market. This argument makes UBI the missing piece that 
completes, not replaces, the neoliberal vision. 
In another essay, I have written about the difficulty of inter-
disciplinarity.26 Valuable integrative ideas can languish in the academic 
uncanny valley—not obviously owned by one discipline or another—
and thus fail to have their potential recognized by anyone. Ideas that 
are quite good from two points of view, perversely, end up being 
championed by neither side, and thus have less immediate success than 
ideas that only appeal to one camp or the other. But what happens to 
the best of these ideas, in the end, is interesting: They go quite abruptly 
from all parties saying ‘that makes no sense’, to all parties saying 
‘well, everyone knows that!’. There’s a similar adage in public policy: 
Important policy reforms are politically impossible, until just about 
the point where they are politically inevitable. We’ve seen plenty of 
examples of this in the slow and halting march of progress. Perhaps 
that is what will happen with UBI. We will look back and wonder what 
took us quite so long. Until then—and this is what scholars are uniquely 
placed to do—we have to keep the idea alive.
26  Waking up and going out to work in the uncanny valley, this volume.
PART THREE
11. The need for discipline
…far from characterizing [academic 
disciplines] by theoretical, disembodied 
abstraction, I view them as sites for the 
coordination and embodiment of skill.
–Timothy Lenoir1 
On and off over the years, I have sung in choirs of various types. I get by 
just fine, as long as I can stand in the middle of the basses somewhere, 
carried with the rumbling tide, but I am not a very good singer, or likely 
to ever become one. So why do I do it? Well, there are the obvious things: 
it’s a bit social; it keeps me off the streets of an evening; and—not to be 
overlooked—it facilitates getting to know and love pieces of music in a 
deeper way than having the radio on will ever do. But none of these is 
the thing I enjoy most about choirs. The thing I enjoy most—and this is 
something I have not publically admitted before—is watching the choir-
master (or choir-mistress) do their work.
If you have been to a choral rehearsal, you will know what I am 
talking about. The choir-master will be sight-reading the piano reduction 
of the orchestral score, switching what they are playing to bring out one 
or the other of the choral lines, all the while listening to four different 
sections singing, spotting the kinds of difficulties they are having, and 
remembering tips that need to be given afterwards. The choir finishes 
a movement. I am just pleased to have got to the bottom of the page 
at about the same time as everyone else. The choirmaster, however, 
pipes up: “I was wondering in bar 73 if the diminuendo should be in 
the sopranos only; the c# in the alto line heralds the key change we are 
going towards, and we need to hear it”. And here I am thinking: how 
were you wondering anything in bar 73? You were sight-reading three lines 
of music and singing a fourth, whilst simultaneously attending to the 
1  Lenoir, T. (1997). Instituting Science: The Cultural Production of Scientific Disciplines 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 2).
© 2018 Daniel Nettle, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0155.11
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timing and pitch and volume and pronunciation and breathing of about 
40 different people. It takes me about 3 minutes just to work out where 
bar 73 is. Yet you did all you were doing so effortlessly that you still had 
capacity spare. It’s a mental and physical dexterity with the components 
of the music that I can appreciate but never reproduce. “Basses, you 
seemed uncertain on that b natural entry; you are getting swayed into 
pitching it flat because of the e flat in the tenors. Listen the end of the 
sopranos’ tune the bar before, and think, ‘happy birthday to you’”. Will 
do, boss. Which ones are the sopranos again?
Yes, there’s something fascinating—moving even—about seeing 
people exercising real skill. You might think that observing the highly 
skilled would be alienating or aversive for those of lesser skill. In fact, 
the opposite seems to be the case. We flock to hear virtuoso musicians 
and watch master chefs on television; we seek out dry-stone walling 
competitions, sheep-dog trials, and demonstrations of glass-blowing. 
I remember once Melissa and I were having a complex-shaped roof 
covered in lead on the back of our terraced house. The roofer gadgie 
duly turned up with his bag of lead hammers and his rolls of lead. I 
said to our next-door neighbour that I hoped that the builders were not 
disturbing his peace. On the contrary, the neighbour said—I cannot 
confirm but would like to imagine a flutter seizing his breast—it’s such 
a privilege to be able to see that man work.
It’s a privilege to see a skilled person work because, I would contend, 
it connects us to something deep about being human. We are the species 
that is good at getting good at doing stuff that is hard to do. We do 
this rather eccentrically and ecumenically: sometimes in domains with 
a utilitarian payoff, sometimes not. Some individuals take skill further 
than others in any particular domain, and this capacity for individual 
specialization is itself interesting and consequential. But skill acquisition 
is not the preserve of a few geniuses: it’s just what human beings do. It 
is because it is so pervasive that we only notice the extreme cases. By the 
time chimpanzees are a few years old, they have pretty much reached 
peak productivity, but humans—their close evolutionary cousins—
live their lives by expressing extraordinary skills that can take twenty, 
thirty, forty years to develop and refine.2 I have an obscure and possibly 
2  Kaplan, H., K. Hill, J. Lancaster and A. M. Hurtado. (2000). A theory of human life 
history evolution: Diet, intelligence, and longevity. Evolutionary Anthropology 9: 156-
85, https://doi.org/10.1002/1520-6505(2000)9:4<156::aid-evan5>3.3.co;2-z
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sentimental sense that it is in the exercise of these embodied skills that 
humans reach their fullest sense of personhood. 
It upsets me that our living species gets the name Homo sapiens, the 
human that knows. Watching my choirmaster, or the roofer gadgie, what 
strikes me is not that they know so much as that they can do. What they 
have is not knowledge in some purely propositional sense, something 
that could be stored on a USB stick. If it is knowledge, it is procedural 
knowledge, instantiated in and distributed across the whole of the body, 
and realised in patterns of movement (striking the keys, bending the 
lead, tensing the diaphragm, modulating the larynx). Indeed, it’s often 
knowledge that cannot be expressed explicitly or imparted verbally, 
so highly routinized and embodied has it become. We lost out in the 
naming game to our extinct relative, Homo habilis. The skillful human. 
That’s what I would like us to be called. I would take being able to do over 
just knowing any day of the week. 
What name should we give the virtue that we recognize in highly 
skilled people? I would, for the sake of today, like to call it discipline. 
Discipline, in the everyday sense of self-control, is what is needed to 
drive oneself through the 40,000 hours of practice and training that 
high skill requires. But the word discipline has broader resonances: it 
links back to the Roman deity Disciplina, with her virtues of skill, self-
improvement, economy of action, dedication to the guild, and simplicity 
of life. What could be more attractive, then, than discipline?
§
I began with a paean to discipline in order to wrong-foot you. If you 
are anything like me, you probably have a well-developed sense that in 
science, disciplines, entailing as they seem to disciplinary boundaries, are 
a bad thing. I have spent my whole career railing against them. Indeed, 
it’s something of an identity marker amongst my people to deplore 
the balkanization of the study of human behaviour across so many 
discrete disciplines; to blame disciplinary divisions for our failures to 
progress; and to claim to be trans-disciplinary or post-disciplinary, in 
our orientations. We don’t tend to say much about how the landscape 
of our post-disciplinary utopia ought to be organized for practical 
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purposes; only that, perhaps rather suspiciously, a lot more status and 
resources would be accorded to people who…well, to people who are 
like ourselves, really. 
Often in academia, we clarify our reservations about some idea 
by stating that idea in its most stark or simple form: the famous straw 
man strategy. But a very useful complement to the straw man strategy 
is the steel man strategy: try to characterize the idea you oppose in its 
best, most sophisticated possible form.3 If you can defeat even the steel 
man version of an idea, then it really is a bad one. More likely, you will 
discover unappreciated virtues in an idea that you previously thought 
of as wholly bad, and adopt a more nuanced position. I feel like this 
about disciplines. I have read (and written) so much argument against 
the segmentation of the academy into discrete disciplines. Yet academic 
disciplines got invented, have been perpetuated by a lot of very clever 
people, and largely continue to exist; indeed, science has been doing 
conspicuously well since about the time disciplinary structures became 
established. All of which leads me, in the spirit of the steel man strategy, 
to ask: what is there that is good about disciplinary structures?
With this question developing in my mind, it was naturally with 
interest that I listened, in a restaurant in Helsinki as it happens, to a 
friend telling me about how a certain university was reimagining the 
structure of their curriculum. Instead of organizing courses of study 
around discrete disciplines, students would study a portfolio of 
modules whose subject matter was defined by phenomena or problems, 
like migration, climate change, or violence. The problems chosen 
were exemplary, in that their solutions could not be generated by any 
discipline acting alone. Within each problem, students would learn 
how economists thought about it, how sociologists thought about it, 
how biologists thought about it, and so forth. This would give them 
the ability to compare, contrast and syncretise different perspectives 
without being artificially shunted into the confines of any one of them. 
Great, I thought, inanely: exactly my kind of thing. ‘How does it work 
in practice?’ ‘Terrible’, she replied. Students could produce generalized 
and often stereotyped comparisons of different disciplinary approaches, 
but without enough depth or detail to actually implement (or improve) 
3  I am grateful to Brett Beheim for introducing me to the idea of the steel man 
strategy. 
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any of them. They were left with the abiding impression that what 
you believe about the world is really just a matter of what identity you 
choose to adopt, rather than the consequence of systematic epistemic 
work using justified standards. In short, they came out of their studies 
not knowing how to do anything. 
This anecdote reminds us that the origin of the term discipline in the 
academic context is a pedagogical one: the set of training you need in 
order to be a competent and useful practitioner in a domain. And this 
training is not reducible to the acquisition of factual statements; not 
even reducible to the acquisition of factual statements plus frameworks 
for interpreting and explaining them. Perhaps more than either of these 
things, the concept describes a set of core physical skills. In this sense, 
the ‘discipline’ of the mathematician or ethologist has more in common 
with the ‘discipline’ of the roofer, the stonemason, or the choir-master 
than one might at first imagine. When we think about practical skills, 
inter-disciplinarity does not seem like a particular virtue. It might not be 
bad, but it is a lesser virtue than excellence within the relevant domain. 
Who would you hire: the inter-disciplinary welder—‘I can weld a bit, 
and I can critically compare welding to carpentry!’—or the welder who 
welds well? 
§
It might be useful to separate analytically two components of scientific 
disciplinarity: the declarative and the practical. On the declarative side, 
academic disciplines sustain particular structures of explicit belief and 
understanding, and they do so in part through political and ideological 
operations. (I am not saying that science is mere ideology or mere 
politics—on the contrary, its content is in the end constrained by nature. 
It is nonetheless a social process that proceeds year to year through 
ordinary human manoeuvring.) Disciplines exert power, and sustain 
ideologies, through control of what gets published (and in what form); 
through control of funding panels; and through control of academic 
hires and curricula. By such means, disciplines can define what types of 
question can be asked, in what way, and what constitutes an acceptable 
answer. They provide handy non-reasoned authority and legitimation 
for particular decisions and inferences. I remember one conversation 
with a colleague about why she was interpreting a particular behavioural 
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phenomenon as evidence for a particular cognitive mechanism in the 
children she studied. Her reply was simply that, in developmental 
psychology (her discipline), that’s how researchers interpret it. Whilst 
her answer was pragmatically realistic, it was epistemologically 
unsatisfactory. I was tempted to recall George Berkeley’s jibe against 
scholastic philosophers: ‘when a Schoolman tells me ‘Aristotle hath said 
it’, all I conceive he means by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion 
with the deference and submission which custom has annexed to that 
name’.4 Judging this a bit heavy for a Tuesday lunchtime, I held my 
tongue. 
It’s the declarative aspects of disciplines, particularly the way they 
trammel and police researchers’ explicit cognition, that are the easiest 
to use in an indictment against them. They normalize assumptions 
that should be exposed, provoke cognitive conformity, and delimit 
possible moves and juxtapositions. Thus, they blind us to aspects of the 
phenomena, or theoretical resources, that might hold the key to progress. 
I’ll come back to this argument, which is the one I have habitually relied 
on in advocating post-disciplinarity. For now, let us concentrate on the 
fact that this argument gives no recognition to the practical components 
of disciplines. 
The practical components of disciplines are the physical skills they 
serve to inculcate, transmit and refine. When you hire a mathematician, 
you want them to be able to do matrix algebra, and when you hire a 
molecular biologist, you want them to be able to pipette. You can expect 
that they will be able to do so skilfully in virtue of the disciplinary 
training that they have received. Disciplines in this sense are guilds 
of artisans. It seems obvious that to drive levels of skill higher and 
higher, there will need to be specialization, deep apprenticeship, and 
assortment of artisans with the others of their guild. The wood turners 
may get on well with the potters, but they will naturally want to spend 
a lot of time with other wood-turners to mutually improve their skill, 
and to pass it on. Viewed from the practical rather than the declarative 
perspective, then, the existence of separate disciplines seems much 
less pernicious and much more natural. And indeed, historically, it is 
4  Berkeley’s jibe is from the introduction to his 1710 Principles of Human Knowledge 
(various editions). 
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the development of particular laboratory or field practices, as much as 
declarative theoretical commitments, that gives rise to new disciplines.5 
You might concede the need, on practical grounds, for disciplinary 
specialities such as electrophysiology or molecular biology. You might 
however still cling to the view that the broad domain covered by 
psychology, sociology, anthropology and economics should simply 
be one open field, since these disciplines all look at the same thing, 
namely human behaviour. That’s only right to an extent. After all, 
electrophysiology, fMRI and EEG all look at the same thing—neural 
activity—but nonetheless require discrete skills. Capturing and analyzing 
large amounts of data on monetised transactions; getting to know and 
understand the lives of a particular small social group; designing and 
interpreting large-scale attitudinal surveys; making experiments to 
isolate the causal structure of particular cognitive processes: these are 
different operations that each require deep reservoirs of skill to do well. 
The lack of expensive equipment and white coats should not blind us 
to the complex and distinctive skills required in each case. And I know 
from experience how easy it is, as a disciplinary novice, to do these 
things so badly that the results are basically useless. 
§
Another musical anecdote: Melissa and I play baroque recorder duets. 
She’s the more skilful player. I am known for proclaiming, as we 
embark on a new piece: I think this movement should have a misterioso 
quality. Her translation: what you mean is that it’s too difficult for you 
to play properly. Your misterioso is basically made up of slowing down 
on the hard bits, getting some of the notes wrong, and a distracting 
smokescreen of emphatic head movements. When I practice a bit, guess 
what, I discover that it sounds even better if, rather than misterioso, it is 
just played well. 
5  For this view of the history of science, see Lenoir, T. (1997). Instituting Science: The 
Cultural Production of Scientific Disciplines (Stanford: Stanford University Press). The 
shift from seeing scientific disciplines as sets of declarative knowledge to seeing 
them as sets of skills is echoed in a recent paper suggesting the same move in the 
study of human language. What we acquire when we learn a language should not 
be seen primarily as a set of abstract declarative principles, so much as the practical 
ability to understand and produce speech in real situations: Chater, N. and M. H. 
Christiansen. (2018). Language acquisition as skill learning. Current Opinion in 
Behavioral Sciences 21: 205-8, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2018.04.001 
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In like fashion, I have been involved in several research projects that 
were self-consciously trans-disciplinary, usually mixing some kind of 
evolutionary biology theory with some kind of social science data. As 
we accumulated rejection slips from the best journals in the field, we 
consoled each other with the insight that journal editors and reviewers 
are cognitively trapped in disciplinary silos, and prejudiced against any 
kind of attempt to transcend them. Our indignation affirmed our sense 
that we were right and what we were doing was important. Indeed, at 
times, it seemed like the more the disciplinary specialists rubbished it, 
the more vindicated we felt in our worldview. I shouldn’t need to tell 
you that this is an extremely disturbing epistemic direction to be headed 
in. Looking back over this history now with the benefit of a bit more 
experience, I can see a plainer truth: the studies we were doing often 
contained interesting germs of ideas, but were just not very well done. 
Our trans-disciplinarity was, not always but all too often, the misterioso 
of science: a pretext for sketchy methods, careless design, hasty data 
analysis, inferential over-extension, and lack of theoretical precision. 
Pat Bateson, nearly fifty years ago now, distinguished between 
roundheads and cavaliers in the study of behaviour. The roundheads 
are methodologically impeccable in every respect, but, in his words, 
unwilling to flirt, let alone dance, with ideas. The cavaliers exhibit great 
dash and intellectual exuberance, but this does not come without cost: 
they ‘also are notoriously unsound and constantly confuse inference 
with evidence’.6 It would be too much of a stretch to equate roundheads 
with disciplinary specialists and cavaliers with trans-discipliners. 
There can after all be people who are cavalier within the bounds of one 
discipline, and trans-discipliners who develop beautiful and rigorous 
methods. There is no doubt in my mind, though, that across the study 
of behaviour, greater trans-disciplinarity comes with a more cavalier 
attitude to methods on average. Which of course links us back to the 
practical components of disciplines. 
I can think of many examples from my career where the growth of 
a trans-disciplinary research area produces high-impact publications 
that could have been better with a little more discipline. There are the 
famous behavioural-economic experiments demonstrating that people 
have a pro-social concern for others’ financial outcomes as well as their 
6  Bateson, P. (1970). What is learning? New Scientist, 25 June: 621–3, p. 621.
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own. These experiments consist of artificial financial dilemmas, in which 
many participants can choose (or not) to pay into a group fund that 
will benefit everyone at net cost to them. I firmly believe, by the way, 
that humans do have other motives than just maximizing personal gain, 
including prosocial motives. It’s just that these particular experiments 
could have been designed better, and provided stronger grounds for 
their conclusions. Specifically, the original experiments did not include 
control conditions to separate the motivation that others should benefit 
from, for example, failure to truly understand the rules of the game, 
or a dislike of using the extremes of a scale. Once you include control 
conditions to rule these alternative influences out, the evidence that 
participants’ behaviour reflects concern for others’ outcomes becomes 
much less convincing.7 The original studies—published in the highest-
profile inter-disciplinary journals—were done by brilliant economists 
who lacked deep discipline in experimental psychology. Experimental 
psychology has many faults, but one of its virtues is real skill in designing 
experiments and, in particular, the almost ubiquitous need for multiple 
control conditions in order to make inferences about the meaning of an 
experimental effect. 
To take another example, in primate neuroscience and primate 
cognition, it’s common to find people taking 1000 or even 5000 trials 
to train their animals on a simple discrimination (say, between two 
colours) where one option is rewarded and the other not. Even after 
thousands of trials, performance is not always very good. There is even 
a view out there that smart animals like chimpanzees do not readily 
acquire arbitrary discriminations in the way that rats or pigeons do.8 
The fact that these monkeys and apes take so many hundreds of trials, 
though, is an artefact of the way they are trained. Intuitively, it seems 
like the way you would make an animal learn an association between a 
stimulus and a reward is by pairing the two as often as possible; so in 
these training paradigms there may be hundreds of pairings of stimulus 
7  Burton-Chellew, M. N. and S A. West. (2013). Prosocial preferences do not explain 
human cooperation in public-goods games. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 110: 216–21, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1210960110
8  See Hanus, D. and J. Call. (2011). Chimpanzee problem-solving: Contrasting the 
use of causal and arbitrary cues. Animal Cognition 14: 871–8, https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10071-011-0421-6; and Bateson, M. and D. Nettle. (2015). Development of a 
cognitive bias methodology for measuring low mood in chimpanzees. PeerJ 3: e998 
for some discussion, https://doi.org/10.7287/peerj.preprints.888 
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and reward, with very short intervals between them, in a single session. 
It turns out that intuition is spectacularly wrong in this particular case: 
the way you make an animal learn an association between a stimulus 
and a reward is to make the stimulus, and hence the reward, very rare 
(i.e. long gaps between trials). Once you do this, the number of pairings 
required comes down by orders of magnitude.9 
Old-school rat and pigeon animal learning theorists knew this very 
well, and they could train an arbitrary association perfectly in a dozen 
or two trials. They also knew how best to navigate the way to learning 
a full discrimination: first training the association between the positive 
stimulus and reward, then introducing the unrewarded alternative, 
then building up to choices. Just sticking two colours in front of an 
animal again and again in quick succession is only going to teach them 
something by a near-endless war of attrition; the unrewarded stimulus 
ends up temporally proximal to the rewarded one, and the required 
informative contingencies in experience are lacking. So the interesting 
question is why the skill held by animal learning theorists has not 
found its way into the communities studying primate neuroscience and 
primate cognition. Well, by and large those researchers don’t have deep 
discipline in animal learning theory. Instead, they are coming in from 
anthropology, or if it is from psychology, it is cognitive psychology. 
One of the sad and pointless things about the ‘cognitive revolution’ in 
psychology, in which behaviourism was allegedly ‘overthrown’, is that 
a lot of really useful skill in how to make animals learn, as well as how to 
design beautiful experiments, was lost in a kind of year-zero mentality. 
We need to build on the practical skill of behaviourist psychology, not 
throw it out with the cognitive bathwater. 
To take a final example, in the last five years, I have begun to work in 
telomere biology, not really because I know much about telomeres, but 
because of the possibility they offer us to provide an integrative marker 
of the insults and damages inflicted by the world over the course of an 
individual’s life. We did four successive experiments where we showed 
9  This phenomenon becomes comprehensible once you appreciate that what you 
want to maximize is not the number of times that a stimulus has been paired 
with a reward, but the information an event carries about a reward. Rare events 
carry more information. See Ward R. D., C. R. Gallistel and P. D. Balsam. (2013). 
It’s the information!. Behavioural Processes 95: 3–7, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
beproc.2013.01.005 
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that telomeres shorten very rapidly in the nestling starling, then a 
fifth experiment where they did not—they appeared to get longer, in 
fact. Had we discovered an extraordinary exception that would form 
the basis of a Nature paper? Reverse the ageing process! A group of 
Northumberland starlings holds the key to immortality! 
I showed the data to a colleague I admire who is more skilled than 
me in the actual lab work. She didn’t need to see the results of my multi-
level model; she didn’t even need to see the statistics on the technical 
replicates. She certainly didn’t need to hear my elaborate theoretical 
interpretation. ‘Oh’, she said, ‘your reaction hasn’t worked. Look, those 
numbers are too high. Your primer concentration must be wrong’. And 
that was it. She was like a choir-master, knowing in her bones where 
and why the basses had been misled. The basses have not stumbled on 
an interesting new direction for Western music; they are merely singing 
badly. The methods sections of the published papers on measurement 
of telomere length by quantitative PCR say all kinds of useful things, 
of course, but what they don’t say is: if these numbers aren’t quite a lot 
smaller than those other numbers, you’ve probably just done it wrong. 
And in the emerging trans-disciplinary field of telomere epidemiology, 
a number of the most exciting ‘findings’—such as the idea that longer 
telomeres shorten faster, or that over short periods, the telomeres of 
about 50% of people get longer, probably reflect measurement error as 
much as anything else.10 If we had all had a bit more discipline prior to 
publication, perhaps science could have proceeded more efficiently. 
§
The conclusion so far seems to be that we should want to retain all the 
practical virtues of disciplines, namely having people with high levels of 
specific technical skill, but abolish the declarative distinctions between 
them. I don’t know if this is possible; as Timothy Lenoir has argued, 
the connections between the practical and the declarative components 
10  See Steenstrup, T. et al. (2013). The telomere lengthening conundrum — artifact 
or biology? Nucleic Acids Research 41: e131, https://doi.org/10.1093/nar/gkt370; and 
Verhulst, S. et al. (2013). Do leukocyte telomere length dynamics depend on baseline 
telomere length? An analysis that corrects for “regression to the mean”. European 
Journal of Epidemiology 28: 859–66, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10654-013-9845-4 
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of scientific programmes are intimate.11 Indeed, I have often wondered 
to what extent the explicit propositional commitments of particular 
disciplines arise spontaneously from the types of practical activities that 
their work involves. If you spend all day in dealing with prices and 
purchases between anonymous actors in a fungible currency, maybe 
you start to think like an economist. Maybe you would do so even if you 
had not been indoctrinated in micro-economic theory; even if that theory 
did not already exist. If by contrast you spend all day in open-ended 
non-monetised interaction with a small group of people, maybe you 
either need to lie down in a very quiet room, or you start to think like a 
social anthropologist, or both. On this view, the declarative differences 
between disciplines would not be (just) historically contingent ideologies 
sustained by the dynamics of power and influence, but the inevitable 
déformations professionelles arising from individuals habitually working 
at different practical activities. Hence, there is no clear dividing line 
where the concern that the practical activities be done skilfully ends, 
and ideological boundary-maintenance begins. 
So it’s going to be hard work to overthrow the declarative 
balkanization of science without any loss of practical skill. And actually, 
allowing the steel man to be even steelier, there exists an interesting 
literature arguing that some declarative balkanization of science is a 
good thing. The argument (which I am interpreting in my own, slightly 
misterioso, manner) goes something like this: the progress of knowledge 
relies on variation, for exactly the same reason that adaptation by 
natural selection does. We need to be trying out a lot of different ways 
of thinking. It is difficult for the same individuals to entertain more than 
one way of thinking simultaneously. Thus, the simultaneous existence 
of multiple groups of individuals, each thinking about human behaviour 
in a different way, is actually a strength. The internal coherence of the 
groups is not undermined by constant blending, and at the meta-level, 
competition between the groups for society’s attention and support is 
an invisible hand propelling humanity towards a higher level of overall 
understanding.12 
11  Lenoir, T. (1997). Instituting Science: The Cultural Production of Scientific Disciplines 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press).
12  For versions of this argument, see Stichweh, R. (1992). The sociology of scientific 
disciplines: On the genesis and stability of the disciplinary structure of modern 
science. Science in Context 5: 3–15, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0269889700001071; and 
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This kind of argument comes up in domains other than science. The 
economic dynamism of early modern Europe (in contrast to China, say) 
has been attributed to the existence of many independent city states, 
in competition with one another, where different things could be tried 
out: the good things could spread, and the bad things didn’t drag the 
whole continent down. Political devolution in the United Kingdom 
has had the virtue that new policy ideas are tried out independently 
in Scotland or Wales, with adoption more broadly dependent on the 
results of those innovations, which are effectively natural experiments. 
In science, this kind of progress-through-variation depends on the 
disciplines being somewhat informationally isolated (or all the variation 
would be rapidly washed out), but nonetheless a little bit leaky. For all 
of the United Kingdom to benefit, the idea that works well in Scotland 
does have to find its way to England in the end. Similarly, the ideas of 
behavioural ecology need to be able get to sociology (and vice versa), 
but without sociology just becoming behavioural ecology. 
What we seek then, if this line of reasoning is correct, is a goldilocks 
level of trans-disciplinary integration: not too little, not too much, but 
just right. The optimal level would be something that could be modelled. 
And much as people like me moan on that the current level is too 
little, the solid evidence that this is the case (for example, that science 
progresses faster in periods or areas where disciplinary integration is 
greater) is currently lacking. Indeed, bibliometric studies have generally 
concluded that inter-disciplinary leakage is already quite substantial 
and ubiquitous under the status quo.13 
§
Having spent a few days with the steel man argument for disciplines, 
has my commitment to greater trans-disciplinary integration changed? 
In one sense, no: there is still so much that has not yet been done, but 
Jacobs, J. A. and S. Frickel. (2009). Interdisciplinarity: A critical assessment. Annual 
Review of Sociology 35: 43–65, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-070308-115954. 
For a recent formal model of why epistemic diversity leads to better discovery of 
knowledge about the world, see Devezer, B. et al. (2018). Discovery of truth is not 
implied by reproducibility but facilitated by innovation and epistemic diversity in 
a model-centric framework. ArXiv 1803.10118, arXiv:1803.10118v2 
13  See Jacobs, J. A. and S. Frickel. (2009). Interdisciplinarity: A critical assessment. 
Annual Review of Sociology 35: 43-65, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-
soc-070308-115954 for review. 
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could be if we could draw our resources and assets together. But I have 
perhaps tempered my views. Not everyone should be bludgeoned into 
inter-disciplinarity all the time; and when we undertake it, we should 
undertake it constructively. The thinking styles of other disciplines, 
arbitrary though they can appear, have arisen for particular reasons, 
often to do with the reality of the practical activities in that area, and 
these reasons need to be understood. It’s perhaps inevitable that there 
will always be cavaliers and roundheads, and that the first to rush into 
a new area will be more cavalier than those who come along later to 
tidy up. Nonetheless, we can try not to be too cavalier. The disciplinary 
specialists have good practical reasons for apparently niggling concerns. 
Modish desires for inter-disciplinarity should not trump our 
commitment to training people to high levels of specialist skill. Some 
of the key skills that we need to train—statistical modelling, for 
example—are already trans-disciplinary anyway, but others are specific 
to particular kinds of data. The glitter of inter-disciplinary declarative 
statements can, for certain types of personality, be more attractive than 
the grit of intra-disciplinary practical skill, but at least some of the latter 
is indispensable if one wants to get anywhere. 
Rather than viewing other disciplines as competitors to be 
rhetorically trashed, or ailing companies susceptible to a hostile merger, 
we should try to understand what skills those disciplines embody, and 
see if we can get access to those skills to raise the level and refinement of 
our research. This is something that can be done by training, and/or by 
collaboration. The best way of understanding what a discipline has to 
offer is not just to read its theoretical end-products, but to attend to the 
detail of its practical methods and processes. Ideally, it’s good to gather 
and handle the kinds of primary data that a particular discipline deals 
with; this might illuminate why its practitioners have the particular 
concerns and notions that they do. If you want to build deep cross-
discipline links, my hunch is that you will get further by spending 
time working in your collaborator’s lab (or field site, or archive) than 
you will exchanging formal talks about each other’s high-level belief 
systems. The latter activity can go two ways: it can become polarising, 
entrenching the perception of difference and incommensurability; or it 
can lead to a superficial patina of consilience without the two disciplines 
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really growing into one another.14 Trying to do primary work together, 
on practical problems, creates living connective tissue that is properly 
vascularized from both directions.15 
What should the academic landscape look like at the macroscopic 
scale? What we seek is what Kevin Zollman calls ‘transient epistemic 
diversity’.16 Students of social life need to be able to pursue the 
phenomena of social life without having to wait for the physicists to 
reconcile the strong and the weak nuclear forces first. They need to be 
allowed to build up and stabilize the best possible skills for doing so. On 
the other hand, the modules so formed should never become completely 
hermetic. If our social theories are incompatible with the laws of physics 
or biology, we can’t just shrug and say, ‘not our problem’ indefinitely. 
How can we realize this paradoxical, unity-in-plurality, world?
Something we can draw on here is the idea of a small-world network.17 
Small-world networks manage to have two interesting properties 
simultaneously. The first is a high degree of clustering or cliquishness: 
most interactions are local, and most of a focal individual’s interaction 
partners are also interaction partners of one another. Thus, small-world 
network architectures would allow for domain-specific transmission 
of skill—for guilds, if you will. The second property is a surprisingly 
short path length connecting any two nodes (the famous six degrees of 
separation/Kevin	Bacon/Paul	Erdős).	Thus,	if	you	put	information into 
a small-world network at any point, it’s really not long before it shows 
up everywhere (if it’s spreadable information that is). Small-world-ness 
turns out to crop up in evolved biological systems, like nervous systems, 
presumably because these have similar requirements as knowledge 
does: specific sub-parts need to deal with specific problems through 
local specialization, but the whole thing also has to function somewhat 
coherently at the macroscopic scale. 
14  The importation of ‘life-history theory’ from evolutionary biology into psychology 
is perhaps an example. See Is it explanation yet?, this volume. 
15  An argument set out by Watts, D. (2017). Should social science be more solution-
oriented? Nature Human Behavior 1: 0015, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-016-0015 
16  Zollman, K. J. (2010). The epistemic benefit of transient diversity. Erkenntnis 72: 
17-35, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-009-9194-6
17  Watts, D. J. and S. H. Strogatz. (1998). Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ 
networks. Nature 393: 440-2, https://doi.org/10.1038/30918 
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How do you make a small-world network? It’s simple. You have a 
grid of nodes (researchers in this instance). You set up a lot of short 
connections between neighbours, and a smaller number of long-distance 
ones to a random point elsewhere. From a small-world network point 
of view, debates about inter-disciplinarity are simply debates about 
whether a parameter p of the network architecture (the proportion 
of connections that are long-distance rather than local) is currently 
too low (too much hermeticism) or too high (insufficient epistemic 
specialization). 
We would make science a small-world network if we trained all 
people deeply in a disciplinary tradition, but encouraged many of 
them to spend at least one year, at some point in their careers, in a 
completely different discipline, getting research training and actually 
doing some stuff. I don’t think this teleported year should be restricted 
to students starting out; full professors could benefit from it too. The 
disciplinary combinations could be as bizarre as you like: the way you 
get small-world-ness in a network is exactly by any long-distance link 
whatever being possible with a certain probability. We need to provide 
mechanisms, within academic careers, for these long-distance links to 
be made, and the extra skills acquired, but not at a cost to the depth of 
formation in whatever people initially do. 
Another mechanism we could employ to maintain small-world-ness 
is complementary peer review. I don’t mean your reviewers should 
compliment you on how great your paper is, though that would indeed 
be refreshing. I mean that every paper, during its development, should 
receive two complementary inputs. The first is a detailed assessment 
of the methods. You are really only going to get this from people who 
have practical skills in the right domain. These reviewers are going to 
be responsible for driving the methodological rigour, in a purely local 
sense, higher. The second input is from someone in a distant discipline. 
The point of this review is to say: did you know people have already 
thought about this kind of problem in this other literature, and they tend 
to think about it in this way; or, we’ve actually got a method over here 
for modelling that situation—why don’t you incorporate it; or just, why 
do you assume that? The local review would hold the work to account 
against the practices of the discipline; but the distant review would also 
hold the whole paradigm to account against the rest of knowledge. Both 
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of these are important functions. The distant review might also have the 
by-product benefit of reigning in bad writing and jargon, since authors 
would have to describe their work comprehensibly enough that the 
distant reviewer could understand what they were talking about. Both 
of these reviews could be published alongside the paper, essentially 
tying in both the disciplinary experts and the neighbouring fields in the 
common cause of trying to understand the world better. 
At present, you tend to get only the local review in specialist journals, 
which is why these journals are filled with papers that are locally 
adequate but conceptually derivative, and sometimes only the distant 
review in inter-disciplinary journals like Nature and Science, which is 
why these journals contain more than their fair share of methodologically 
unsound research. I personally think we should all publish in some 
big online archive that spans all subject areas, and features both local 
and distant open peer-review.18 And I think, more generally, the onus 
of peer-review should be moved away from rejecting pieces work, and 
more to collaborating constructively on their development, starting 
where possible before the data are actually collected. If reviewers 
could make the conceptual leap from anonymous controllers of access 
to a scarce and zero-sum resource, to critical co-producers of shared 
information about the world, surely we would all be better off. 
A final point about small-world networks. Although they have 
clusters, they have no abrupt cluster boundaries. One dense region 
gives way continuously to another. And this was of course true of 
early modern Europe too. It was only relatively recently that passports, 
borders, and border guards existed.19 Prior to that, there were certainly 
centres of influence and innovation, each with the ability to generate its 
own laws and norms, but their influence shaded off with distance like 
gravitational fields. Many people lived in marches or borderlands with 
access to more than one political centre. Political centres influenced one 
another and were involved in higher-level federations. Travel, though 
physically hard, was not administratively policed. Perhaps there are 
ways of maintaining discipline, but without boundaries.
18  I think this should be controlled by a self-organizing not-for-profit collective, much 
as the programming language R is. 
19  Carr, M. (2013). Beyond the border. History Today, January. Downloaded from: 
http://www.historytoday.com/matt-carr/beyond-border 
12. Waking up and going out to 
work in the uncanny valley
…giving up a compact disciplinary 
identity can be very risky.
–Rudolf Stichweh1
Film folklore has it that, in François Truffaut’s film Tirez sur le pianiste 
(1960), Charles Aznavour’s central character never actually occupies the 
centre of the frame. Whether or not this is quite true, he certainly spends 
a lot of time round the edges, down the bottom, or out of shot entirely. It’s 
an apt visual mirror: there’s a gap between his great artistic aspirations 
and the reality of his achievements. He has an air that the attention has 
always moved somewhere slightly different from wherever he is.
My academic life is likewise permeated with a constant sense of 
slight marginality; of failure to ever get myself quite to the middle of 
the frame. This may be just my personal mixture of insecurity and self-
importance. Or perhaps all academics out there feel that they are more 
peripheral than everyone else. For example, the Psychology degree 
programmes I have worked on are periodically audited by the relevant 
professional body. Part of the body’s concern is with how much of the 
teaching is done by ‘real’ psychologists. I’ve always felt vulnerable 
here: I have slightly less than half a degree in Psychology, my PhD is in 
Anthropology, and I don’t usually publish in journals with ‘Psychology’ 
in the title. However, asking around, it seems like pretty much all of my 
colleagues also feel that, for one reason or another, they are not ‘real’ 
psychologists either. And what is more, they seem to see me as the real 
psychologist! 
1  Stichweh, R. (1992). The sociology of scientific disciplines: on the genesis and 
stability of the disciplinary structure of modern science. Science in Context 5: 3–15, 
p. 13, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0269889700001071
© 2018 Daniel Nettle, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0155.12
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Even if everyone feels a bit off-centre, though, I feel a long way off-
centre sometimes. I have ended up, by random stumbling around as 
much as by judgement, living my whole life outside the comforting 
shelter of any single disciplinary or sub-disciplinary encampment. 
Two consequences of this strike me as non-obvious enough to dwell 
on. The first is the following: I have an easier time talking to colleagues 
about the components of my work that are far from their concerns, 
than the components that are near to their concerns. The second 
consequence is that parts of my work are consistently misinterpreted or 
misremembered as saying something that they really don’t quite say. I 
offer these observations not (I hope) as mere whinges, but as reflections 
on something interesting about human cognition, about how it tries 
to impose categorical order on a shifting and continuous landscape of 
information. 
§
Back in the 1970s, the Japanese engineer Masahiro Mori introduced 
the concept of the uncanny valley. The uncanny valley originally 
described a reliable phenomenon that occurs when robots are made 
more human-like in appearance and behaviour. As robots move from 
very un-human-like to a bit more human-like, people’s psychological 
response to them becomes more positive and empathetic; and when 
the robots are completely indistinguishable from humans, we respond 
to them as humans. But there’s a dodgy bit in between, in the place 
where the robots are getting really quite like humans, but occasionally 
leak cues that betray their artificiality. And in this gap—the uncanny 
valley—people don’t like the robots at all. They like proper people, and 
they like good old-fashioned droids with crazy LED eyes and wires 
hanging out. They really do not like the thing in the middle, ‘the thing 
that should not be’.2 
2  There’s a large literature on the uncanny valley phenomenon. I draw here in 
particular on: Saygin, A. P. et al. (2012). The thing that should not be: Predictive 
coding and the uncanny valley in perceiving human and humanoid robot actions. 
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 7: 413–22, https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/
nsr025; and Ferrey, A. E., T. J. Burleigh and M. J. Fenske. (2015). Stimulus-category 
competition, inhibition, and affective devaluation: A novel account of the uncanny 
valley. Frontiers in Psychology 6: 1–15, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00249 
 20112. Waking up and going out to work in the uncanny valley 
Early accounts of the uncanny valley related it to our particular 
conception of ‘the human’, and our aversion to this key boundary being 
infiltrated or violated. But it turns out that the uncanny valley is a much 
more general phenomenon; you get one as you move continuously 
across many conceptual boundaries, not just the human/non-human 
one. So the explanation of the uncanny valley phenomenon needs to be 
rooted in more general ideas about how brains work.3 
Brains are prediction machines. You can’t do perception or cognition 
purely inductively, allowing the information in the incoming sense data 
to impress knowledge about the world onto a flat blank canvas. You 
can’t do this because there are too many gaps in the immediate data: 
objects that are partly occluded by other objects; patterns of luminance 
that could reflect either a change of colour or variation in illumination; 
retinal images that could represent various combinations of size, shape 
and distance; ellipses and ambiguities in people’s utterances. So brains 
need to create high-level ‘models’ of what is out there. These models 
employ categories that are at least to some extent discrete. Perception 
and cognition are as much as a case of your internal models projecting 
downwards to funnel the sensory input into some kind of structured 
form, as they are of the incoming information driving upwards to 
determine what you believe. That’s why people are famously susceptible 
to all kinds of perceptual and cognitive illusions: their internal models 
can be tricked into firing erroneously in various ways. 
The interaction of bottom-up sensory data and top-down internal 
model is a delicate one. Over the long run, internal psychological 
models are built up from experience and continuously modified by it, 
so it is the incoming data that determines the model in the end. (Or at 
least, the incoming data in interaction with inbuilt priors, such as you 
can’t have two objects in any one place at a same time, something can’t 
be both plant and animal, and so on.) Over the short run, though, the 
internal model provides a lot more weight than any momentary piece 
of experience. A one-off anomalous scene or object is therefore apt to 
be reinterpreted as something else, something more compatible with 
existing model schemas. The meeting up of incoming sensory data and 
3  The particular view of how brains work described here comes from Clark, A. 
(2013). Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of 
cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36: 181–204, https://doi.org/10.1017/
s0140525x12000477. I am grateful to Rob Barton for introducing me to this paper. 
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internal model schema does not happen at any one stage in the neural 
hierarchy. Rather, there are many inter-connected processing levels in 
the brain. Each level passes down to the level below a prediction about 
what the world is currently like, and hence what data it should be 
receiving. The level below passes up one of two things: nothing, if the 
prediction is met and the world is as the model suggests, or an error 
signal, which effectively says ‘No, it can’t be that. What I’m getting 
deviates from that expectation in this particular way’. These prediction 
error signals do two things. Immediately, they cause the higher-level 
circuit to select another hypothesis about the world (‘maybe that thing’s 
not so close, it’s just big; try this prediction’), and distally, they cause the 
model weights to be slightly adjusted so that next time, the circuit won’t 
make the same mistake given the same cues. 
How can we relate all this to the uncanny valley? Well, all is going 
well for your brain when it can choose an interpretation of the world 
that produces no residual error signal at all. What’s this? Is it a goat? No, 
big error signal. Is it a person? Error signal equals zero. My work here 
is done. But there are some things that are uncanny, and this means, 
precisely, that they give you a big error signal whichever way you 
interpret them. Consider the faun. Is it a goat? No, big error signal. Is 
it a person? No, now I’ve got a different but equally large error signal. 
Damn. This thing is just…yucky on my brain. 
Roughly speaking, people dis-prefer stimuli whose error signal can’t 
be got down to a reasonable level, stimuli that defy sensible resolution 
into a model. Such stimuli are troublesome, incompressible: you 
can’t wrap them into an economical, unified, higher-level conceptual 
category with zero prediction error and go on your way. You have to 
settle for lower-level representations of bits of the stimulus, and a kind 
of ‘Warning: Failed to converge’ at the higher conceptual level. The 
brain is nothing if not an economical beast. It doesn’t want this kind of 
clutter hanging around. It needs to avoid it, ignore it, or tidy it up. 
§
How does this relate to my experiences as an inter-discipliner, and 
particularly one who tries to bridge social science and biology? I 
have an interesting natural experiment to report here. For most of my 
career, I worked exclusively on humans, and not just any old humans, 
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but (mostly) contemporary British humans. Some of my human work 
relates to phenomena like teenage pregnancy. I have a particular take on 
this phenomenon. I have argued that women from poor backgrounds 
who bear children at a young age are not necessarily ‘making a mistake’ 
or ‘failing to exercise self-control’. They are making a ‘contextually 
appropriate response’. That is, they are following a behavioural 
strategy that makes a lot of sense given their relatively short healthy 
life expectancies (in the poorest English neighbourhoods, women can 
expect to be in good health only until they are just over 50—why would 
they wait until they were 40 to start a family?); and given the modest 
economic returns to delaying childbearing when only low-skilled, low-
paid jobs are available.4 
My position is extremely congruent with other social-science 
perspectives. Social science scholars have also made the point that women 
who bear children young are not committing impulsive individual 
mistakes but responding, sometimes with some deliberation, to the 
circumstances in which they find themselves.5 I’m making exactly the 
same argument, but I am prone to alluding to the evolutionary concepts 
of ‘adaptive behaviour’, ‘lifetime reproductive success’, ‘fitness’, and 
so on. I do this because evolutionary behavioural ecology, the source 
I drew inspiration from, provides rather useful general expectations 
(or methods for coming up with expectations) about how individual 
organisms should respond to their environments.
You might think, naïvely, that my teenage pregnancy work would 
fascinate and engage my social science colleagues, and make it easy to 
build academic bridges between social science and biology. I’m saying a 
lot of what you guys are saying, and then I am also relating it to a suite 
of more general concepts from behavioural biology that are already 
lined up and ready to be investigated. Isn’t that exciting? I have given 
numerous talks of this kind to audiences from epidemiology, public 
health, sociology, and economics.
I have to tell you that it has not, in the main, gone very well (though 
there have been a few enjoyable exceptions). People have always been 
4  Nettle, D. (2010). Dying young and living fast: variation in life history across 
English neighborhoods. Behavioral Ecology 21: 387–95, https://doi.org/10.1093/
beheco/arp202 
5  See for example Arai, L. (2009). Teenage Pregnancy: The Making and Unmaking of a 
Problem (Bristol: Policy Press). 
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very polite and friendly. The overt hostility to evolutionary approaches 
that people attribute to social scientists is not, in my experience, 
widespread. What I do experience is simply a slightly embarrassed 
awkwardness, and no return phone call. Paul Feyerabend said that 
scholars who introduce transgressive ideas find themselves faced, ‘not 
with arguments, which they could most likely answer, but with an 
impenetrable stone wall of entrenched reactions’.6 And the reaction in 
Britain is, most often, quiet puzzlement, a polite but slightly strained 
question or two, checking of the train timetable home, and perhaps 
sometimes—I am remarkably neurotic but, yes, I think it might 
sometimes be there—a fleeting moment of well-concealed disgust.7 
I accept that my rather broad level of analysis simply may not 
answer the fine-grained questions that social scientists want to answer. 
But there may also be something deeper going on. Perhaps the central 
argument of my research on humans comes across as ‘the thing that 
cannot be’. The central dogma of evolutionary biology is (allegedly) 
that genes make bodies and therefore the successful replication of genes 
is, in the final analysis, the determinant of what goes on. The central 
dogma of social science is (allegedly) the idea that context determines 
behaviour.8 These two dogmas seem a long way apart, like you would 
need to choose one or the other. It may not be clear to my audience 
which one I have chosen; hence the reaction. 
In fact, though, you don’t need to choose. Let’s start at the 
evolutionary biology end but move in the direction of social science: 
because the replication of genes is so important, and because the best 
way of surviving and reproducing is very different in different local 
environments, evolution has produced creatures that are highly 
sensitive to the contexts they get put in. Evolution, instead of making 
6  Feyerabend, P. (2010 edition). Against Method: Outline of an Anarchist Theory of 
Knowledge (New York: Verso, p. 59). 
7  The anthropologist Mary Douglas importantly linked the emotion of disgust to the 
violation of category boundaries, and hence, though she did not put it this way, to 
prediction error signals in the brain and the uncanny valley phenomenon: Douglas, 
M. (1966). Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London: 
Routledge), https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315015811 
8  ‘The idea that context determines behavior is the ‘central dogma’ of all social sciences 
from anthropology to sociology, political science, psychology and economics.’ 
Glass, T. A. and U. Bilal. (2016). Are neighborhoods causal? Complications arising 
from the ‘stickiness’ of ZNA. Social Science and Medicine 166: 244–53, https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2016.01.001 
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a train that can only go down fixed tracks, has made a self-driving 
autonomous vehicle that can go to a wide range of places according to 
the landscape it finds itself on. Genes have done this, if you will, because 
it is in ultimately in their replicatory interest. Thus, the sensitivity 
to context our genes give us is not a random one, but one structured 
toward certain needs or goals. On the other hand, it’s not as though all 
the possible consequences that could emerge once a whole fleet of self-
driving autonomous vehicles start driving around a town were already 
present in the heads of the engineers who designed the vehicles; of 
course they weren’t. Likewise with genes. So you don’t need to choose 
between genes and context, any more than you need to choose between 
brake pads and traffic jams. 
You might think this kind of position would make everyone 
happy, and we could all get on famously. But all too often, it seems 
to fall into the uncanny valley. What does this guy really think? He 
talks like a social scientist about these contextual factors, then he starts 
mentioning genetic fitness, and it is as if we suddenly see his battery 
pack and realize he is really a replicant. If we stick to his actual claims 
about context—for example that poverty and emotional trauma predict 
teenage pregnancy—then we already knew those facts, and don’t feel 
any great need for any explanation for them beyond those we already 
have (indeed, these facts constitute a certain kind of explanation for 
the behaviour). If we focus on all that evolutionary baggage, then we 
end up with something that gives a rather large prediction error signal 
whether you try to think of it as a duck or as a rabbit. So the view that 
social science and evolutionary biology can be productively integrated 
into a synthetic position incorporating information from both is hard to 
hang on to. 
The uncanny valley is steep on both sides. The same talks that 
produce polite puzzlement in social science departments produce just 
as much puzzlement, or perhaps even more puzzlement, in Zoology 
departments. A recent survey of working biologists found only 60% 
agreeing that what we learn from humans is relevant to understanding 
other evolved creatures, and the survey probably over-sampled 
biologists working on humans.9 The explicit reasons evolutionary 
9  Briga, M. et al. (2017). What have humans done for evolutionary biology? 
Contributions from genes to populations. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: 
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biologists give for a queasiness about humans vary from the sensible 
and practical—like the long generation time and the difficulty of 
performing true experiments—to the completely bizarre and question-
begging—like ‘humans are influenced by social factors’. 
§
Five years ago now, I began to work on European starlings (sensitivity 
to context thereof, as it happens; the starling is 75 grams of very 
sophisticated autonomous vehicle). One consequence of this shift, 
unsurprisingly, has been greater interest in my work from zoologists 
and evolutionary biologists. This is the payoff for having climbed out of 
the uncanny valley up the biological escarpment, and hence generating 
no troublesome error signals from the fact that my study species wears 
clothes and watches cable TV. 
Strikingly, colleagues from the social sciences and humanities also 
engage with my starling work much more enthusiastically than they do 
with my human work. You’re that starling guy who shows that what you 
get to eat early in life affects your behaviour when you grow up. How 
fascinating! I love what you do! Actually, I was watching the starlings in 
my garden, and I was wondering…. I am continuously pumped with 
feathery questions, questions that one might quite comfortably ask of an 
exotic human society (and to which I usually do not know the answer). 
This curiosity extends to the general public too. When we are working 
in the field, people stop their cars to ask what we are doing, why the 
starling has become so much rarer, whether individual birds use the 
same nest box every year, whether starlings can feel pain, and whether 
it is true that the male starling must offer a nuptial gift of aromatic 
greenery, placed ceremoniously on the nest, before the female will 
begin to lay.10 
There is no unease or edge in any of this questioning, just delight. 
People grasp that there is a form of life over on the other side of the 
uncanny valley in birdland, and they know that they don’t know what 
it is like. Hence they love meeting someone who has tried to go there 
and can talk to them about it. That person generates no prediction error 
signal and poses no embarrassment. Even the insight that the form of life 
Biological Sciences 284: 0171164, https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2017.1164 
10  It is true. 
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in birdland has features recognisably akin to our own—parenthood and 
nuptial gifts—is just fine, as long as we are talking about two different 
worlds with some parallels, not a mixed world. The two sides of the 
uncanny valley can echo each other’s landscapes in a kind of aesthetic 
way, and each can contemplate the other admiringly from afar. Waving 
from the opposite hillside is a lot easier than living down in the uncanny 
valley. 
§
The same processes that give us the uncanny valley produce a continual 
loss of the nuanced middle ground in the behavioural sciences. I am 
prepared to bet that despite my rather careful explanations about 
autonomous vehicles, the compatibility of genes with sensitivity to 
context, and so forth, there have been times when someone has said: 
‘We had that Nettle here yesterday. He believes teenage pregnancy is 
caused by genes rather than the environment!’. And it is not just me 
that has this problem. Mischaracterization of evolutionary approaches 
to human mind and behaviour—particularly, the claim that such 
approaches must deny the importance of context—is pervasive, despite 
repeated and explicit statements to the contrary by the proponents of 
these approaches.11 One has to ask oneself: is it our fault for not being 
clear, their fault for not listening, or is something more general going 
on?
Failure of scientists to correctly represent one another’s positions is 
not surprising. Classic work by Frederick Bartlett showed that if you give 
someone an irreducibly complex shape, have them copy it, than have a 
second person copy the first, a third person copy the second and so on, 
the shape soon becomes less complex, and closer to something simply 
nameable like a cartoon cat or a letter ‘A’. Monica Tamariz and Simon 
Kirby showed that all you need to do to make this loss of nuance happen 
is to have each participant need to store the shape in memory for a short 
time.12 It’s the compressive processes of cognition—specifically, to be 
11  See Kurzban, R. and M. G. Haselton. (2010). Making hay out of straw: Real and imagined 
controversies in evolutionary psychology. In Missing the Revolution: Darwinism for Social 
Scientists, (J. Barkow ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 149–66), https://doi.
org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195130027.003.0005 
12  Tamariz, M. and S. Kirby. (2015). Culture: Copying, compression, and 
conventionality. Cognitive Science 39: 171–83, https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12144 
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stored, something has to be expressed in terms of an internal model—
that inexorably drive the distortion and polarisation of complex ideas. 
In another revealing experiment, participants were trained on a 
mathematical function: they saw one x-value at a time, represented as 
the width of a bar, and they had to select a corresponding y value.13 
They were given feedback until they got it right. They were then given a 
set of test trials with no feedback: on each trial, the x was given, and the 
participant proposed a corresponding value for y, which was recorded. 
The next participant was then trained, not on the original function’s x-y 
pairings, but on x-y pairings that the previous participant had offered 
during their test trials; their version of the function.
The results are some of the most remarkable I have ever seen. 
Within a depth of about seven participants, all the functions had 
become positive linear ones, regardless of what the starting point was. 
Curvilinear functions became positive linear ones. Randomly generated 
patterns became positive linear functions. Remarkably, even negative 
linear functions became positive linear functions. In short, within a 
few rememberings and retellings, the image we were left with carried 
no information at all about the stimulus we started out with. It carried 
information only about the kind of pre-existing schemas that people 
find easiest to learn and remember. This is a very sobering result, given 
that the ideas worth devoting one’s life to are nuanced, layered, and 
don’t fit into convenient pigeon-holes like nature or nurture, genes or 
environment, individual or society.
§
What happens to ideas that don’t fit neatly into any existing schematic 
paradigm? Mostly, they get turned, like the functions in the function-
learning experiment, into something more black-and-white, and less 
accommodating. (This can give an airtime advantage to ideas that are 
black-and-white and not very accommodating to start with.) Occasionally, 
though, a new idea gets a foothold. In effect, the community’s internal 
models get updated enough for there to be a new recognisable category 
13  See Griffiths, T. L., M. L. Kalish and S. Lewandowsky. (2008). Theoretical and 
empirical evidence for the impact of inductive biases on cultural evolution. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 363: 3503–14, 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2008.0146 
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of argument out there. The idea becomes sufficiently stabilised to hold 
its identity. A new explanatory schema is born. 
In my main field, human evolutionary behavioural science, there 
were some examples of this back in the 1980s and 1990s. The new 
explanatory schemas included, for example, the idea that our current 
minds (and bodies) are specialised for life in small-scale Pleistocene 
societies, not the kinds of societies we live in today; and the idea that 
culture is an inheritance system, parallel to genes. The emergence of 
these schemas gave rise to a process of fragmentation as groups of 
researchers coalesced around one or other of them, forming the mini-
disciplines of ‘evolutionary psychology’, ‘cultural evolution’ and 
‘human behavioural ecology’.14
Once new schemas such as these get a foothold in the middle of 
the uncanny valley, what happens next is predictable but somewhat 
ironic. The schemas attract paradigmatic adherents, who are often more 
dogmatic than the founders, and the adherents form cliques with one 
another. This shows us that most people are unable or unwilling to live 
out there in the blazing sun of complex and ambiguous phenomena 
with just their bodies and their native wits to protect them. They crave 
the epistemic shade provided by a micro-community with a nameable 
paradigm: a comforting system of assumptions, sacred texts and fellow 
worshippers. They crave this for their own cognitive ease, but also 
because of the social processes involved. It’s easier at an academic party 
to say ‘I am an X’ than ‘I look at A with a bit of Y and a bit of Z’. 
So once a mighty tree takes root out there in the uncanny valley, soon 
there’s a little copse of saplings underneath. And these copses, these 
mini-disciplines, come to have some of the unfortunate properties of the 
big disciplines they initially hoped to bridge. They have mini-uncanny 
valleys all around them, between them and neighbouring copses. They 
acquire purity to be defended. The boundaries of the mini-disciplines 
are in some ways more troublesome than the macro-boundaries like 
the social science/biology boundary. They are troublesome because the 
copses, though verdant, are small enough to have limited resources 
and odd founder effects. The adherents defend their copse. They try to 
14  See Sear, R., D. Lawson and T. E. Dickins. (2007). Synthesis in the Human 
Evolutionary Behavioural Sciences. Journal of Evolutionary Psychology 5: 3–28, 
https://doi.org/10.1556/jep.2007.1019 for a review.
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suppress competitors, and the competitors you most need to suppress 
are those who encroach most closely on your niche. I have been struck, 
as I have watched these mini-disciplines take root in my community, 
how easily the new adherents abandon the responsibility of pluralism. 
They don’t often feel the need to visit the other copses, except maybe to 
dismiss them. They don’t even engage much in an ongoing way with 
the broader intellectual sources—ethology, cognitive science, social 
science—from which their inter-disciplinary mini-disciplines sprang, 
and on which its future flourishing depends. 
All this means trouble if you want to operate in the uncanny valley 
between evolutionary biology and social science, but don’t want to 
commit exclusively to one of these copses. (You may see the value in 
all of them, but also recognize the incompleteness of all.) On the macro-
scale of engaging distant colleagues, it’s hopeless. It’s hard enough 
to get them to understand that there is one way of combining aspects 
of evolutionary biology and aspects of social science. To get them 
understand that there are several different ways of combining them, and 
these are not interchangeable, that’s hard. One risks, as it were: ‘I’ve 
heard about one attempt to be evolutionary about modern humans 
and I didn’t like that, so I assume you’re just the same’ (and if not that, 
then: ‘you evolutionary people don’t even agree amongst yourselves’—
it’s hard to win at this game). Within the tiny community of human 
evolutionary behavioural scientists, too, it’s hard to be an in-betweener. 
People need you to either be one of their own copse’s flag-bearers, or 
else a straw man. You can get castigated for deviations from schemas 
you never intended to adopt. Many of the most interesting empirical 
findings—observations that would extend all of the copses, but are not 
immediately recognisable as central exemplars of any of them—simply 
languish. They fill badly needed gaps in the literature. 
§
The only thing worse than having people not cite your work is having 
them cite it. When your work does get picked up in the literature, 
it’s salutary to look carefully and try to identify the claims that those 
citations are used to support. When I do this exercise, what I often see 
is that those claims are not really the claims I made; they are somewhat 
similar claims that are either more familiar, or more obviously ridiculous. 
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The argument that Ian Rickard, Willem Frankenhuis and I have been 
developing about why childhood family conditions have an effect on a 
wide range of adult outcomes in humans really isn’t quite the argument 
that the childhood household furnishes cues about the harshness of the 
adult environment (and it really isn’t quite the argument that childhood 
stress just messes up your brain, either).15 I really have never claimed that 
the reason some people behave less pro-socially and more anti-socially 
than others is because they are following a ‘fast life-history strategy’.16 
And my favourite recent example: Melissa Bateson, Clare Andrews and 
I wrote a paper giving an evolutionary take on human obesity.17 The 
first draft started with a long background section in which we were very 
critical of the widespread idea that contemporary humans are obese 
because fats and sugars were rare in ancestral environments, and thus 
we have not evolved control mechanisms for saying ‘stop’ when these 
things are abundant. (There are numerous problems with this idea, at 
least in its simplest form, for example that many humans live in affluent 
societies and never become obese). That background section didn’t 
make the final edit, because that idea was not the main point of our 
paper anyway. Within six months of the paper being out, guess what I 
saw in a draft manuscript I was reviewing? ‘Sugars and fats were rare 
in Pleistocene environments, and so humans have not evolved restraint 
mechanisms to stop them over-eating when these are available (Nettle, 
Andrews and Bateson 2017).’ If you didn’t laugh, you would probably 
cry. 
My case is not unusual or worthy of any special consideration. It’s 
just the one on which I have the richest data. It illustrates a more general 
problem: what people actually say is not what we remember them as 
having said; and not what it would be more convenient from the point 
of view of our agendas if they had said. There are two commonplaces 
from the history of science that fit with these observations. The first is 
15  Rickard, I. J., W. E. Frankenhuis and D. Nettle. (2014). Why are childhood family 
factors associated with timing of maturation? A role for internal prediction. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science 9: 3–15, https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691613513467 
16  One of the places I really don’t say this is in: Nettle, D., A. Colléony and M. Cockerill. 
(2011). Variation in cooperative behaviour within a single city. PLoS ONE 6: e26922, 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0026922 
17  Nettle, D., C. Andrews and M. Bateson. (2017). Food insecurity as a driver of obesity 
in humans: The insurance hypothesis. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40: e105, https://
doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x16000947 
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that the troublesome data that will eventually necessitate a change of 
scientific view often exist in plain sight for decades or even centuries 
before the change of view happens. The problem is not that the critical 
observations have not been made. The problem is that the community 
does not know where to put them in its mental models, so it either 
ignores them, or misrepresents them as something different from what 
they really are. 
The other commonplace is that new ideas get dismissed as wrong 
until exactly the point where people say that they are obvious and they 
always knew them anyway. From the point of view of mental models 
and prediction errors, we can see what is happening here. Initially, I 
hear idea X one or two times. I can’t assign it to any mental model. It just 
makes error signal. It must be wrong. But later, I have heard it dozens 
of times, enough for it to have changed the representational options 
available in my internal mental model. Here’s that thing X again! I’ve 
already got a mental model of it, so it seems obvious!
§
The human brain is often described as one of the greatest remaining 
scientific problems. I think this is true, and not just in the way it is 
usually meant. One lesson for researchers is the need to be extremely 
clear and do a lot of very patient, cheerful, and if necessary, repetitive 
signposting. Some of our most successful conceptual innovators have 
been prepared to do this, year in year out, writing the same paper for 
different audiences, or even the same paper for the same audience, 
until the penny begins to drop and the idea gets recognised for at least 
approximately what it is. If like me you are prone to constant shifts 
of views, banging the drum for the same idea year after year is not 
something that comes easily. Clear repetition also hardens all too easily 
into dogmatism and parochialism. Nonetheless, some modest insistence 
is often necessary. 
I would like to close by proposing a scientific innovation: the 
anti-abstract. This is a short summary of what a paper does not say. 
I think all papers should have these, published immediately after the 
conventional abstract. Casual readers could read the paper, spend 30 
seconds counting backwards in 7s from 116, and then read the anti-
abstract. If they get a big error signal from comparing the anti-abstract 
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to their memory of what the paper said, then they know they need to 
read the paper again, paying closer attention. They need to put the 
effort into creating a finer-grained representation of the paper’s claims: 
those claims are not what they thought at first pass. The anti-abstract 
would be very handy as a one-stop-shop for all the likely peer reviewer 
misinterpretations. Instead of having to take paragraphs of precious 
Introduction and Discussion laboriously setting out a load of ideas that 
are not in fact the ideas you want to test, you could simply mention 
them in the anti-abstract as claims you are neither advancing nor even 
considering, and for which your work should not in any circumstances 
be mistaken. 
I am really looking forward to writing anti-abstracts. In fact I might 
start doing so, and keep them in the file drawer for the day academic 
journals start asking for them. I can imagine beginning with the broad 
theoretical anti-sweep: ‘Researchers have argued that individual 
differences in many behaviours can be mapped onto a single underlying 
continuum of fast versus slow life history strategies. This paper is not 
an exemplar of those arguments’. Then there’s the anti-summary of 
methods: ‘Methods we did not use in this study include the public goods 
game’. And of course, the anti-implications: ‘Results are not interpreted 
in terms of the poor lacking self-control’; or ‘Our findings do not imply 
that fertility decisions are controlled by specific genes’. The best thing 
of all about the anti-abstract is that it gives the perfect chapter and verse 
defence when you get mischaracterized. Stronger as a defence than ‘I 
never said that’ is ‘Look, I actually anti-said that in the anti-abstract’. 
Undermining misapprehensions at source is surely a worthwhile 
goal. Mutual misconceptions comfort and simplify—the inside of one’s 
prejudices is an easy place to live, after all—but are not, in the end, very 
useful. The more we clear out misconceptions about what other groups 
are saying, the more connected our conversations might become to the 
world itself.

13. Staying in the game
‘I’ve done this a long time’, she said. 
‘I’ve seen long careers and careers cut short. 
The difference is how you handle the 
darkness’.
–Michael Connelly, The Late Show
A student from another university interviewed me. An assignment for 
one of her classes was to interview a researcher from a field of her choice 
about their work and their career. She chose me. As one of her prepared 
questions, she asked me what my aspirations were for the next ten years. 
I replied that, looked at in the round, what I hoped for in ten years was 
to have remained alive, and ideally continued doing some research. 
I think the student was a little taken aback. Perhaps she had been 
told how focussed and driven successful researchers have to be; how 
they have to have boundless confidence and a nine-point plan. So to 
hear that the best I hoped for was merely to somehow stay in the game 
(and that I was not completely confident I would succeed in doing so) 
was disarming to her. In some ways, though, my answer was a sensible 
one. Science (and other creative endeavours) are rather like animal life 
in a Darwinian world. There are many more ways to be dead than alive, 
and the vast majority of all lineages die out. To succeed—more exactly, 
to not yet have failed—is to still be in the game; to flourish is simply to 
not yet be extinct. 
A document has done the rounds at my university that attempts to 
inform young researchers about the career structure of academia. At the 
left-hand side is a fat horizontal arrow, pointing rightwards, which is 
marked ‘PhD student’. Then to the right of that one, pointing in the 
same direction, a slimmer arrow is marked ‘Post-doc’. To the right of 
post-doc, and about half the girth, is the arrow marked ‘Independent 
research fellow’. Finally, at the extreme right is the slimmest arrow of 
all ‘tenured university professor’. It is less than a quarter the width of 
© 2018 Daniel Nettle, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0155.13
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the ‘PhD student’ arrow. And where each horizontal arrow meets the 
next, there is a vertical downwards arrow reminiscent of the way sinks 
or earths are depicted in physical diagrams. ‘Exit academia’, this arrow 
is labelled. 
You might think if you make it to the right-hand side, to ‘tenured 
university professor’ then the shoals have been navigated and you are in 
the game forever. Not really. The research longevity even of professors 
is finite. There comes a point where things get becalmed. What was front 
page news when they were a PhD student only makes the middle pages 
now. They have friendly but sad annual meetings with the Dean, like the 
solid lay wardens of a settled religion whose congregations are declining; 
wondering if the fervour will ever quite come back. They are gently asked, 
or volunteer themselves, to take on senior administrative functions, or 
more teaching. There is nothing wrong with this, of course. The life of 
the body has to be lived. Besides, these functions are important ones. 
Still, they are not what most of us went into it for. We were seduced by 
the primary research process: the idea that you could find a question; hit 
on your own approach; perform and manufacture the work; and finally, 
see it there in print, with your name attached, a thread woven in to the 
tapestry of human knowledge. A thread of memory. 
Perhaps the student was seeking some pearls of wisdom about how 
to stay in the research game. I am not sure I managed to give her any; 
and my immediate thought was that I am the last person she should 
have been seeking to emulate. If she knew how narrowly I have hung 
on, I thought, she might have chosen someone else for her assignment. 
But, on second thought, maybe the people who have narrowly hung on 
are the most informative. After all, you can find any number of books 
about the practices of the most successful, the mega-stars—the case 
study of the ‘winner’ is an established genre. It has always struck me 
that, interesting as these books might be, in a way they pose the wrong 
question. It’s very hard to win the big prizes, and thus of some interest 
to know how the few people who do, do it. But the more pressing 
question is: how do you stay in the game without winning them? How 
can you live a worthwhile and satisfactory life if you are a competent 
businessman but not a Bill Gates; a competent actor who is not a Marlon 
Brando; or a useful scientist who never garners the accolades of a 
Stephen Hawking? That’s what takes real grit, humanity, wisdom and 
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technique: to just be there, quietly, purposefully, usefully, afflicted with 
neither pomposity nor despair, whatever the weather. To flourish in the 
middling state. The character we respond to most in Ronald Harwood’s 
play The Dresser is not ‘Sir’, the famous lead actor, but Thornton, the 
long-term bit-part player who loves his craft and stays in the ensemble, 
taking small roles with dignity year after year. A good life: always 
working, always touring; but never London. 
I suppose, then, I am well qualified to say something about staying 
in the game. I have done it for over twenty years. I have contributed to 
research on several topics in biology and the social sciences. I hold a full 
professorship in a decent research-intensive university. I get some very 
nice academic invitations. So it seems I have avoided the ‘exit academia’ 
arrows, possibly even with aplomb. But—and this is what qualifies 
me—I haven’t avoided them nearly as easily as you probably think. If 
it looks that way from the outside, that’s only because you lack the data 
I have. You don’t see the failures, the false starts, the wasted time, or 
the awkward conversations with the Dean. (All of these are ubiquitous, 
by the way, just not well written up in the literature.) And opposite the 
Scylla of the ‘exit academia’ arrows has always lurked the Charybdis 
of my own demoralization: walking away from the game even if the 
game does not eject me. I gave up completely once, for several years, 
then eventually clawed my way back in; a second time I partly gave 
up but left myself attached by a lifeline, a lifeline I duly climbed up 
within a year or so; and probably two or three more times over the 
years I reached the point of starting to make other plans. Periodic 
demoralization and depression are not rare amongst researchers. It’s not 
‘not caring any more’, or ‘not being able to be bothered’, as depression 
is often and erroneously characterized. It is caring so much, being so 
bothered, that one cannot advance on any front. One drowns in one’s 
own disorganized and gradually souring passion. 
There’s a lot to trigger demoralization an depression in the typical diet 
of the contemporary researcher: intrinsic uncertainty about the subject 
matter and one’s progress through it; rewards that are always deferred 
and whose arrival is highly unpredictable in time; structurally frequent 
rejection that is hard not to take personally; permanent opportunities 
for unfavourable social comparison; and, at least in British universities 
since they became so obsessed with research ‘metrics’, an officially 
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deniable but still palpable sense of threat. Despite all this, though, I still 
believe that to spend one’s working life as a weaver on the collective 
tapestry of human ideas is a noble calling, and a privilege. You’ve just 
got to find a way of doing it that suits you, works well enough, and 
keeps your spirits up most of the time. So, for what it’s worth, I thought 
I would set down some of the lessons I have learned trying to stay in 
the game all these years. These are the lessons that I wish I had told that 
student about, and I wish she had asked me for. 
Lesson 1. Every day has to count for something
I try to start each working day with a period of uninterrupted work. 
Work, for me, is: collecting data, analysing data, writing code, drafting 
a paper, writing ideas in a notebook, or just thinking. Things that do not 
qualify as work are: background reading, literature searches, answering 
correspondence, marking students’ assignments, peer-reviewing a 
paper, sorting out my website, correcting proofs, filling in forms, 
tidying datasheets, having meetings, and so on. These are work-related 
activities, which are necessary for work to be possible, but are not the 
work itself. It’s very important that this distinction be maintained. Don’t 
try to do a simultaneous mixture of the two (it’s obvious how that is 
going to end); and always do work first, work-related activities second. 
For example, I might decide to start the day with two hours of work, and 
then, at 11 o’clock say, allow myself to start the work-related activities 
required to keep the show on the road. Working requires emotional 
commitment. It needs to be planned the day before. The phone is off; the 
email is off; if you are likely to be disturbed, there is a ‘do not disturb’ 
sign on the door. And if like me your work time is first thing in the 
day, then you never peek at your email before starting. I like to be very 
quiet in the morning, not even getting into too animated a discussion, 
reserving my energy for doing some work; then, once work is done, I 
can be more relaxed and expansive. 
I thought that starting the day with a period of work was just a system 
that I had discovered by trial and error works for me, but something very 
like it turns out to recur in descriptions of the creative life,1 and self-help 
1  For example, Murakami, H. (2008). What I Talk About When I Talk About Running 
(New York: Knopf); Hardy, G. H. (1940). A Mathematician’s Apology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
 21913. Staying in the game 
books on how to be more productive.2 And these accounts stress that 
it is imperative to do work every day. I don’t mean you shouldn’t take 
days off: I don’t usually work at the weekends, and I take about a month 
completely off every year. I mean that if today is a working day, it must 
contain a period of work; it cannot be completely filled up with work-
related activities. Though there are some challenging exceptions (e.g. 
field work, travel), I try to maintain the every-day rule. If your day is 
filled with meetings, then fine; you have to get up an hour earlier that 
day to at least get one hour in on that particular day. And when it comes 
to scheduling meetings, you will probably have some latitude; don’t 
schedule them for 9 or 10am. If people ask to see you, say you are not 
available at those times, but that you are happy to see them at lunchtime 
or afterwards. And it’s good, when you are thinking of whether to drop 
into a colleague’s office, to be considerate about the time of day: are they 
likely to be working, or just doing work-related activities? Could this be 
sorted out over lunch or in the afternoon?
Why is the every-day rule so important? Well, there are only about 
200 working days a year, so 1 day is 0.5% of a year. Proper work is really 
hard. And we are lazy, weak creatures. We are not set up to forage in 
really hard ways when much easier ways of foraging are only a click of 
the browser button away; why would we be? If you allow that there is 
some set of circumstances X that permit starting the day without settling 
to proper work first, then you will manage to convince yourself that X 
obtains quite often: namely, whenever you are a bit tired or stressed; 
when the problem you are working on is getting difficult; or when 
your belief in your current project is a bit insecure. But not working 
on it today won’t solve any of these problems; indeed, will make them 
worse. One day without useful work rapidly becomes two or three, and 
then a whole week; then before you know it, your working practice has 
descended into undifferentiated low-value grazing on work-related 
activities, without really getting anywhere. That’s why the difference 
between amateur writers and professionals is that amateur writers 
write when they feel inspired, whilst professionals write every day. See 
your designated work time out each day, even if it means staring at the 
wall for an hour. 
2  For example, Newport, C. (2016). Deep Work: Rules for Focused Success In A Distracted 
World (New York: Grand Central).
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You may well say, it’s all very well for you to advocate this idyllic 
lifestyle, since you work at a nice university that gives you low teaching 
and administration burdens. True enough, but I make two observations. 
The first is that I know plenty of people who have lower teaching and 
administration burdens even than me, and still don’t get much done. 
The second is that your deep work doesn’t need to, and probably can’t, 
take many hours out of each day. Even one good hour per day would 
cumulate quite rapidly over the course of weeks and months. And 
surely you can carve out one hour per day? In fact, I find few historical 
examples where real work goes on for more than a few hours per day, 
even absent any other demands. Murakami writes in the morning and 
spends his afternoons training for his marathons, and the great G. H. 
Hardy would work for 3-5 hours on his mathematics, then take himself 
off to Fenners to watch the cricket. For those of you who enjoy palaeo-
bullshit, 3-5 hours a day was Marshall Sahlins’ suggestion for how much 
time humans spent working (i.e. foraging) in hunter-gatherer societies. 
The remainder was available for rest, social life, self-maintenance, 
and just being. This pattern, Sahlins teaches us, constitutes a form of 
affluence; not the affluence of the consumer society, but the affluence 
of doing a bit of the stuff that matters most deeply to you, and having 
simple wants beyond that.3 Once you have done your 3-5 hours, there is 
time for really talking unhurriedly to the people you work with; going 
to talks; having walks; understanding how to do something you don’t 
currently understand; or whatever. 
Daily deep work keeps the black dog away, for there is nothing 
worse for mood than the sense that one is not progressing. And it can 
spiral in a bad way: the more you feel you are not progressing, the 
worse you feel; the worse you feel the more your hours become non-
deep junk; and the more exhausted you are by non-deep junk hours, 
the less you progress. As they say up here, many a mickle makes a muckle. 
This translates roughly as: large things are composed of many small 
things. This is not a commitment of Northern folk to a particular kind 
of reductionism. Rather, in this context, it means that the biggest gains 
3  Sahlins, M. (1968). Notes on the original affluent society. In Man the Hunter. (R. B. Lee 
and I. DeVore eds., New York: Aldine Publishing Company, p. 85–89); Sahlins, 
M. (2009). Hunter-gatherers: Insights from a golden affluent age. Pacific Ecologist 
Winter 2009: 3–8, downloadable from: https://pacificecologist.org/archive/18/pe18-
hunter-gatherers.pdf
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to your overall productivity stem not from any macro-level great leap 
forward, but from small changes to your daily practice. If you make 
each and every day a bit more productive, then the months and years 
kind of take care of themselves. And if, as one colleague complained 
to me a while ago, you are putting in eighty hour weeks and still not 
getting your important goals achieved, then the answer is not to put in 
more hours: it is to put in fewer.
Commitment to deep work entails choices. It means not travelling 
to more than one or two conferences or workshops a year; not taking 
on peripheral involvement in collaborations extraneous to your main 
purpose; not filling up your diary with ‘it might be useful…’ training 
courses or committees; or applying for money you don’t really want 
or need. Saying no is hard; we worry about missing out on something, 
and about the social or reputational consequences of a refusal. In my 
experience, these are siren voices. It is better to be a polite ‘no’ than 
a ‘yes’ who turns out to be over-busy, late, and frustrated; better no 
application than one rushed together at the last minute. A phrase I find 
useful is ‘whilst I would love to, I do not have the capacity’. I enjoy its 
ambiguity, and it never leads to anything other than a sympathetic and 
understanding return message. 
Lesson 2. Cultivate modest expectations
A friend of mine talked to me years ago about how to start a theatre 
company. Hire a small cheap room and invite three people along, she 
said, then spend your time making work that means something to you. 
If two of the three people come along, that’s fine. Don’t sweat too much 
about getting West End producers to attend. As a foolish young man, I 
thought this was rather negative. What is wrong with these arts people? 
What’s the point of making work if hardly any one sees it? But now I 
am older I understand her wisdom. If you can manage not to care who 
comes, you can make the work with freedom and right mind. If you are 
worrying about whether the West End producers will show up (they 
probably won’t), then you can’t. And if your expectations are modest, 
you can not only meet, but sometimes exceed, them.
I was at a discussion meeting recently where a number of us from 
similar fields had been assembled. The organizer said at the outset 
that he thought together we could get a paper into the journal Science 
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(arguably the world’s most prestigious journal) from the discussions of 
the meeting. I asked what the paper would be about, and he replied 
that he didn’t know yet but he hoped it would become clear over the 
course of the two days. This, it seems to me, is the very antithesis of my 
theatre friend’s wisdom; it is focussing on the accolade and not what the 
accolade is an accolade for. The consequence is not just that we don’t 
have a paper in Science. We don’t have a paper at all.
I have never hit the heights of papers in Nature and Science. For a long 
time, this and other failures rankled. I know that it cost me at least one 
job, and there is the slightly uncomfortable feeling of being thought of as 
never having quite made the grade. There are two possible philosophies 
here: keep on trying, winners never give up, or find an inner sense of value 
in your work, rather than relying on glittering prizes. I respect and can see 
the logic of both philosophies, and people are very different in terms of 
what keeps them going. But I would be a card-carrying hippy if hippies 
weren’t so against the carrying of cards, so I think you can probably 
guess which one temperamentally attracts me. 
Why? Well, the glittering prizes we academics strive for are positional 
goods kept deliberately scarce by bureaucratic or commercial interests, 
and allocated in ways whose relationship to long-term value is probably 
quite weak. For example, Nature is a for-profit enterprise that rejects 
nearly everything in order to defend its exclusive market position. If we 
all send everything there, the rejection rate goes up. If we all increase the 
quality of our science, it still nearly all gets rejected, by the very design 
of the institution. The idea that all good papers can be in Nature or 
Science is as ludicrous as the idea that all Olympic athletes can get gold 
medals, but without the strong link between actual ability and finishing 
position that obtains in the Olympics. 
If you are in the habit of comparing yourself relative to peers or 
rivals against simple external yardsticks, your modal experience will be 
a feeling of failure (believe me, I’ve been there). For a start, the external 
comparators available to us all have right-skewed or ‘winner take all’ 
distributions. In such distributions, the median is always well below the 
mean. So most people look worse than average, and all but one person 
can find someone who is doing a lot better than them. Besides, there is 
an unhelpful asymmetry of information. You get new information on 
your own progress every day (have I published any new papers since 
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yesterday? No.). For your peers and rivals, you check their website 
maybe once a year (six new papers since I last looked!). So of course it 
looks like they are progressing better than you. But they may not be: 
you are just sampling less frequently for them than you are for yourself. 
The solution? How about trying not to think about it? 
There is a subtle issue here of the allocation of mental energy. My 
theatre friend’s modesty of aspiration came from a deep understanding 
that mental energy allocated to chasing the external trappings of success 
is not being allocated to the authenticity of the work. By trying to 
make a West End hit, you make something which is, at best, derivative 
of previous West End hits. Its capacity to be truly transformational 
is probably limited. Great art often begins on the fringe. Similarly, 
valuable future paradigms and innovative ideas start life in obscure 
places. Journal editors cannot yet see their potential, and the authors 
themselves are tentatively feeling their way into something new. So 
by focussing on capturing the established indicators of prestige, you 
distort the process away from answering the question that interests you 
in an authentic way, and into a kind of grubby strategizing. Or so I tell 
myself, admittedly through clenched teeth at times. 
In truth, the best things in my career have been fringe efforts, done 
in ludic spirit with no funding, and published in journals that base 
publication decisions on ethical and analytical soundness, not some 
editor’s hunch about whether something is a West End hit or not. This 
has allowed me licence to do what I thought was interesting, even 
though the big journals or regular funders would never look at them. 
Whether they stand the test of time, we won’t know until well after I 
am gone; but that would have been true too had they been published 
in Science or Nature. The outputs of which I am most proud are judged 
pretty much worthless in terms of the metrics like journal impact factor 
that universities obsess about. This hurts. However, I am consoled by 
the fact that there is a small band of people, spread across the world, 
who really get what I was trying to do, and think it is interesting. I 
know because they write to me; because they actually download and 
cite those papers a fair amount; and because as I get older I start to see 
tiny signs of my influence in their work. That’s the best I can hope for, 
and all I try to need. 
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Of course, your Dean might have a few words to say about your 
Stoic disavowal of impact factors, massive grant income, and what 
not. This is a difficult problem. It is important to understand that your 
Dean is not a bad person, or anti-intellectual; they are just relaying the 
pressures that are hitting them, on down the line. And they are right 
that our positions should not be sinecures: students and tax-payers pay 
our salaries, and are entitled to audit what they are getting. You should 
not go out of your way to avoid prestigious publications or grant income 
when the opportunity arises. It’s just that somehow those things have 
not to dictate your direction or self-worth; and you have to find a way of 
keeping going whether or not they come. I suppose I have had a happy 
knack of paying enough unto Caesar as to keep the Roman army off 
my back, but not so much that I lost my independence of spirit. A life I 
admire is that of Spinoza, who preferred to work a fraction of his time as 
a lens grinder than accept patronage or a university chair. This meant he 
could stay in the game on the strength of his lenses (which by all accounts 
were very fine), and pursue his philosophy with complete freedom and 
honesty. I am no lens grinder, but I try to pay my way in the world 
through a very steady flow of openly shared, thoughtful, workman-like 
science, even if most of it is not deemed stellar; trying to be a public 
communicator; being a good-enough teacher; and contributing my fair 
share to the common weal of university life. 
Lesson 3. Publish steadily 
I’ve been able to stay in the game despite not hitting the big metrics 
because I have always managed to publish one or two workman-like 
empirical papers every year, pretty much without exception. I have 
often done other stuff too: popular books, a textbook, reviews, more 
speculative ideas pieces and so on. But I do not depend on these other 
things. Every year, whether or not these other things happen, there is 
a peer-reviewed primary paper or two, not just with my name on, but 
actually written by me, with empirical data or original computation 
reported in it. This has been important both for avoiding the ‘exit 
academia’ arrows, and for keeping depression away.
I think the mistake a lot of people make is focussing too much on 
getting the big shot, the single career-establishing paper in a top journal, 
and therefore not quietly building up a solid, progressive portfolio of 
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sound work. Think of staying in the game as trying to keep your head 
above water. You can achieve this by giving a couple of small kicks with 
your feet per minute. Each of these only imparts a limited amount of 
energy, so if you follow this strategy, you can’t afford to miss a minute. 
If you do, you will start to sink, and your small kicks may not be enough 
to regain the surface. On the other hand, as long as you keep your 
small kicks regular enough, they will keep you smiling indefinitely. 
An alternative strategy is to come up with a super-duper big kick that 
will send you free of the surface for many hours. Good for you if you 
manage this, but on average, your attempts will fail (all mine have). 
So you spend a minute trying to devise your schmancy big kick, and 
during that minute, you haven’t produced any normal small kicks. That 
means you are a bit lower in the water, and so that big kick is going 
to have to be even bigger (hence, even less likely to succeed) when it 
comes. So you get even more focussed on making your big kick really 
big; this is hard, and absorbs all your attention, and another minute 
goes by in which your position in the water has declined very slightly. 
The danger is, of course, that in the end you reach the point where the 
kick you need to save yourself would be infinitely large.4 
I think my great strength is that I have always continued to produce 
something moderately useful, even when things weren’t going well, 
and even when the big, bold, transformative ideas I so hanker for have 
eluded me. This has kept my head comfortably above water—indeed, 
left time and energy to strive after other things too—whilst I watched 
cleverer people than me gradually disappear into the ‘in prep’ section of 
their CVs, never to return. Relatedly, although I have made many false 
forays on my journey, I have got something out of every foray I have 
made, be it a methods paper, a model, a review, or a minor empirical 
study. This is a good knack. So if you are worrying about staying the 
game, rather than planning your next Science publication, I would ask 
yourself where your 1-2 solid papers each year are going to come from. 
4  Devotees of foraging theory may recognise the spirit of David Stephens’ classic 
risk-sensitive foraging model here: Stephens, D. W. (1981). The logic of risk-
sensitive foraging preferences. Animal Behaviour 29: 628–9, https://doi.org/10.1016/
s0003-3472(81)80128-5. And there are also echoes of Dean Keith Simonton’s work 
showing that more successful creative people—whether in academia or the arts—
are distinguished from less successful people mainly by producing more stuff 
overall, even though much of it is minor. See: Simonton, D. K. (1997). Genius and 
Creativity: Selected Papers (Greenwich, CT: Ablex Publishing). 
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Just as you should not go a single day without proper work, you should 
not go a single year without publishing anything, as one year rapidly 
becomes three. 
Lesson 4: Get your hands dirty
Some people go into research because they enjoy the technical stuff: 
building and manipulating equipment, designing and carrying out 
experiments, being in the field, and so on. The problem these people 
have is that they under-invest in writing up everything they have done. 
They end up with mounds of unpublished data and cool techniques that 
have not really led to concrete outputs, and hence have not contributed 
to the field in the way they should. Other people conceive of the job 
of researcher as closer to the job of novelist. I don’t mean they make 
everything up. I mean that what excites them is the writing, the putting 
it all together into a text that manages to capture their varied manifold 
of ideas and observations satisfactorily. I am the writer type: what 
has always attracted me is authoring wide-ranging books, articles, 
syntheses. Laying out the big ideas. I am never happier than when I 
have a free morning with a laptop and a pot of tea. 
Whereas the technical type person only writes up as a last resort, to 
get the next round of funding or whatever, the problem with writers 
types like me is that we spend too much of our energy on the writing 
up. We view the gathering data as no more than background research, 
assembly of exemplary material for the writing we are doing. As a 
consequence we pick fruit that hangs too low: we end up using poor 
easy methods like online surveys, doing hasty secondary analyses of 
existing data, or just giving up the pretence and writing purely verbal 
papers that make various assertions in a sometimes appealing but often 
rather approximate manner. The only regret I have about my chequered 
career is that I have spent a bit too much energy on writing up—reviews, 
discursive papers—and not quite enough challenging myself by getting 
my hands dirty with primary research. 
It’s not that I don’t see the value of the verbal argument, the synthetic 
text. Quite the contrary. It’s that my verbal big ideas pieces, in the final 
analysis, have mostly not been quite good enough to be satisfying. 
Getting my hands dirty with difficult primary research helps me do 
them better. This is because science is a specific and concrete endeavour, 
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and hence doing the specific and the concrete is a way of disciplining 
one’s grasp of it. If you work on animal behaviour, then hours spent 
observing your animals are never wasted. If you do social research, 
then hours in your field site are what keep you sharp. And analysing 
your own data, as well as warding off dementia, brings the possibility 
of seeing new patterns and hence growing as a theorist as well as a 
data analyst. The mind fed on its own devices can become flabby and 
tendentious: only through a practice of repetitive confrontation with 
the primary phenomena we are allegedly talking about is it honed, and 
its confirmation biases challenged. Your animals or your people have a 
way of doing something you didn’t expect: this is the source of a new 
idea or interest. Your data will be messy, and will do a better job of 
refining your ideas than the peer-reviewers or conference debates can 
ever do. And I suppose, beyond all this, doing the primary activities of 
your research area is simply a way of keeping busy, keeping away from 
too many low-quality hours spent in front of a computer. It is a way of 
executing Robert Burton’s famous anti-depressant maxim: Be not idle!5 
Keeping your hands dirty also means learning how to do new things. 
And this is a good thing: the skills I picked up in graduate school could 
not possibly have sustained me this long. Learning new skills has always 
paid dividends of one kind or another; and stepping back from doing 
primary research myself has always been the point at which things have 
started to go less well. 
§
I learned lessons 1-4 by through making the best of an often-bad job. 
These are not necessarily good ways of being a researcher, I thought, so 
much as good ways of managing to remain a researcher despite being 
as neurotic, hyperactive and easily-discouraged an individual as I am. 
But, reading back over them, perhaps I am doing myself a disservice. 
Perhaps lessons 1-4 (or lesions 1-4, as my word processor seems to want 
to call them) are more generally useful. 
Take lesson 1, for example. Given the enormous increases in the 
efficiency with which we can gather and analyse scientific information 
in the last couple of decades, the productivity of the academy ought 
5  Burton, R. (original publication 1621), The Anatomy of Melancholy, What It Is: With All 
the Kinds, Causes, Symptomes, Prognostickes, and Several Cures of It.
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to have increased many-fold. I am not sure it has; even if the volume 
of output per researcher has increased, I doubt the depth has. This 
phenomenon is much discussed in the business literature under the 
name of the internet or Solow paradox: ‘You can see the computer age 
everywhere except in the productivity statistics’.6 For most academics, 
what the internet age has brought is mostly an increase in the available 
ways of treading water in low-quality work-related activities, without 
getting round to much real work. Apparently the average business email 
is read 6 seconds after being delivered. Given reasonable assumptions 
about the duration of undivided attention that useful thought requires, 
this means that on the modal day in a modern office (and probably 
university too), the amount of quality work done is…erm, none at all.7 
So if we all started our days with a few hours in which the internet was 
shut off and curfew was enforced, I think our outputs would increase 
dramatically in both quantity and quality. Interestingly, over the years 
I have read literally dozens of institutional plans for improvement in 
output. They are full of meaningless statements like: ‘We will focus 
on our core themes whilst also responding to strategic opportunities’ 
or ‘We will expand our teaching offer whilst increasing our research 
capacity’. In other words, there is no strategy at all. Never once have I 
read one that said: we won’t hold any meetings in the morning, so that 
staff can actually get some work done. I wonder why, since it is what 
might actually make some difference, and it would probably make us 
all nicer people to work with. 
Now consider lessons 2 and 3. People straining after high impact 
factors and flashy publications has a serious distorting effect on scientific 
knowledge, and reduces the efficiency of science. It means people over-
invest in under-powered, cute exploratory studies, and under-invest 
in well-powered confirmations. It leads to serious publication bias 
away from the null hypothesis, and consequent falsehood of much of 
what we find in the textbooks. It motivates researchers to oversell their 
story, and exercise degrees of freedom in what they report; and peer 
reviewers to focus on grandstanding and subjective value judgments, 
rather than providing technical verification and assistance to the 
6  Solow, R. (1987). We’d better watch out. New York Times Book Review July 12, p. 36.
7  See Alter, A. (2017). Irresistible: The Rise of Addictive Technology and the Business of 
Keeping Us Hooked (London: Penguin).
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authors in better understanding their data. It encourages secretiveness 
and competitiveness, rather than what science should be about, which is 
open sharing and collaboration. A bit more indifference to the glittering 
prizes, and more of a focus on creativity, integrity and openness, would 
be to our common good.8
And then we come to lesson 4. I recognize in myself that I have 
been overly tempted to perorate, at the expense of detailed empirical 
or computational work. Looking around, I can see a number of eminent 
people in my field who have made precisely the same mistake (they 
tend to be men, interestingly). They accept the quick and dirty from their 
lab or field site, or just give up on having a lab or field site at all, and 
carve a niche of sitting in their studies putting the discipline (or several 
disciplines) to rights in a stream of long-form verbal salads. Of course 
I see what motivates them to do this—here I am trying to do the same, 
after all. Look at Darwin, they say: it’s the big ideas pieces that change 
the world. Look at Darwin, I respond. Literally thousands of hours of 
experiments on barnacles, worm-casts, and the germination of seeds 
immersed in salt water for every big ideas piece he wrote. It’s the careful 
artisanal practice that makes the big ideas pieces really good when they 
come. The idea that you might only write big ideas pieces seems like an 
athlete choosing only to run track finals, and never training runs.
When I look at eminent colleagues who rose above the level of getting 
their hands dirty and became full-time commentators in the field, it 
seems to me that their ideas contributions started to get less valuable 
around the time their direct involvement in primary research reduced. 
Where formerly their thought was taut and rigorous, it became vaguer, 
flabbier, more programmatic, and more self-referential. They cherry-
picked their examples. Their ability to see both sides of the problem 
decayed. Empirical research, I like to think, is like an adversarial 
collaboration with reality. The mind is like the immune system; to 
function properly it needs to be constantly challenged by data. So if like 
me you are prone to covet big ideas and the freedom to spend all day 
8  For the critiques of current scientific practices on which this paragraph draws, see: 
Young, N. S., J. P.A. Ioannidis and O. Al-Ubaydli. (2008). Why current publication 
practices may distort science. PLoS Medicine 5, 1418-22, https://doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pmed.0050201; and Higginson, A. D. and M. R. Munafò (2016). Current 
incentives for scientists lead to underpowered studies with erroneous conclusions. 
PLoS Biology, 14: e2000995, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2000995 
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pontificating, it would probably not be bad to force yourself to spend, 
say, two thirds of your effort gathering and analysing primary data. 
It is not that you shouldn’t write your big ideas pieces. You should. 
It is that these will be improved by grappling between times with the 
real concrete problems of the working researcher. I like to think that 
Spinoza’s lens-grinding did more than buy him the freedom to pursue 
his philosophy. I like to think it made his philosophy better. 
On which note, I have spent too much time on this essay. I’ve got a 
data set that needs analysing. 
14. Morale is high 
(since I gave up hope)
…there ariseth in his soul many fears, and 
doubts, and discouraging apprehensions, 
which all of them get together, and settle in 
this place
–John Bunyan, The Pilgrim’s Progress
…for I feel in me
An inexpressive lightness, and a sense
Of freedom, as I were at length myself
And ne’er had been before. 
– John Henry Newman, The Dream of Gerontius
In April 2015, Richard Horton wrote as follows: ‘The case against science 
is straightforward: much of the scientific literature, perhaps half, may 
simply be untrue’. Horton goes on to provide a worrying charge-sheet: 
scientists typically leap to generalisations from overly small samples, 
and are abetted by the establishment in doing so; they pursue dubious 
trends for extra-scientific reasons; statistical inference is poor and 
formulaic; data are sifted to support predictions; predictions are altered 
to retrofit data (‘These are our values, and if you don’t like them…we 
have others!’); researchers are driven by the maximization of their own 
status metrics; there are often blatant conflicts of interest; universities 
behave like sweat shops for making more, rather than more credible, 
scientific outputs; scientific journals are for-profit entities that want to 
attract attention to their brand, not reveal the truth about the universe. 
The consequence is a scientific literature much of which we should be 
very careful about trusting.
Just what we needed, you may be thinking. Some anti-science 
nut, chaining together half-truths and conspiracy theories in order to 
undermine the case for more public investment in science, evidence-
based public policy, or the teaching of evolution. We need to be out 
© 2018 Daniel Nettle, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0155.14
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there defending the enlightenment and its progeny against this kind 
of flat-earth knavery, which has a very definite agenda of its own. But 
Richard Horton is most certainly not an anti-science nut. He’s the editor 
of The Lancet, one of the pre-eminent medical journals in the world. What 
he is reporting on in this particular editorial is a symposium involving 
the major funders of biomedical research, as well as some of the most 
senior individuals in the field, to consider ‘the idea that something has 
gone fundamentally wrong with one of our greatest human creations’.1 
That’s our real problem, you see: it’s not just the barbarians outside 
the gates saying that the empire is decadent and corrupt. Increasingly, 
there is unease among the citizens inside the gates too.2 This unease has 
been preoccupying me. I don’t just mean that I have been reviewing my 
own working practices to understand how they could be more robust, 
though I have been doing this. I mean something deeper: it has been 
affecting my morale, my ability to carry on. 
I attempted to go into science out of a very naïve, very pure and 
rather spiritual sense of love. I was always interested in the arts too, and 
in fact I worked in the arts for a few years. But I fell in love with science 
through the enchanting writings of authors such as Richard Dawkins 
and E. O. Wilson.3 I can hardly describe the exhilaration of learning 
about science from these masters: not just that it made the drugs and 
1 Horton, R. (2015). Offline: What is medicine’s 5 sigma? The Lancet 385: 1380, https://
doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(15)60696-1. By the way, the title of this essay comes from 
that of a show by Powder Keg theatre company, a show that was about searching 
for something to cling to amidst mess and uncertainty.
2  Non-exhaustive list of key references on science’s current troubles: Ioannidis, J. P.A. 
(2005). Why most published research findings are false. PLoS Medicine 2: 696-701, 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.0020124; Simmons, J. P., L. D. Nelson and 
U. Simonsohn. (2011). False-positive psychology: Undisclosed flexibility in data 
collection and analysis allows presenting anything as significant. Psychological 
Science 22: 1359-66, https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611417632; Prinz, F., T. Schlange 
and K. Asadullah. (2011). Believe it or not: How much can we rely on published 
data on potential drug targets? Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 10: 712, https://
doi.org/10.1038/nrd3439-c1; Open Science Collaboration. (2015). Estimating 
the reproducibility of psychological science. Science 349: aac4716, https://doi.
org/10.1126/science.aac4716; Smaldino, P. E. and R. McElreath. (2016). The natural 
selection of bad science. Royal Society Open Science 3: 160384, https://doi.org/10.1098/
rsos.160384; Higginson, A. D. and M. R. Munafò. (2016). Current incentives for 
scientists lead to underpowered studies with erroneous conclusions. PLoS Biology, 
14: e2000995, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.2000995; Young, N. S., J. P. A. 
Ioannidis and O. Al-Ubaydli. (2008). Why current publication practices may distort 
science. PLoS Medicine 5, 1418-22, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.0050201 
3  For example, Dawkins, R. (1998). Unweaving the Rainbow (Boston: Houghton Mifflin) 
and Wilson, E. O. (1998) Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Knopf).
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the computers work, not that it added to the size of the economy, but 
the sweeping intellectual and even aesthetic case that underpinned 
it. Science: an unbounded golden web of elegant theory, beautiful 
experimentation, and the best of the human potential. A shibboleth that 
makes us scientists different from, and, frankly, better than, creationists 
on one side, and postmodernists on the other. The ‘science’/’everything 
else’ division became for me, I now see, the division between the 
sacred and the profane, remade by these great writers in a new and 
astonishing way. Wilson, in Consilience, stated very clearly that science is 
a qualitatively distinct kind of activity from other expressions of human 
belief. Other belief systems may serve ‘psychological functions’, he 
concedes, but science is revolutionary in its ability to discover truth. The 
Enlightenment is a singularity, and science is a new phase of human life. 
This is why the current problems in science are so unsettling. 
To discover that the revolutionary sacred activity probably misses 
truth at least as often as it hits, not just through bad luck but through 
systematically stupid and bad behaviour; to discover that all kinds 
of ‘psychological functions’ such as confirmation bias, protection of 
fiefdom, the quest for status, exaggeration of a case in order to market a 
product, and so on, are deeply embedded in the one institution supposed 
to be different; what this adds up to is discovering that the ordinary, 
disappointing regularities of the profane are right there in the heart of 
the sacred. This poses the question ‘How can I carry on?’. Although 
various theories posit income-maximisation or cultural conformity as 
prime movers of human behaviour, my personal experience is rather 
different: people, including me, want to do things that they could readily 
justify to a jury of their peers (including, critically, the jury within). The 
personal cost of trying to do science rather than something else is very 
big. You have to feel convinced it is worth it. You need to know that the 
things you believe and promote have some validity. You need to feel 
sure that it isn’t all some kind of delusion, quackery, or racket. 
I have two questions today. The first is really the warm-up: how 
can we simultaneously accept the evidence that the actual practices of 
science are flawed, and its products often wrong; and yet hang on to the 
assurance that science is a special kind of activity whose long-term arc 
bends towards the truth? The second is the small matter of how, having 
answered the first question, we can best live.
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The first question turns out to be surprisingly easy. In order for the 
long-term arc of science to bend toward the truth, science does not 
have to be perfect. It only has generate a force that is on average very 
slightly stronger than the forces that hold human knowledge back. 
That’s how science can be both very similar to other kinds of human 
activities (shamanism, rhetoric, marketing and what not), and also 
revolutionarily different. Those other activities all generate a velocity 
slightly less than that needed for epistemic escape; science generates a 
velocity that is at least sometimes slightly greater. A small difference, 
with big consequences.
Let us spell this out with an example: powered flight. What was 
revolutionary about early powered aircraft is not that they were efficient. 
They weren’t. In fact, they were terrible. The vast majority of the energy 
they generated was wasted as heat. Of the energy they did manage to 
generate as motive force, very little was converted into lift. So the point 
was not that they were very good. They were about the worst devices 
for powered flight you could come up with, except for all the other 
devices that had been tried out in the history of humanity. For most of 
those earlier devices, the lift they produced was insufficient to exceed 
the pull of gravity. The early powered aircraft were only incrementally 
different, perhaps, but the increment was a consequential one: it was the 
increment that reversed the sign of difference between gravity and lift, 
not by much, and not always, but enough for something unprecedented 
to happen. And once the sign was reversed, once the planes took flight, 
their design could be gradually improved by the cumulative tinkering 
that characterises human culture. 
Let us return to science. It is not that the people, or even the institutions, 
that characterise science as a profession are so very different from any 
other body of people or institutions. It’s that somehow, the interaction of 
those people with those institutions has led to a slow accretion of better 
understanding of the world over long passages of time. Much of science’s 
energy is wasted: the ideas and the claims in any individual publication 
or even career mostly turn out to be nugatory. But the resultant of all 
the chaotic motion is a ratchet of gradually better understanding of the 
processes of the world. The good stuff is just slightly more likely than 
the bad stuff to be generated and retained, on average. The improving 
arc is more perceptible the further away you stand: close up, you only 
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see the individual sparks flying off in all directions, mostly not the right 
one. Only from afar do you see that there is a bit more energy going in 
one direction than in the others. Just as in the powered flight example, 
once a science has achieved some kind of lift off, its efficiency can be 
cumulatively improved. We should be putting as much energy into 
reforming methods (improving the efficiency of plane design) as we 
do into individual studies (going for a fly around). The current debates 
within the scientific community, the so-called ‘replication crisis’, should 
really be seen as discussions about how best to do this, not repudiations 
of the whole scientific enterprise. 
This view of science leads very naturally to seeing science-ness as 
a continuum. The best cases for the revolutionary nature of science 
can be made from physics, from chemistry, and from certain parts of 
basic biology. It’s no accident that the best cases made by Dawkins and 
Wilson come from those areas of science. The day-to-day reality of my 
working life, though, comes from the study of behaviour and society, 
where the situation is rather less decisive. If lift routinely and decisively 
exceeds gravity in physics and chemistry, then the two forces are much 
more nearly equal in the social and behavioural sciences. Where the 
two forces are about equal, there is a lot of scope of bump along with 
bad ideas persisting too long; multiple incompatible views being held 
simultaneously; fads that appear and vanish like the morning mist; and 
rhetoric, ideology, and social influence determining the disposition of 
the field. That’s why professional disputes are often so prolonged and 
so bitter in social and behavioural fields: because, as it were, the stakes 
are so low. Still, we have to hold on to the hope that even in these fields, 
the arc towards the truth proves a bit stronger than the will to power in 
the very long term. 
§
The problem of how to live, as a scientist, is the following one. You need 
faith in order to be able to do the work. Faith that what you are doing 
is sensible and worthwhile. Faith that you have the right methods and 
design. Faith that the patterns you see could be real patterns. Faith that 
the way you have analysed your data is a sensible way. Faith that the 
arguments you make are good arguments, and important ones. You need 
faith in all these things because the whole process is genuinely difficult, 
and very slow; you are constantly knocked off course by obstacles and 
236 Hanging on to the Edges
distractions; peer reviewers can be quite gratuitously unpleasant, as 
well as sloppy; rejection is designed in to the process; and employment 
conditions are often less than ideal. So if you do not have sufficient faith 
in what you are doing, you will quite sensibly walk away. 
Yet science is a system of organized scepticism. Faith is the one thing 
you should never have. The view of science I have sketched in the last 
few pages suggests that, rationally, you should make the pessimistic 
meta-induction: the specifics of the thing you are working on will 
probably not turn out to be as you believe them to be; your results will 
probably not replicate; your methods will appear naïve and flawed to 
a future generation; and the world will not turn out to be quite as you 
contend. It’s a hard thing to pull off this trick: enough conviction to get 
up and go to work every morning, enough scepticism to remain a good 
scientist. 
The way most successful scientists solve this is very simple: they 
have faith in their own work, and relentless scepticism about everyone 
else’s.4 It’s much like the large majority of car drivers who apparently 
believe their driving to be better than average. But we are all grown-
ups here: we should know that we can’t all be better than average. 
The lesson I take from the replication crisis is not that there are few 
bad apples in science who should be pilloried. It’s that we’ve all been 
doing bad science, probably still are, in myriad banal ways that are so 
habitual that we don’t even realise their significance. The very fact we 
can’t see anything wrong with our own practices is precisely the point. 
Though we understand that others might fudge the theory, hypothesise 
after the results are known, exercise researcher degrees of freedom, or 
torture the analysis in search of the ‘significant’ p-value, it doesn’t feel 
like we ourselves do it. But we must concede there are thousands of tiny 
judgements involved in the writing of every single paper, the analysis of 
every dataset, and these are not generally recorded in any public ledger. 
And the thing about self-deception is that you are always the last person 
to know. 
The prospect of patterns in my empirical work not replicating holds 
a particular awfulness for me, a feeling of bleeding slowly to death. And 
just as I ought to expect, there have been some instances of it. Let me give 
you an ongoing example. Melissa Bateson, myself, and colleagues had 
4  This brings us back to the essay with which this book began: How my theory explains 
everything: And can make you happier, healthier and wealthier, this volume.
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a beautiful finding in starlings. We’d been measuring a physiological 
marker that relates to future life expectancy. (The marker is called 
developmental telomere shortening, and it measures how much the 
telomeres—the DNA caps on the ends of chromosomes—of red blood 
cells shorten over the bird’s early life. More shortening predicts shorter 
subsequent life.) We then conducted a behavioural experiment in which 
we assessed how impulsive the birds were; how strongly they preferred 
a small but immediate reward to a larger reward for which they had 
to wait longer. It’s basically the famous ‘marshmallow test’, but for 
starlings. 
In our first experiment, we found that birds with more developmental 
telomere shortening were also more impulsive. But of course, that makes 
perfect sense: if you are going to live longer, you can afford to wait, 
whereas if your life-span is limited, you’d better take what you can get 
now. It is compelling; somehow the birds can detect their own somatic 
state, and set their behavioural priorities accordingly. This beautiful 
result became a much-cited publication. 
We have repeated the experiment twice more, in different sets of 
birds.5 Figure 6 shows the results in the form of what is known as a 
cumulative meta-analysis. To orient you, the first row on the figure 
shows the result of the first experiment, described as ‘2012’ because 
that is the year the birds hatched. The square indicates that there 
was an association between developmental telomere shortening and 
impulsivity in that experiment with a regression coefficient of around 
0.5 (zero means no association; the larger the coefficient, the stronger 
the positive association). The horizontal whiskers show the 95% 
confidence interval for that coefficient; the zone in which, in light of 
the experiment’s findings, we should believe that the ‘true’ association 
between developmental telomere shortening and impulsivity in 
starlings falls. 
5  The sources for this section are as follows. 2012 birds: Bateson, M. et al. (2015). 
Developmental telomere attrition predicts impulsive decision-making in adult 
starlings. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 282: 20142140, https://
doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2014.2140; 2013 birds: Nettle, D. et al. (2015). Developmental 
and familial predictors of adult cognitive traits in the European starling. Animal 
Behaviour 107: 239–48, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2015.07.002; 2014 birds: 
Dunn, J. et al. (2018). Early-life begging effort and adult body condition affect choice 
impulsivity in the European starling (Sturnus vulgaris). Unpublished manuscript: 
Newcastle University.
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Our first follow-up experiment was on another cohort of birds 
hatched in 2013. The second row on the figure shows the association and 
its 95% confidence interval when the data from the 2012 and 2013 birds 
are combined. We then performed another follow-up on a cohort of birds 
hatched in 2014. The third row adds the data from these birds in to the 
other two cohorts. I think you can see what is happening. As we gather 
more data, the apparent strength of the association is bleeding away 
toward zero. (For God’s sake, don’t anyone do a fourth experiment!) 
The pattern shown in figure 6—the first-published associations are the 
strongest, and as more evidence comes in, the overall association gets 
weaker and weaker—is frequently found in scientific literatures. It is 
attributed to differential likelihood of flukily strong early results being 
published and getting notice, followed by the gradual dilution of these 
early outliers by more typical replications. But to achieve it within your 
own lab, well that’s quite something. 
Figure 6. Forest plot from a cumulative meta-analysis of three successive experiments on 
developmental telomere shortening and impulsivity in starlings. The squares and whiskers 
indicate the regression coefficient of the association between developmental telomere 
shortening and impulsivity, and its 95% confidence interval. These are also shown as 
numbers on the right. The first row represents the experiment on the 2012 birds alone; the 
second row the 2012 and 2013 birds combined; and the third row the 2012, 2013 and 2014 
birds combined. 
Rationally, I don’t think we have anything to reproach ourselves for. 
We asked a fair question, and Nature is answering in her own sweet 
time. There might still be something to our initial finding. Actually, 
even though the impulsivity results have not held up as we hoped, we 
have found evidence from other, different behavioural tasks suggesting 
that birds’ behaviour may be related to their future life expectancy, 
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as measured by developmental telomere shortening.6 The follow-up 
impulsivity experiments are not exact replications of the original (the 
developmental histories of the birds were rather different in the three 
cohorts, and in 2014 the impulsivity measure was different too). Perhaps 
we have hit upon some interesting and real heterogeneity. And we have 
not tried to suppress or massage away the inconsistency of the results: 
we should perhaps get some credit for this. But still: it’s devastating, 
and it keeps me awake at night. Why?
Part of the reason is to do with the usual human concerns: self-
consciousness about reputation, status and apparent competence. 
Feeling like no-one will ever believe anything I say again. I am the first 
scientist in my family (when a teacher suggested at a parent-teacher 
evening that I should consider further study of mathematics, my father 
queried whether they were discussing the correct child). I have never 
felt quite at ease in the august and self-confident circles in which I can 
nowadays move, so there is more than a hint of the imposter’s fear of 
being found out. I think of my dream-friend Franz Kafka. The key to 
understanding Joseph K.’s odd passivity when his accusers arrive at his 
door in The Trial is that somewhere in his heart, he already suspected he 
was guilty. In some diffuse way, he was expecting it. He just didn’t yet 
know what it was he was guilty of.7 
But there is more to it than this. When you analyse a dataset, there is 
a lot of tedious merging and cleaning and preliminary analysis. Then at 
a certain point, you try an analysis or two, and suddenly see a pattern. 
That moment is psychologically completely and utterly compelling. 
The pattern jumps out at you with a concrete and immanent reality. 
You instantly grasp why that is the pattern that makes sense, that made 
sense all along. This is an example of what Nick Chater calls the ‘grand 
illusion’ of consciousness: when our minds alight on a belief or percept, 
it feels as if we had always had that belief or percept there, waiting in 
6  Nettle, D. et al. (2015). Developmental and familial predictors of adult cognitive traits 
in the European starling. Animal Behaviour 107: 239–48, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
anbehav.2015.07.002; Andrews, C. et al. (2018). A marker of biological ageing 
predicts adult risk preference in European starlings, Sturnus vulgaris. Behavioral 
Ecology 29: 589–97, https://doi.org/10.1093/beheco/ary009
7  He still didn’t know as he was being repeatedly stabbed to death in a quarry. This 
is possibly an analogy I should not extend too far. 
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the mental depths to be brought into the foreground. No matter that, in 
reality, the brain may have fabricated it that very instant.8 
It’s very hard to tell yourself, in the grip of the grand illusion, that 
the result may be a fluke; that you may have tortured the dataset until 
it confessed to something; that your prediction has shifted and you are 
rationalizing yourself after the fact. When someone else’s subsequent 
experiment, or your own, fails to reproduce the finding, it is as 
unnerving as the discovery that a conversation you had yesterday was 
in fact a hallucination. But I saw it! The p-value was there! Oh please, let 
me not be mad! 
§
When middle-aged scientists go through replication crises, some turn to 
drink, some to drugs, some to Bayesian statistics. I have been turning to 
Buddhism. I can’t say I have got very far (aren’t there a lot of numbered 
lists?). Nonetheless, there are some elements of Buddhist thought that 
seem like they could come in handy in getting papers written and 
equanimity preserved. 
At the heart of Buddhist thought, as far as I understand it, lies a 
network of linked ideas. The first, expressed in the first noble truth, is 
that living is synonymous with suffering, or at least, exposure to the 
possibility of suffering (dukkha). This is because, in living, we crave 
and are attached to—indeed are fuelled by—worldly things that are 
by their nature impermanent and likely to fail us or fade away. These 
worldly things include pleasure, material goods, status and renown, but 
also beliefs and habits. To the extent that we condition our happiness 
on obtaining or maintaining these things, we are locked into a cycle 
of endless living-suffering (samsara), because pleasures always fade, 
beliefs turn out to be wrong (see figure 6), and status is never enough. 
This is the bad news, but the good news follows: once we recognise 
the reality of suffering, and its causes, we see that it can also cease, and 
that there is an available route to liberating ourselves from it. This route 
requires nothing other than enlightenment of our minds. We achieve 
the liberation not by satisfying our attachments and cravings, which 
would after all just bind us further into samsara, but by living according 
8  Chater, N. (2018). The Mind is Flat: The Illusion of Mental Depth and the Improvised 
Mind (London: Penguin).
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to the eight-fold (or just possibly three-fold, or 8 x 3 = 24-fold) noble 
path.9 This path consists of right speech, right action, right livelihood, 
right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration, right view, and right 
resolve. Basically, trying to live mindfully, wisely and well. The noble 
path leads directly to the release from the compulsory cycle of desire, 
striving, attachment and suffering known as nirvana (often translated in 
US English as ‘tenure’). 
The noble path is not just asceticism. The Buddha certainly rejected 
living by trying to fulfil one’s cravings as unprofitable and painful; but 
he rejected a life of extreme austerity and self-mortification too, on the 
same grounds. After all, attachment to austere ritual, to self-denial, is 
just another form of attachment. Instead he proposed the middle way: 
in the world, of the world, yet trying to navigate it nobly. 
Before I completely lose any credibility I had, I would invite you 
to consider the above doctrine not as supernatural or even religious, 
but as a set of rules of thumb for living worked out over centuries 
by thoughtful members of a smart species of ape.10 A species with no 
single mental governor, but whose mind consists of a noisy parliament 
of different and perfectly explicable motivations—for resources, for 
reputation, for sex, for power, for avoiding danger—which together 
conspire to produce powerful patterns of habit and thought, patterns 
that can in the long term produce interpersonal and intrapersonal 
problems. But this same species of ape also, for extraordinary but 
not supernatural reasons, possesses a surprising capacity for offline 
reflection and reasoning, a capacity that can be used to calm fractious 
disputes and reach wise compromises, including, critically, disputes 
and compromises within the parliament of the mind. The first noble 
truth reminds us that our very real and natural motivations can make 
us disappointed or miserable and cause us problems; the noble path 
reminds us that we have mental resources to deal with these problems, 
and it’s a good idea to practice using them. 
Let’s apply some of these ideas back to the life of the scientist. To 
be a scientist is synonymous with suffering, or at least exposure to 
9  See Hanh, T. N. (1998). The Heart of Buddha’s Teaching: Transforming Suffering into 
Peace, Joy and Liberation (New York: Random House).
10  This is the approach of Jonathan Haidt’s 2006 book The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding 
Truth in Ancient Wisdom (New York: Basic Books).
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the possibility of suffering. The reasons for this are part banal—we all 
want the big grant, the big promotion, our papers to be accepted in the 
selective journals, but we can’t all achieve this. Others will succeed and 
mostly we will fail. There are more metaphysical reasons, too: the beliefs 
and hypotheses to which we devote thousands of difficult hours of our 
lives will more often than not turn out to be wrong. We won’t know 
this for a very long time, perhaps never, and, individually, will have 
very little control over how it turns out. So we must live with doubt and 
uncertainty about the aspects of our lives that are more important to us 
than anything else. And what we achieve always, in my experience, falls 
short of what we hoped to achieve: as E. O. Wilson put it, all scientists 
‘are children of Tantalus, frustrated by the failure to grasp that which 
seems within reach’.11 Thus, if we base our well-being on getting what 
we crave, or attachment to what we have done before, we can never be 
really satisfied, for we are trying to hold on to a will o’the wisp. 
Faced with this dilemma, two courses suggest themselves. The first 
is equivalent to the life of hedonic gratification: in the long run, no-one 
knows who is going to be right, and I won’t be around to find out 
anyway, so I will just make as good a career for myself as I can. Consider 
researchers of type A. They make a big name for themselves with their 
seminal Hypothetical Attachment Theory (HAT), or whatever. They make 
the positive case for HAT in big idea piece after big idea piece. They 
churn out empirical studies, and present them in the best pro-HAT light 
the peer reviewers will let them get away with. The studies are as good 
as they need to be, but no better. They aggressively confront journal 
editors who reject their papers. When peer-reviewing, they recommend 
‘reject’ if the authors do not cite enough HAT references, and that is 
nearly always. They know who their rivals are and make sure to rubbish 
their grants so that they do not get funded. As the evidence accumulates 
that HAT is probably old hat, they dismiss the criticisms as ill-founded 
or personally motivated. They defend their dung-hills. They see the 
exchange of academic views as a social game to be won. It is because 
senior people are type-A researchers that science sometimes seems to 
advance, in the famous paraphrase of Max Planck, one funeral at a time. 
It is obvious that type-A researchers suffer from grasping attachment: 
11 Wilson, E. O. (1998). Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Knopf, p. 3).
 24314. Morale is high (since I gave up hope)
to status, power and their habits of thought. They are locked into the 
samsara of revise and resubmit, busy-work, dogma and self-promotion. 
Now consider researchers of type B. All too aware of the possibility 
of error and luck, they are desperately cautious about what they will 
publish. They always want to take more time over everything. They 
need more data, another replication, before they will show their results 
to the world. They always need to do more reading, in case there is 
something they have missed. And when they do write, there are caveats 
on their caveats: their papers will not come down strongly for any 
position, all too aware that to do so might lead to saying something that 
could turn out to be wrong. The type-B approach is also problematic. 
Science could not work if everyone followed it. The dynamism of science 
emerges from it being a vigorous and passionate conversation, with 
people willingly sticking their heads above the parapet with interesting 
data and the strongest possible advocacy of particular ideas. And, less 
obviously, researchers of type B are suffering from grasping attachment 
too, like the ascetics criticized by the Buddha. In fact, it’s another form 
of egotism. They crave a kind of certainty and definitiveness that we can 
never really have; they are too attached to their own self-image, their 
personal comfort and their rituals of scholarship to be prepared to let 
the ideas and the data speak for themselves. 
You can see where I am going here: towards the middle way, and 
a path to the cessation of suffering. The middle way is where we are 
quite prepared to put out what we have done, including strong and 
principled, even passionate, arguments for what we think it means 
theoretically; yet on the other hand we are open to changing our minds at 
a moment’s notice; we encourage alternative views and welcome those 
whose starting point is different from our own; we are quite prepared 
to say when we were wrong, and patient to say why if we still think we 
might be right. Really it comes down to humility and openness: Open 
sharing of our data, openness about what operations and analyses we 
have performed, openness to sticking a preprint out there that turns 
out to be ill-informed, openness to alternative views, openness to trying 
to see things a different way. The eight-fold noble path (right speech, 
right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right 
concentration, right view, and right resolve) is a pretty good recipe for 
making contemporary science not just more effective, but also a nicer 
244 Hanging on to the Edges
place to live. We need to provide both the incentives and the social 
norms that encourage this kind of nobility, and discourage its opposite. 
§
What, then, of nirvana? This is often translated as ‘release from the cycle 
of existence’. I have always struggled a little with this. Many of my very 
favourite things depend rather heavily on me existing. So why would I 
follow a path whose best-case scenario is self-obliteration? This question, 
in the general case, is rather above my eschatological pay-grade, but we 
can make a useful translocation of the nirvana concept for science. In 
fact, there is a surprising link to Karl Popper, of all people. 
In contemplating the human capacity for reasoning, and hence 
science, Popper made the following point (and in doing so revealed 
himself as a better philosopher than zoologist). When most animals 
hold a false belief, it can lead to their deaths (think of a deer with a false 
belief about which species are dangerous predators, or a false belief 
about which food is safe to eat). So the stock of beliefs is only improved 
by the cycle of birth (which introduces variation in beliefs), and death 
(which disposes of the false ones). The miracle of being human rather 
than being some other kind of animal is that the deaths of our ideas 
can become decoupled from our own deaths. We can represent ideas 
symbolically, then debate, converse, test, adjudicate, modify, falsify, 
and eventually reject them, all in relative safety. We can, as Popper put 
it, ‘let our false theories die in our stead.’12 This opens up the possibility 
of an adaptive evolution of ideas, with a generation time much faster 
than our biological generations, but giving ideas an eventual lifetime 
that could be much longer than our own. Ideas take on a life of their 
own. Science, perhaps above all else, is the commitment to fostering 
this artificial life: ideas proliferating, mutating, recombining, dying 
and becoming immortal in the rich, distributed ecology of the scientific 
literature. 
What does this have to do with nirvana? The following: what is it 
that a scientist can most sincerely hope for? What most can sustain him 
in feeling that it was all worthwhile? It is not being right. It is not being 
the cleverest. It is that the ideas to which he devoted his life ultimately 
12  Magee, B. (2010). Popper (London: Fontana, p. 64). 
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released him from their cycle of birth and death. Those ideas began 
to evolve on their own, in ways he could not predict, through other 
people, through artefacts and dusty books, through conversations 
in coffee shops, through different technologies or social institutions, 
through a shy student’s first moment of enchantment. This possibility 
is profoundly and existentially comforting though, paradoxically, the 
person for whom it is comforting vanishes from the picture. 
This is what I think. It’s a long old game. If I stick at it well enough, I 
will cease to matter. I will sooner or later disappear to the hills, another 
wind-lined Pennine man; inconclusive; increasingly vague; stalwart of 
the local choral society; heft gradually diminishing through ordinary 
somatic processes. But maybe I’ll know that, somewhere in the world, 
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Pat Bateson died half way through the writing of Hanging on to the 
Edges. Some of it might have puzzled him: his pre-replication-crisis 
generation was less afflicted than mine is with doubt and uncertainty 
about their science (or maybe that’s just how Cambridge people are). But 
much of it—on the active role of the individual organism, on the need 
to transcend the boundaries between the ‘biological’ and the ‘social’, 
on the aspiration of science to do good in the world—is a testament 
to what he believed in, and patiently argued for, over many years. He 
influenced me both directly and indirectly.
Finally, my greatest thanks, and my love, go to Melissa Bateson, 
my inspiration, principal scientific collaborator, spouse, and fellow 
adventurer. 
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